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Abstract

UNCOVERING THE PROGRESS OF PLANNING FOR VULNERABILITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE
AND COASTAL STORMS: A PLAN EVALUATION OF NORFOLK, VA & NEW YORK CITY
By Eric Karl Borchers, Master of Urban and Regional Planning
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Urban and Regional
Planning at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2017.
Major Director: Meghan Z. Gough, PhD, L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs

In response to recent storms like Superstorm Sandy and sea-level rise influenced by climate change, cities,
particularly those located at the coast, have taken initiative to combat these growing threats with adaptive
urban planning. Although civilians residing in susceptible neighborhoods are often the most vulnerable
socioeconomically, there has been minimal evidence that planning has accounted for the characteristics of
vulnerability. This thesis evaluates the recent planning efforts and vulnerability of Norfolk, VA and New
York City to gauge the progress being made toward reducing citizen vulnerability and raising adaptability
and preparedness. The most recent peer-reviewed research is consulted to forge the evaluation framework
and also to recognize breakthroughs and conformity. After analyzing the performance of the sets of
planning documents in both cities, it is evident that the ability to effectively plan for the public’s
vulnerability is contingent in part on inter-governmental capacity, but more specifically on disaster
experience.

Chapter 1. Introduction
Extreme flooding caused by the one-two punch of coastal storms and sea-level rise constantly
threatens to undercut the balance or aggravate the imbalances in society. Floods themselves are
characterized as a hazard to communities but events that are devastating enough to severely
disrupt life in communities are classified as natural disasters. Predicting the timing, severity and
positioning of these disasters is an enigmatic task. What can however be anticipated is the people
and places that are more likely to face their wrath and are unarguably predisposed to natural
disasters. Under that very nature, people and their exposed places are specifically defined as
vulnerable to extreme flooding. The planning profession, with the aid of government at all three
levels, has championed a range of efforts to combat the present and future impacts of flooding in
urban jurisdictions. To what degree these efforts are able to shift the tide whenever a disastrous
flood strikes, in communities with the least political and economic power, from a scene of deeprooted recovery to one of burgeoning opportunity is inconclusive.
To shed light on the consideration for social dynamics of cities on the front lines of the perpetual
battle against extreme flooding events, I meticulously evaluate the planning efforts in Norfolk,
VA and New York City. Both cities have experienced coastal storms declared federal disasters
since 2010, both are prone to rising sea-levels influenced by climate change, and both have
fought tirelessly to combat their impacts. This plan evaluation centered on the momentum in
Norfolk and New York City aims to better unveil to what degree plans are fostering resilience in
communities most vulnerable to the impacts of coastal storms and sea-level rise. The plan
evaluation and hazards planning literature distinctly lay out a foundation for goals, fact base,
strategies, coordination, participation and implementation in plans that is most directly
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associated with reducing vulnerability to sea-level rise and coastal storms. Both cities have
pursued the wide range of planning approaches like regenerative design, climate adaptation, risk
reduction and mitigation, and disaster recovery to attempt to shape a future that is resilient even
to worst case scenarios. Further evidence in the literature communicates characteristics of local
communities such as low levels of income that make them most susceptible to these disasters.
The evaluated plans are vessels of long-range planning efforts to prepare for and adapt to sealevel rise and coastal storms. Both threats are identified as pervasive obstacles to resilience in
each city currently and in the future, and in many other cities around the world. I consult the
planning literature to forge the framework for evaluating the content and quality of plans and
their ability to engender resilience in vulnerable locations. To equate the plan evaluation with
vulnerable neighborhoods, I synthesize available information and data to formulate a
vulnerability index that pinpoints areas of alarming vulnerability in each city from a social,
physical and geographic perspective. Recent literature combined with the evaluation results
begin to unveil the persistent barriers and limitations undercutting the ability of plans to
successfully plan for vulnerable groups, and where areas of greatest emphasis in these recent
planning endeavors lie.

1.1 Rationale
In response to recent “storms of the century” like Superstorm Sandy, that devastated the New
York metro region, and Hurricane Katrina, experts have warned of an uptake in extreme weather
on the horizon. The frequency and intensity of certain types of weather events can be attributed
to a globally changing climate that is already affecting the United States and abroad. Risks from
climatic events such as flooding, sea level rise, extreme weather, and higher temperatures are
concentrated in urban areas (Melillo, Richmond, & Yohe, 2014). Storms and other extreme
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weather events have been described by some as social equalizers, however in actuality these
events exacerbate underlying economic inequities (Weiss, Weldman, & Bronson, 2012).
The vulnerability of urban residents and communities to disasters is influenced by pronounced
social inequalities reflecting age, ethnicity, gender, income, health, and mobility. Climate risks
threaten urban infrastructure, flows of goods and services, natural resources, health, and
livelihoods, especially in vulnerable low-income areas (IPCC, 2014; Melillo et al., 2014). Lowincome communities, specifically, have a high degree of vulnerability from a housing
perspective, where residents are more likely to be confronted with poor-quality housing and
infrastructure. Low-income housing is more vulnerable to extreme weather, is often located in
areas with a high chance of experiencing extreme weather, and requires extensive rebuilding
efforts (Baussan, 2015). Vulnerability, generally, refers to the propensity or predisposition of a
population or group to suffer harm or be adversely affected by a hazard event (Glavovic &
Smith, 2014). Risk levels from hazardous events will continue to rise unless cities are prepared
to manage disaster risks and adapt to them (IPCC, 2014).
Responses to climate change have, before recently, focused narrowly on energy efficiency and
mitigation. The fight has since expanded to include adaptation as local governments become
motivated by an understanding of the climate related risks and vulnerabilities that their city will
face in the future (Aylett, 2014). By 2015, there were more than 90 cities in the U.S engaged in
either the early scoping stage, the planning and analysis stage, or the implementation stage of
climate adaptation planning (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). Despite the heightened perception that
adaptation to climate hazards and disasters is an integral part of future planning, the inclusion of
adaptation with respect to vulnerable sub-populations remains low across all actions. A
vulnerability approach is a practical way to assess risks because it confines the analysis to people
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and communities, which in turn allows planners to devise place-based adaptation strategies.
These strategies alleviate adversity in local areas while making effective use of scare resources
(Rumbach & Kudva, 2011). Progress is budding for adaptation initiatives drawn from impact and
vulnerability assessments and adaptation research, though in practice a gap in understanding still
persists (Ford et al., 2011; Lesnikowski et al., 2015).
Lack of a public constituency has been a major impediment to action on public risks. In the case
of climate adaptation, a lack of awareness cannot explain this deficiency. A low level of priority
for action consistently accompanies a moderate-to-high level of awareness. Much of the public is
aware of the risks of climate change and natural hazards but assigns low priorities to taking
action. The perceptions are consistent with the temporal and geographic remoteness, broad
distribution of risk, and limited individual understanding associated with public risks (Berke &
Lyles, 2013). Arguably, the same is true of planning for disaster recovery. Natural disasters fall
into a general class of planning issues like public risks that have a weak public constituency.
Unlike issues that attract broad public interest, such as transportation improvements or
neighborhood revitalization, disaster recovery lacks stakeholders who appreciate the issues and
are actively engaged to deal with them. Lack of support may be because the costs of recovery
planning are immediate, benefits are long-term and uncertain, and the physical manifestations of
planning are not visible until after disaster occurs (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney,
2014).
In southeastern Virginia, Norfolk and the Hampton Roads region has garnered formidable state
and national attention regarding sea-level rise. The coastal geography combined with regional
land subsidence has led the region to experience the highest rate of sea-level rise on the East
Coast. Since 1930, mean sea level has risen 14.5 inches in the region, compared with a global
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average rise of eight inches since 1875 (ULI Advisory Services Panel, 2014; McFarlane, Coastal
Resiliency: Adapting to Climate Change in Hampton Roads, 2013; VIMS, Center for Coastal
Resources Management, 2013). At this rate of sea-level rise, the Hampton Roads region is the
U.S.’ second largest population center at risk from sea level rise after only New Orleans
(Mitchell, Stiles, & Hartley, 2014; Virginia Coastal Zone Management Program, 2008;
Tompkins & DeConcini, 2014). Considering the extent of development in harm’s way, the
Norfolk-Virginia Beach Metropolitan Area ranks 10th globally in value of assets exposed to an
increase in flooding from sea-level rise (Tompkins & DeConcini, 2014).
Despite how vulnerable the region is to flooding from rising water and coastal storms, Hampton
Roads is in a profitable position to plan proactively for eminent disaster. Impacts on the region
from recent major storms have been on the milder side, yet other locations like New York and
New Orleans, that have been swept into the fight against these dangers, have served as wake-up
calls for the rest of the country. Norfolk and Hampton Roads can simultaneously draw
inspiration from these trailblazing cities as well as call upon the proliferating research field on
hazards like coastal storms and sea-level rise.

1.2 Background
1.2.1 Norfolk
Being cited by experts that their region is highly susceptible to sea-level rise and coastal storms,
regional government organizations, private industry and institutions of higher education in
Hampton Roads have coalesced to derive the risks and causes of coastal flooding on their
localities. Consequently, they have begun to identify ways to adapt to sea level rise. On the
global scale, sea level rise is directly attributed to the amount of warming experienced from rise
in both land and ocean temperatures. The rate of increase in sea levels locally in the Hampton
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Roads Region is notably greater than the global rate because of both natural and anthropogenic
causes.
1.2.1.1 Flooding & Sea-Level Rise
Two main forces that affect all sub-regions, are accounting for the disparity in the rate of sea
level rise locally; one being ocean currents and the other, land subsidence (McFarlane, 2012;
VIMS, Center for Coastal Resources Management, 2013). The Atlantic Ocean current that flows
northward along the east coast tends to transport water away from the coast as it curves to the
right, though recent analyses have posited that as the ocean warms, this current slows and
suppresses the rate that water is pushed away in this manner (VIMS, Center for Coastal
Resources Management, 2013). In some parts of the world where the ground is uplifting faster
than the global rate of sea level rise, the sea is actually retreating relative to built infrastructure.
In Hampton Roads, however, the sea is encroaching on the built environment and this
phenomenon is exacerbated by land subsidence occurring from separate unrelated sources
(McFarlane, 2012; McFarlane, 2013).
Scientists have pinpointed these three effects being glacial isostasy, sliding of sediment toward
the Chesapeake Bay Impact Crater, and sediment compaction from groundwater withdrawal.
With these three effects in combination the consequence is a doubling of the rate of relative sea
level rise as subsidence has been identified as accounting for one-half to two-thirds of
experienced rise (McFarlane, 2012; VIMS, Center for Coastal Resources Management, 2013). In
a survey of emergency managers in the region, about half of respondents claimed portions of
their locality flooded during normal high tides, three-quarters that areas flooded during extreme
high tides, and nearly all that their localities flooded during large storms. While coastal flooding
is an observed issue for almost all municipalities in Hampton Roads, less than half of emergency
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managers view sea level rise as a contributor to these problems (VIMS, Center for Coastal
Resources Management, 2013). Separate detailed analyses conducted by the Virginia Institute of
Marine Science and researchers at Old Dominion University revealed that not only has sea level
rise been greater than the global average, but it has increased from a rate of 1 to 3 mm per year to
4 to 10 mm per year as of 2011 and is accelerating at rate of 0.30 mm/year² (McFarlane, 2013).
1.2.1.2 Recent Planning
Emerging from the many diagnoses of the effects of climate change on the Hampton Roads
region is a momentous intergovernmental effort to prescribe and implement a set of functional
adaptation strategies. Before Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast, Virginia was inflicted
with lesser impacts by Hurricane Isabel that spurred a more localized interest into the
repercussions of sea level rise and a changing climate. Coastal inhabitants began to realize and
be informed that damage from storms will only intensify as ample coastal development persists
and frequency of violent storms escalates under predicted by climate scientists (Virginia Coastal
Program, 2005).
Early trends in planning policy to reduce the risks of hazards involved assigning prohibitive
development controls in high risk areas (Serrao-Neumann et al., 2015). Having not yet
progressed from also following this simplistic approach at the time of Isabel in 2003, Hampton
Roads was not prepared for the pervasive impacts storms like Isabel could inflict on the region
(Virginia Coastal Program, 2005). Amidst the aftermath of Isabel, the Virginia Marine Resources
Commission and the now defunct Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Department issued
emergency guidance on rebuilding procedures, but this was faced with widespread confusion.
Taking advantage of the opportunity to learn from the experiences of Hurricane Isabel, local and
regional governments subsequently began the pre-disaster planning process, though several years
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after the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 set national standards for hazard mitigation planning
(Virginia Coastal Program, 2005).
Fast forwarding to 2016, a versatile portfolio of planning reports, programs and projects have
been implemented to further the ability of Hampton Roads to adapt to the adverse conditions it
faces. Planning efforts ranging from private-sector and academic reports to federal programs and
state plans to local projects are relevant to informing an assessment of whether Norfolk and
Hampton Roads are forging a resilient future in regards to its most vulnerable residents.
1.2.1.3 Federal/State
In the years immediately following the aftermath of Hurricane Isabel, Virginia mainly adhered to
Federal requirements and filtered Federal funding down to the localities in greatest need of
assistance. In more individualistic fashion, the State has also distinguished itself in inventing
programs to mobilize innovation around mitigating and adapting to natural hazards. The Virginia
Coastal Zone Management Program under the direction of multiple coordinating state agencies,
existing long before the mainstreaming of pre-disaster hazard mitigation, has latched onto this
mobilizing role.
Some initial needs at the state level that have already been identified for enhancing the efficacy
of Hampton Roads to adapt to climate change include an updated statewide climate adaptation
plan with detailed adaptation measures or a timeline for implementation across the sections
examined, more dedicated funding, policies, or guidelines to improve resilience against
exacerbated flooding from climate change and sea level rise, and more evidence of action to
incorporate climate change projections into state-level programs, investments, and activities
(Climate Central, ICF International, 2015).
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1.2.1.4 Regional/Local
Evidenced by the cohort of collaborative projects ongoing in Hampton Roads to adapt to sealevel rise and climate change supported by state and federal agencies and programs, this planning
movement is converging over a fairly condensed period of time, though locally, lesser efforts
have occurred in the past with similar intentions in mind. The Hampton Roads region
geographically encompasses all of the counties, cities and towns south of the Middle Peninsula
Planning District in Virginia , north of the Virginia-North Carolina state line, and to the east of
the Richmond Metropolitan Region. Politically, all of this region is governed by the Hampton
Roads Planning District Commission (HRPDC), however the region can be further broken down
into the Peninsula as the spurt of land between the York and James Rivers, and Southside
Hampton Roads, the area to the south of the James River and the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay.
Southside Hampton Roads, the economic engine of the region, happens to be the most at risk
portion of the region and so it makes unequivocal sense that the percentage of resources directed
at its municipalities for learning to adapt far surpasses that of the Peninsula.
1.2.1.5 Vulnerable Households
Norfolk has a majority rental-occupancy housing market with 55% of its 86,485 occupied
housing units that are rentals. The existing housing stock is more mature in comparison with
other municipalities in Hampton Roads in bolstering a stock that nearly two-thirds of which is 50
years of age or older. This older housing stock places an unnecessary strain on low income
residents with the compounding effects of deteriorating quality, absentee landlords, and limited
financial resources available for maintenance and repair. In the city’s comprehensive plan, this
dire issue is identified as an essential need to be addressed. Certain neighborhoods have received
status as a redevelopment, conservation, or special service district through a partnership between
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the City and Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA). In redevelopment districts
the intent is for blight removal and new construction, in conservation districts it is rehabilitation
via home improvement loans and grants and home buyer assistance, and in special service
districts the emphasis is on rehabilitation loans and grants in targeted areas (Department of
Planning and Community Development, 2013).
The City has also targeted housing affordability for renters and homeowners alike as an utmost
priority. Old Dominion University has offered its assistance to the city with its Community
Development Corporation to increase affordable homeownership opportunities in several
locations. The City of Norfolk and NRHA continue to reinforce affordable rental housing with
the development of new apartments in the Broad Creek mixed-income community, and through
the provision of over 3,600 public housing units and 3,500 housing choice vouchers. Norfolk
also realizes that it must meet the housing needs of its large special needs population that it has
identified as the most vulnerable in the city in requiring supportive services in addition to
housing solutions. The extremely low income households is one group the City has categorized
as among the vulnerable special needs population in its most recent comprehensive plan
(Department of Planning and Community Development, 2013).

1.2.2 New York City
Benefiting from greater financial and governmental resources, the New York City region has
taken initiative on sea-level rise and coastal storms earlier and more vigorously than most other
cities and regions. Like Norfolk, New York faces the increasing challenges of coastal flooding
and storms, and sea-level rise and coastal erosion. The city is compounded with an increasing
population at risk to flooding and sea-level rise, an aging building stock, and growing income
inequality.
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1.2.2.1 Flooding and Sea-Level Rise
With more than 520 miles of waterfront and 400,000 people in the highest risk areas for
flooding, New York City is one of the most susceptible cities to hurricanes and coastal storms in
the country. Exemplifying its position on climate change and sea-level rise, the city has relied on
its own panel on climate change to model localized climate change impacts. The New York City
Panel on Climate Change (NPCC) has determined, consistent with the IPCC that heavy rain
events are increasing in frequency and intensity, and the sea is rising at its coastlines.
Populations living in coastal and low-lying areas, and lower income neighborhoods are highly
vulnerable to the risks associated with climate change.
In New York City, the sea has risen on average 1.2 inches per decade since 1900 for a total of
around 13 inches. Projections for future sea level rise range from 11 to 21 inches by 2050, 18 to
39 inches by 2080, and up to 6 feet by 2100. The consequence of this amount of sea-level rise,
which is greater than the global average rate, would be an up to 10- to 15-fold increase in the
frequency of the current 100-year coastal flood by the 2080s. The most common coastal storms
in New York are tropical cyclones and nor’easters. Filtering down information from the IPCC, it
has been determined that it is more than likely that the intensity from winds and precipitation of
hurricanes will increase in the North Atlantic Basin. The result is an increase in exposure of the
city’s neighborhoods, businesses and infrastructure, with the aging building stock located in
flood zones only growing (NPCC, 2015; Department of City Planning, 2015; NYC Recovery,
2016).
In 2012, Hurricane Sandy devastated hundreds of thousands of New York residents with wind,
rain, and water that left them without power, damaged the city’s critical infrastructure, and
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destroyed some 300 homes. The city’s most vulnerable population was left with limited access to
food, clean water, healthcare, and other essential life-dependent functions.
1.2.2.2 Recent Planning
Before the threat of sea-level rise and extreme coastal storms was a personal issue for New
Yorkers, the city often ignored flooding and coastal erosion and built structures on beaches,
dunes, barrier islands, and flood plains, subjecting them to damage and loss. To combat the
problem the solution would be to install inadequately designed and constructed protective
structures. During and after Hurricane Sandy, the city’s immediate response and preparations
were among the largest efforts to mobilize public services in its long history.
1.2.2.3 Federal/State
The New York State Coastal Management Program, the equivalent program for channeling funds
down from the national government via the Coastal Zone Management Act, elects to abide by a
set of coastal policies that (1) steer development away from environmentally sensitive areas, (2)
channel waterfront development and revitalization activities towards areas which are neither
without ecological and physical development constraints or areas which had once been
developed but need rehabilitation , (3) promote the proper use, development or preservation of
coastal erosion hazard areas, and (4) encourage wide utilization of coastal resources which are
renewable and nonrenewable (New York Department of State, 2007).
HUD’s Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) program
provided the additional funding the city needed to divvy out resources to communities to address
the wide range of development needs, to support continued recovery, and to build resiliency in
the face of climate change. The CDBG-DR program provides communities impacted by disasters
with resources to address a wide range of disaster-related needs. CDBG-DR allocations provide
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funding to develop viable communities, particularly for low- and moderate-income persons,
through decent housing, a suitable living environment, and the expansion of economic
opportunities (NYC Recovery, 2016).
In mid-2014, the National Disaster Resilience Competition was introduced as a partnership
between the Rockefeller Foundation and HUD to remit funds to communities that suffered from
a presidentially declared disaster between 2011 and 2013. 67 disaster affected jurisdictions
competed for $1 billion in HUD leftover disaster recovery funding to implement disaster
resilience strategies and projects that directly benefit low- and moderate-income groups by
focusing on unmet recovery needs, as well as building regional resilience capacity to manage
extreme weather events and adapt to sea level rise. The Rockefeller Foundation, pioneer of the
100 Resilient Cities initiative, provided targeted technical assistance to states and communities
and support a stakeholder-driven process to identify recovery needs and innovative solutions in
the first and second phases of the competition. The partnership built on the Rebuild by Design
model that awarded $930 million in 2014 to projects that demonstrated how privatephilanthropic resources and federal funding can be leveraged to support the design of innovative
resilience projects that conceived a vision for protection from future disasters in neighborhoods
and cities in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut that were affected by Hurricane Sandy.
The State of New York, to expand on the city’s capacity for adapting to sea-level rise and coastal
flooding and ensuring another Sandy does not breach the gaps in resources, has, through its
Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, Homes and Community Renewal
division, Disaster Preparedness Commission and Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery,
dedicated resources for coastal storms and other intrusive hazards to supplement resources at the
local and regional levels. The New York Rising Community Reconstruction program through a
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collaboration between the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery and the Homes and Community
Renewal division culminated with a series of reconstruction plans for coastal areas throughout
New York City that warranted supplemental long-term strategies post-Sandy (NY Rising
Community Reconstruction Planning Committee, 2014).
1.2.2.4 Regional/Local
Suffering from the city’s worst natural disaster to the tune of $19 billion in damages and
economic disruption in 2012, New York has been compelled to expand and enrich its portfolio of
plans to combat and prepare for coastal flooding and storms and sea-level rise. Fortunately, the
city has been greeted with enormous assistance from the state and federal government to both
build back better post-Sandy and to serve as a hotbed for innovative solutions to extreme storms
and flooding (Office of Recovery and Resiliency, 2015).
In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, New York funneled resources from all places to rapidly
recover from its impacts and return to a normal routine. Months after the brunt of the recovery
work had been undertaken, the city began to think creatively to transcend its existing intelligence
on dealing with extreme storms and flooding. The mayor commissioned a new wave of plans
embracing resilience, preparedness and building back better to account for future disasters of the
worst possible magnitude.
Like Norfolk, New York received both funding and expertise through the 100 Resilient Cities
challenge of the Rockefeller Foundation and the National Disaster Resilience Competition of
HUD. The product of these grants is a groundbreaking comprehensive plan positioned toward
resilience that incorporates the vision of 100 Resilient Cities while also going above and beyond,
and an ongoing project to build resilience in low- and moderate-income areas of Lower
Manhattan.
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Foregoing these two grants, the Rebuild by Design initiative selected several pioneering projects
designed by private-sector firms. One of the more esteemed projects awarded under this model
was the self-proclaimed BIG team championed collaborative scheme that relied on the strengths
of several high-profile firms (BIG Team, 2014).
1.2.2.5 Poverty & Inequality
Despite the overall prosperity of some New Yorkers, the city has been a poster child for high
living costs and income inequality. Poverty and homelessness remain a significant challenge
across all five boroughs. Affordable housing is in short supply and is dwindling in areas
previously thought of as reasonably priced. New York is a different animal than Norfolk and as
such, experiences similar modern urban plights but on a glorified scale.
As certain neighborhoods and sections of New York become more attractive to live in thanks to
investment, the areas left glanced over can become disconnected and eventually blighted. This
issue has dissipated in most areas of the city as many sections and neighborhoods have thrived
from investment and the recent urban immigration movement. As such, what was an issue of
blight has transformed into a widespread affordability crunch that has left many reeling to remain
in place. In its housing plan, the city has set a commitment to preserve or create 200,000 units of
affordable housing and then expanding on that goal by setting a target of 240,000 new housing
units in the immediate future. But presently, with the high cost of housing (making up more than
30 percent of income in a majority of renters), and as wages stagnate among lower and lowermiddle class citizens, income inequality is increasing and nearly half of the population lives at or
near the poverty line. Moreover, 1.4 million residents live in households that do not have access
to sufficient food. As Hurricane Sandy made apparent, and as peer-reviewed studies will admit,
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many of these strained residents are vulnerable to the consequences of sea-level rise and coastal
flooding (Department of City Planning, 2015).

1.3 Research Questions
Undoubtedly, both Norfolk and New York City are accompanied by socioeconomic and
physiographic characteristics that make them among the most susceptible urban centers in the
U.S. to the alarming risks associated with sea-level rise and coastal storms. Hurricane Sandy in
New York and the recurrent flooding in Norfolk has added another dynamic to the inequality
present between neighborhoods to the extent that these two cities have been compelled to do
something about it. They have concurrently taken action themselves and benefitted from the
actions taken by their state and federal governments. Thus, they serve as prime subjects to apply
this multi-faceted plan evaluation methodology with the aim of answering some of the most
imperative questions in response to this new realm of planning:
(1) Are recent planning efforts adequately accounting for the vulnerability of local communities,
especially their social dynamics, such that they are better able to prepare and cope for future sealevel rise and coastal storms?
(2) What obstacles have persisted preventing planners from reducing vulnerability in these
communities and what have cities like Norfolk and New York done to overcome them?
Because Norfolk and New York City are in no way representative of all other cities in the U.S. or
even the East Coast, my research acknowledges this and thus outlines the takeaways from the
experiences of these two cities to inform other cities. I make judgments about the extent to which
these two cities are able to answer these questions for this planning field.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
2.1 Theoretical Background
2.1.1 Role of Plans
Plans continue to endure the test of time in the planning profession as they remain the ideal form
to distribute information and share meaningful future intentions for a place. A planner’s chief
responsibility has then been to produce plans to capture the creative process within the
profession (Ryan, 2011; Talen, 1996). The planning profession’s dominant purpose has been to
solve societal problems like congestion, environmental degradation, poverty and more recently,
those caused by natural forces. Particularly, planning has extended its reach to tackling natural
phenomena that are recurring like floods, hurricanes and other natural hazards (Brody, 2003).
The value of plans lies in their capacity to capture visions for the future, guide and regulate urban
development, and encourage democratic realization of visions for community conditions and
growth. When adopted, plans own the ability to influence any range of matter such as
environmental justice, quality of life, economic development, hazard mitigation, transportation,
and other elements of community life (Berke & Godschalk, 2009; Lyles & Stevens, 2014).
Despite the endurance of planmaking, only in the last couple decades has the importance of
many of the aspects of plans been recognized among the upper tiers of government. Many state
governments have mandated the preparation of local area plans that adhere to thorough,
methodological and exhaustive requirements (Baer, 1997). Physical plans have proved to be an
effective tool to actualize urban change and urban policy. As opposed to a process, plans record
historical, cultural and intellectual concepts, a statement of social and political values, and an
accord of the profession and society (Ryan, 2011). Traditionally, plans have steered urban
facilities and set parameters for zoning and other regulatory measures on real property though
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they have also ignited stakeholder action with images for the future. When it comes to
visualizing a future, citizens and interest groups are more welcoming of planning decisions
depicted through graphic images within a plan because it allows them to conceptualize the
outcome (Neuman, 1998).
2.1.1.1 Plan Quality
Plans have been published and adopted for all sorts of purposes and intentions. Whether or not a
plan is a vision, blueprint, land use guide, antidote, or any other action guide, it is accompanied
by a different set of criteria that determines its quality and efficacy (Baer, 1997; Berke &
Godschalk , 2009). Incidentally, plans of greater quality are usually those that hold greater
precedence in the profession, or plans that bring about government action on the issues they
address (Burby, 2003). Persuasive plans have the ability to inspire action through their images,
designs, maps and visions that other instruments of public policy do not incorporate.
Empowering qualities have elevated plans to be able to overcome barriers in planning (Berke &
Godschalk, 2009). Plans have connected people to places by rallying them around a common
future for their place and self. The pictorial depictions of place help to portray collective hopes.
Plans coalesce together different perspectives and interests together in an institutional setting that
nurtures conflict and contention. Plans derive power by being themselves an extension of the
governing power structure. The spatiality of plans successfully conceptualizes what outcomes
will occur where, to whom, and when they will occur (Neuman, 1998). Two dimensions of plans
collectively reveal their quality that predict their ability to achieve these planning feats; internal
plan qualities and external plans qualities. Internal plan quality is the content and format of key
components of the plan whereas the external plan quality is the relevance of the scope and
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coverage to reflect stakeholder values and the local situation to maximize use and influence of
the plan (Berke & Godschalk, 2009; Lyles & Stevens, 2014).
Plan qualities have been the impetus for evaluating plans and the progression of planning to
change and adapt to new conditions. The whole notion of comprehensive plans and similar
policy instruments is that in order to remain relevant by adapting over time to the needs,
knowledge base, and experiences of a community they require continual revisions and updates.
Similarly, it is the goal of communities to improve plans’ abilities to address particularly
recurring problems like floods, hurricanes and other natural hazards. Strong factual basis, clearly
articulated goals, and appropriately directed policies have been repeatedly identified as the core
characteristics of plan quality, and with measurable indicators of each characteristic adapted to a
particular planning domain (Brody, 2003). Communicative action theory has been a funnel for
more contemporary principles of plan quality in evaluating local plans. Communicative action
principles comprise of qualities that reflect conditions fostering democratic discourse like allinclusive clarity, emulation of stakeholder interest, liberating scientific accuracy open to
interpretation, and sincerity and accountability (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012). Generally, plan
quality is used as an outcome variable for assessing the planning process and as a causal variable
for assessing the planning implementation process (Brody, 2003).
2.1.1.2 Plan Evaluation
To examine the quality of a plan is to conduct a content analysis to determine whether certain
pre-set plan criteria or characteristics introduced in the analysis exist in the studied plan. Plan
content analysis relies on replicable methods for content analysis that generate reliable
information regarding the content of plans (Lyles & Stevens, 2014). Plan quality evaluation is
the process by which data from a content analysis is linked to a determination of what constitutes
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a superior plan based on normative criteria. Plan outcome evaluation then further incorporates
plan quality evaluation by verifying that certain characteristics are akin to desired or intended
outcomes. The normative criteria that ultimately distinguishes good plans from poor ones can be
largely dependent on the context of a plan like its planning domain and geographic scale or
location (Lyles & Stevens, 2014).
After a plan has been implemented, a post hoc evaluation becomes a viable option to assess the
outcomes of that plan. A post hoc evaluation is a tool that can verify performance and
effectiveness. Certain criteria is essential to decide the appropriate timing for outcomes to be
realized and what the actual outcomes should be compared to. The outcomes of a plan can be
compared to the expected outcomes in the absence of that plan. Alternatively, the actual
outcomes could be compared to the intended outcomes of the plan. Further comparisons could
comprise of either evaluating the effects of any unanticipated outcomes, evaluating the influence
the plan had on the reality for a place, or evaluating different expressions of outcome in instances
where the intended outcome might not be tangible (Baer, 1997). Post hoc evaluation has been
applied for more specific purposes such as assessing the distribution of outcomes versus the
intended distribution linked to planning goals. The correlation between planned accessibility of
public facilities and actual accessibility adds a spatial and socioeconomic dimension to post hoc
evaluation that is complimentary to assessments of plan effectiveness and performance. Spatial
interaction models, distance measures, and facility and demographic characteristics can be used
to measure the socioeconomic component of distribution or the accessibility between public
facilities and population groups (Talen, 1996).
To attain conclusive evidence of how effectively plans have reduced the vulnerability of lowincome populations to coastal flooding and storms, ideally, an evaluation would want to look at
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the outcomes of those plans. With the novelty of addressing these issues in the planning
profession, outcomes have not been fully realized or are still in their early stages so this has yet
to become a possible option. Evaluations then must resort to the second best option – plan
quality evaluation. Compiling normative criteria from the latest research on this planning domain
and linking the criteria to an identification of plan quality can create a veritable determination of
future outcomes. The criteria conceived in research is generally influenced by several planning
themes that have evolved out of other areas of research. In evaluating planning for low-income
groups residing in coastal communities, vulnerability, resilience, adaptation, preparedness,
anticipation, and equity are all guiding principles.

2.1.2 Vulnerability
Vulnerability is interrelated with risks or hazards that pose a threat to the livelihood and
wellbeing of people. Considering disasters are the by-product of extreme events and vulnerable
conditions, the depth and magnitude of vulnerability is a predictor that a community will
experience a disaster in the future (Glavovic & Smith, 2014). Vulnerability is a variable for
equating the risk of suffering. The magnitude of suffering from risks is the product of hazards
and vulnerability. Housing, infrastructure and land that is unsafe all characterize vulnerability, as
does human susceptibility. Physical exposure and social circumstances function as
interdependent agents of vulnerability to hazards (Jones & Andrey, 2007). Social vulnerability is
defined as the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity
to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (Rumbach &
Kudva, 2011, Van Zandt, et al., 2012; Oulahen et al., 2015). Physical vulnerability, on the other
hand, is the physiological, structural and infrastructural exposure to hazards (Highfield, Peacock,
& Van Zandt, 2014; Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006).
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2.1.2.1 Physical Vulnerability
Physical vulnerability can also be interpreted as the vulnerability of people, places and things
according to innate traits that predispose them to ill-fated risk factors. Human vulnerability is the
physiological disposition of certain people to be more susceptible to life-threatening
circumstances from hazards. Youth and elderly are familiar images of human vulnerability but
also representative of a component of social vulnerability. Agricultural vulnerability, the
susceptibility of plants and animals to environmental impacts, also falls into physical
vulnerability though poses less of a bearing in the urban settings of Norfolk and New York.
Structural vulnerability, another form of physical vulnerability, is symptomatic of subpar roofs,
foundation, exterior materials, and building standards, specifically their inability to resist damage
(Jones & Andrey, 2007; Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006). Ultimately, societies face no impact
despite their accompanying physical and social vulnerability until they are exposed to hazards.
Then, hazards have the ability to uncover the pervasive disparities among vulnerable populations
and the potential to make a permanent imprint on communities.
2.1.2.2 Hazard Exposure
Hazard exposure arises from people’s occupancy of geographical areas where they could be
affected by specific types of events that threaten their lives or property. For natural hazards, this
exposure is caused by living in areas near or within the floodplains that sometimes extend only a
few feet beyond the floodway (Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006). A hazard can be any event that
poses an unavoidable danger or risk, but for these purposes, coastal flooding and storms are
chosen as threats that low-income people are vulnerable to for their intensification from climate
change and sea-level rise. When people, no matter vulnerable or not, are greatly impacted by the
dangers of coastal hazards, those hazards are then regarded as natural disasters. Adaptation
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strategies that directly address the inherent structural vulnerabilities and reduce exposure
decrease the likelihood of harm, but preclude any socioeconomic characteristics that yield a great
potential to suffer from hazards once they do occur (Jones & Andrey, 2007; Highfield, Peacock,
& Van Zandt, 2014).
2.1.2.3 Social Vulnerability
Characteristics of social vulnerability easily dispute the consenting belief that natural disasters
are undifferentiating events while suggesting that they are instead socially constructed (Peacock,
Van Zandt, Zhang, & Highfield, 2014). Social circumstances are most often predictors of
insufficiencies in the accessibility of social, economic, and political resources (Jones & Andrey,
2007). Incidentally, damage from coastal storms and flooding are shaped by social, political, and
economic vulnerabilities of people and societies. Disasters tend to amplify and accelerate
trajectories already occurring in communities, thus preexisting conditions are key indicators of
future outcomes (Mearns & Norton, 2009).
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Figure 1. Intersectionality of Vulnerability & Social Impacts
Vulnerability is also a function of the nature and types of resources that individuals and groups
have at their disposal. Resources like human capital in the form of training, skills, and
knowledge; social capital as relationships and institutional access; financial capital as liquid and
non-liquid assets; natural capital in terms of natural resources; and built capital in the form of
infrastructural resources, all reduce the vulnerability of people to disasters and climate variability
(Mearns & Norton, 2009). Exploring the inner processes of a population’s vulnerability to risks
and disaster and their detected anticipation potentials could culminate with coping strategies
toward resilience enhancement (Mitrovic, 2015).

2.1.3 Resilience
Resilience has been increasingly leveraged to drive desired planning outcomes especially as
attention to coastal hazards has burgeoned. Bouncing back from unforeseen circumstances has
always been at the crux of resilience, even with all of its adaptations. Specific to bouncing back
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from coastal flooding and storms, resilience is the ability of a community or society, along with
the biophysical systems on which they rely, to resist or absorb the impacts of hazards, rapidly
recover from those impacts and reduce future vulnerabilities through adaptive strategies (Berke
& Lyles, 2013).
Resilience can trace its meaning along a trajectory spanning varying fields. The field of ecology
has been instrumental in giving rise to ideas on resilience related to global environmental
change. Particularly, ecology has associated an understanding of social ecological systems with
dynamic action on climate change and disasters (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013; Brown,
2014). A social ecological system is purely a unit of interaction between people and the
environment wherein ecology forms the basis for its body of thinking that the two are
ubiquitously interdependent of one another. Repeated research has identified a strong correlation
between human activity and ecosystems at a global scale. Whereas people have had a substantial
influence on the global environment and in engendering ecological change, it is regarded that if
ecological systems exceed a certain threshold then human well-being will be compromised,
resulting in social change (Folke, 2010).
This complex relationship can be understood in the example of a neighborhood of growing
appeal adjacent to a coastal wetland. The neighborhood may choose to accommodate for growth
by infringing on the wetland, and gradually erasing its existence. Once as a natural protective
barrier from the dangers of the open shore, the wetland as a shadow of its former self no longer
has the ability to mitigate the full effects of a threatening storm. The threatening storm is able to
wreak full havoc on the neighborhood and permanently change its outlook. Had the
neighborhood chosen to allow for growth more strategically it would have preserved the delicate
relationship with an ecological system that returns the favor.
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change describes resilience as the amount of change
that a social ecological system can undergo without experiencing a change in state. Some argue
that social ecological systems and resilient societies may be unable to avoid transition to an
alternative state, after exposure to previously unforeseen threats. Rather, the amount of change a
social ecological system can absorb without sacrificing key structures, the capacity to reorganize,
and the capacity to learn and adapt in the face of change are all characteristic of resilience
(Glavovic & Smith, 2014). Concepts arisen out of social ecological resilience include capacity,
complexity, connectedness, adaptation and feedback (Brown, 2014).
2.1.3.1 Resilience Framework
Resilience began as the idea of a dynamic system, responding to a shock, being brought into a
brief chaotic state and returning back to its original state. This depiction does not account for the
complexities of systems, of their environments, and of the changes that occur. Key findings on
resilience thinking incorporate two other aspects with resilience that are interrelated and draft a
more representative picture of resilience – adaptability, and transformability. Adaptability is
defined as the capacity to adjust responses to changing external drivers and internal processes
and thereby allow development along the current trajectory. Adapting can more tangibly be
thought of as the process to achieve resilience and stability. Transformability is the capacity to
cross thresholds into new development trajectories. Combining principles, they equate to the
capacity to continually change and adapt yet remain within critical thresholds (Folke, 2010).
Evolutionary resilience broadens the description of resilience to incorporate the dynamic
interplay between persistence, adaptability and transformability across multiple scales and time
frames (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). A persistent system subject to change remains
within a stability domain, continually changing and adapting yet remaining within critical
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thresholds. When united, persistence, adaptability, and transformability forge a framework that
carries thought about processes like climate adaptation into realms that are more dynamic and
holistic. At the intersection of all three is preparedness, where social learning capacity is
rendered as a human responsibility to enhance the chances of resisting disturbances, absorb
disturbances, and move toward a more desirable trajectory (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood,
2013).
From a coastal disaster perspective, resilience thinking could be defined as the capacity of
interconnected physical, social, and economic systems to rebound from an episodic shock or
extreme event. The societal context within which disasters occur and the precondition to confront
the agents of vulnerability that predispose communities to disaster are central to this capacity
(Glavovic & Smith, 2014).
2.1.3.2 Adaptability
Adaptability has an interdependent relationship with resilience. Adaptability captures the
capacity of a system to learn and to combine experience and knowledge, in addition to adjusting
responses to changing external drivers and internal processes, and continuing to develop within
the current stability domain (Folke, 2010).
Resilience thinking is critical to analyzing the complex dynamics of communities. Communities
themselves, after enduring a shock to its status quo, emerge from an event in a multitude of
manners. A social system such as a neighborhood may emerge from a threatening event in severe
disarray - a worsened version of its preexisting state, in an adaptive state, or a transformative
state (Folke, 2010). Deliberate transformation requires resilience thinking, first in assessing the
relative merits of the current versus alternative, potentially more favorable stability domains, and
second in fostering resilience of the new development trajectory (Folke, 2010).
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Adaptability is achieved through flexibility and resourcefulness. Both flexibility and
resourcefulness are pathways to resilience, with flexibility denoting the existence of networks
and cooperation. Networks either facilitate the flow of ideas and resources or foster connections
between people and institutions. In other words, in this manner, networks can increase the
adaptability of systems. Cooperation across scales and times is equally as essential for
adaptability. Resourcefulness is comprised of efficiency, quickness, and diversity.
Homogenization is associated with an undermining of resilience. Biological diversity and
diversified economies are both adept at dealing with the adverse consequences of macro-level
instability (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013).
2.1.3.3 Preparedness
In relation to the themes of resilience, adaptability and transformability, preparedness influences
all three. Preparedness reflects the intentionality of human action and intervention that
demonstrates learning capacity. In order to be prepared, groups must search for ways to enhance
their ability to anticipate and plan (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). Actions exhibiting
preparedness, when planned for ahead of time, typically satisfy what to do during a disaster,
what supplies are needed, evacuation protocols, points of contact, and where to find emergency
shelter. Preparedness includes five mission areas – prevention, protection, mitigation, response,
and recovery. Each area correlates with a stage in the overall process of reducing impacts, and
tend to be sequential (Schwab, 2014).
2.1.3.4 Transformability
In the interplay between persistence, adaptability and preparedness, transformability syncs with
innovation to bring a system from an undesirable state to a more desirable one. Transforming to
a radically different and more desirable trajectory becomes an option in chaos and trauma
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(Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). Innovation is key to envisioning a fundamentally new
system when a group or society is so entrenched in a stigma of distress that reconfiguration arises
(Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004). Adapting and transforming is as much about
finding potential vulnerabilities as it is about identifying opportunities for reconfiguration. Desire
for transformation over persistence is merely a difference in perspective where rather than
viewing impacts as detrimental they are viewed as opportunistic and creatively destructive
(Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). Transformation that is unplanned can actually be
detrimental to a community. Only when a transformative state is planned for can desirable social
change be ensured. Resilience as transformation considers shifts in variables but also shifts in
perception and meaning, patterns of interaction among political leadership and other power
relations, and institutional arrangements (Folke, 2010; Brown, 2014). Transformational change
occurs at all the interconnected scales of individual, society, institution, technology and
economy. These changes can be embodied in practice, lifestyle, power relation, norm and value
(Brown, 2014).
2.1.3.5 Resilience in Practice
By and large, three different views for reaching resilience have surfaced from recent research.
The first, resistance and maintenance, indicates a controlling and defensive response to change
and a decisiveness to maintain business as usual, even in the face of imperative change and
intensifying risk. Maintaining stability may be socially desirable as long as resistance to change
is concurrent with continued societal success; otherwise it may lead to collapse. The second
interpretation, change at the margins, is typical incremental adjustments within communities and
societies to adapt to change while still preserving the status quo. This view could be
characterized as one that identifies the symptoms of climate change as they appear and
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subsequently eliminates them, but not as one that addresses the underlying causes of climate
change. The third view, openness and adaptability, demonstrates an awareness for addressing the
underlying causes of risks and threats by embracing transformative or radical change.
Considering existing power structures, building resilience in communities then requires planners
to confront systemic barriers (Glavovic & Smith, 2014).
Resilience in policy and practice is applied in responding to climate change uncertainties and
socio-economic insecurities. Building resilience has become synonymous with the component of
climate adaptation whereby a society has the capacity to bounce back or rebound to a stable
state. Stability refers to the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporary
disturbance (Davoudi, Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). Resilience as coupled incremental and
transformative change stresses the need to frame planning as a fundamental socio-political
course of action that explicitly recognizes and confronts the perpetuated status quo of practices
and inequitable power distributions that deepen vulnerability (Glavovic & Smith, 2014).
2.1.3.6 Shortcomings of Resilience
Independently, resilience has fallen short on several fronts and fails to address issues of equal if
not greater importance. Resilience seldom applies to a specific population or group of people, but
rather a species, a habitat, or a development, and has not achieved social contingence. When
resilience does pertain to a human society or any multitude of systems, it’s most common
application has been persistence, the mildest form of adaptation, and very seldom transformation.
Part of what influences persistence as a prescription for resilience is the emphasis on troubling
exogenous forces and ignorance toward internal social dynamics. Resilience in theory overlooks
conflicts over resources and the importance of power relations, in assuming that there is
consensus on the desired state or that a desired state is even identified. A prominent dialogue
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stressing management for resilience exists, and so do powerful interests that threaten the
implementation of a dynamic or adaptive strategy. Not taking into account the institutions within
which practices and management are embedded and the politics of their distribution and
management has driven resilience in practice to conservatism or a business as usual perspective,
particularly in the fields of development and climate change. In the interplay of vulnerability and
resilience to coastal disasters, resilience approaches have brought increased capacity, but evaded
consideration of the root causes of vulnerability (Brown, 2014).

2.1.4 Equity
Coastal disasters and the changing climate that influences them correlate with contentious intragenerational and inter-generational equity issues. The intra-generational inequities are a matter of
the distribution of impacts across individuals and at different points in time. Inter-generational
aspects relate to the discrepancy of consequences from climate change occurring across time
between the near-term and the long-term. Intra-generational inequity is a fuel that incites action
to guarantee preparedness and resilience in the most vulnerable and inflicted communities.
Equity itself is based loosely on wellbeing or security, health, and education among others. This
vision of equity encompasses not only economic goods and services but also individuals’ health
and life expectancy, education and access to public goods, social and economic security, and
capacity to partake freely in economic interchange and social decision-making (Markandya,
2011).
Inequality and climate change are in fact deeply interlaced. The causes and implications of
climate change are entwined with patterns of inequality where climate change acts as a multiplier
of existing vulnerabilities. It threatens to quickly erode at the long ensuing progress made in
reducing poverty and enhancing overall wellbeing. The injustices of climate change are rooted in
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the dilemma of responsibility for its causes which are inversely proportional to the degree of
climate vulnerability. This pervasive dilemma demands equity, social justice, and environmental
justice to be placed at the core of a reactive agenda (Mearns & Norton, 2009).
2.1.4.1 Environmental Justice
Three forms of environmental inequality have emerged or intensified from climate risks and
disasters, one of which being environmental justice. Climate activism has increasingly
galvanized around environmental justice, as the impacts of risks and hazards are unequally
distributed across all populations. Environmental justice bears a resemblance to vulnerability and
the moral obligation of unequal hardship wherein support for justice in the poorest communities
is stimulated by an awareness of these unevenly distributed impacts. (Alario & Freudenburg,
2010).
2.1.4.2 Social Justice
Coastal storms and extreme flooding often fracture down social lines. Those stuck in the lower
end of the socioeconomic spectrum suffer an unequal share of impacts from these coastal
disasters. Typical of environmental injustice, the ability to secure economic, social and political
opportunities is sacrificed among those that are more vulnerable and impacted. By that undue
limitation, coastal storms and extreme flooding are pressing social justice issues. Social justice is
precisely the right for all to have equal access to economic, political and social opportunities.
Climate change, a stimulus of storms and flooding, is often cited as the defining social justice
issue of our time for its tendency to place a disproportionate burden on the livelihood of those
most vulnerable and who have contributed the least to its causes. It raises equity considerations
between generations because actions taken or not taken today will affect future generations. It
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also has powerful implications for intra-generational equity today, among individuals and groups
within societies (Mearns & Norton, 2009).
Social justice has been approached from several views, but under the cost-benefit analysis tool,
an outcome is considered most desirable or socially just if the net benefit or the difference
between the added benefits and added costs is greatest. Although the proportionality does not
hold unless the utility of net benefits is weighted more heavily and the distributional implications
are taken into account. Alternatively, social justice can be judged in terms of the level of
wellbeing of the worst-off member of society. On top of wellbeing, social justice denotes the
capability of all individuals to freely make choices from a set of alternatives and engage in social
and market transactions (Markandya, 2011).

2.1.5 Anticipatory & Adaptive
2.1.5.1 Anticipatory Governance
Adaptation and flexibility go hand in hand, since the act of adapting to risks entails being open to
change driven by expected risks. Therefore, adaptation is an anticipatory principle. Anticipatory
governance is a model for planning and decision-making under volatile conditions that merges
concepts of foresight, flexibility, and a range of futures to anticipate adaptation strategies. Actual
change and uses of these adaptation strategies are monitored in order to guide decision making.
The anticipatory planning model recognizes the limitations of managing environments based on
previous experience, and it offers opportunities to build local networks and problem-solving
capacity amid great uncertainty about the future (Berke & Lyles, 2013; Berke et al., 2014).
Making adaptive policies under these circumstances requires policy makers to treat strategies and
programs as iterative processes of exploration and learning, based on targets and milestones,
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strong performance-based monitoring and evaluation systems, and enabling frameworks for
interactive engagement with a host of stakeholders (Mearns & Norton, 2009).
The pool of knowledge for local planmaking and implementation considers a range of possible
future scenarios rather than a forecast derived from empirical evidence and historic variability
for a single future scenario. Local planmaking that employs scenario development to account for
a range of possible future climate conditions and associated impacts on communities and their
environments provide local governments the foresight to reduce risks and to increase their ability
to more vigilantly anticipate and adapt to events at early onset. Scenarios become anecdotes
capable of aiding decision-makers, encouraging creativity and facilitating brainstorming about
possible futures. While scenario development requires expert consulting, scenario planning can
be extended to the affected public and other interested parties through focus groups and
roundtable discussions to not only inform the public, but coordinate and collaborate on ideas.
Involving the public, a diverse range of stakeholder groups, and experts together in a
collaborative atmosphere enables expert knowledge and personable knowledge of existing
conditions and future concerns to synthesize into a more expansive outlook (Berke & Lyles,
2013).
2.1.5.2 Adaptive Management & Policy Learning
Adaptive policy making in the context of the climate challenge is a guide to ensuring an
approach shaped by a socially inclusive learning process is infused into a portfolio of climate
action. Three sets of features of the climate challenge influence this directive. The first features
are the long time horizon over which decisions must be made, and the path-dependent nature of
these decisions. The next feature is uncertainty such that even if some changes are inevitable,
their precise timing, location, and distributional impacts usually remain unclear. And third, that

34

effective and coherent climate change adaptation involve coordinated action amongst an
abundance and diversity of decentralized agents. Adaptive policy making then calls on public
participation for defining place specific contexts for climate change adaptation (Mearns &
Norton, 2009).
An adaptive management approach is a highly effective framework for enabling policy learning.
Constantly changing environmental conditions, drastic shifts in political interests and objectives,
and a continuous barrage of new and often ambiguous information lends planners to be able to
react to a range of situations. Hazard mitigation plans and policies then should function for
uncertainty and surprise by acting as flexible instruments. Under adaptive management policies
are designed as hypotheses and management is implemented as a series of experiments to test
those hypotheses. Hypotheses are often predictions about how existing conditions will respond to
management actions (Brody, 2003).
Much like technical scientific experimentation, the consequences of the actions should be
potentially reversible or replicable allowing for the experimenter to learn from breakthroughs
and failures. When a policy meets its objectives successfully, the hypothesis can be affirmed
resulting in the protection of human well-being. Fortunately a failed policy also has intrinsic
value in permitting learning such that future decisions can be accompanied with a larger body of
comprehension. In this sense, policy learning experimentation is a very pragmatic process, but is
an effective tactic for devising innovative adaptation solutions to natural hazards like coastal
flooding and storms. Each occurrence of a flood or severe storm offers ample opportunity to
experiment by testing out ideas or hypotheses and determining their success. Thus, if plans are
regularly updated after or prior to an event, the policy instruments themselves can demonstrate
learning that takes place within the planning organization and community at large (Brody, 2003).
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2.1.5.3 Adaptive Thinking
Devising ideas for adapting to coastal flooding and storms is a more intellectually and
emotionally demanding exercise than planners are accustom to and requires them to dig more
deeply and think more creatively than they typically do. Planners and professionals representing
the community are expected to think critically about the problems that can arise with these
hazards. Critical thinking allows professionals to grasp the implications of any intended set of
actions that affect the future of communities in some shape or form. Positive thinking emerges
from ideas, or creative thinking that people gravitate to. Particularly in brainstorming for whole
communities and audiences of citizen participants creativity flourishes in group environments.
People can not only be creative individually, but collectively, building off of each other’s ideas
and learning from each other. Collaborative creativity in this manner effectively engages citizens
and generates public support for the strategies that are subsequently implemented, in part
because such collective creativity is action provoking and empowering (Schwab, 2014).
Plans generate the most buy-in among affected communities when they demonstrate emotional
intelligence and the ability to empathize. Disaster survivors process emotional reactions that
accompany their disaster experience. Without allowing time and space for these emotional
reactions, planners are inviting delay to adaptation by suppressing natural response to
catastrophe. Planners and public officials who can think intuitively and learn to respond
constructively and empathetically to people will benefit the recovery process, most often.
However, the attachment many people have to conditions and a sense of place preceding disaster
can impede people’s ability to re-envision the future of their community, no matter how torn
from hazards or other problems, such as poverty or social inequality, ultimately perpetuating a
state of vulnerability. Adaptive thinking among planners and policy makers embodies more than
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mere anticipatory thinking, though essential, but also thinking critically, positively, creatively,
intuitively, and emphatically (Schwab, 2014).

2.2 Measuring & Quantifying
2.2.1 Vulnerability Assessment
Many communities are inherently more able to overcome hazards and disasters, but in order to
identify those that require extraordinary assistance to resist and adapt, communities’
vulnerability should be mapped, particularly their social vulnerability. Generally speaking,
socially vulnerable populations are not evenly distributed throughout an urban area, but are
instead clustered in neighborhoods. Pinpointing socially vulnerable neighborhoods can ignite
action by public officials in developing an awareness of the exacerbation of impacts this
clustering causes and the ability to target efforts spatially before and after disaster. Systematic
application of social vulnerability perspectives at the community scale can identify
concentrations of populations at the household level with particular social characteristics
meriting special attention, planning efforts, and mobilization to respond to and recover from
disasters and hazards (Van Zandt, et al., 2012).
Social constructivist approaches to vulnerability assessment characterize the multitude of causes
for individual outcomes in an entitlement and livelihood style. Rather than the risk-hazard
approach to vulnerability analysis that defines the relationship between an exogenous hazard and
its impacts, inadequately addressing social dimensions of risk, the social constructivist approach
classifies people as vulnerable to undesirable outcomes. The climatic event or natural hazard is
interpreted as an external episode, while the risk of disaster and suffering is socially ridden. The
entitlements and livelihoods subsets depict vulnerability as an inadequate means to protect or
sustain oneself in the face of climate events such that risk is determined by productivity and
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social fortification. Whereas the external dimension is typified as exposure to climate variations,
the internal dimension is in connection with sensitivity and adaptive capacity to stressors.
Integrating both internal and external factors, the overwhelming objective of vulnerability
assessment is to distinguish those that are vulnerable and ways to assist them (Mearns & Norton,
2009). In all these approaches, there is acceptance that development and disaster preparedness
must operate at the level of the community.
An essential purpose is for the assessment to catalyze a process that empowers the people in the
community and supports their capacity to control their own situation (van Aalst, Cannon, &
Burton, 2008). Participatory risk assessment tools can be useful for building up awareness and
capacities for adaptation to climate change and disasters. These tools could include risk mapping,
transect walks, asset inventories and livelihood surveys, historical and seasonal calendars, focus
group meetings, surveys and discussions, and key informant interviews (van Aalst, Cannon, &
Burton, 2008).
On top of impeding socioeconomic qualities is the trickle-down feature of housing whereby
minorities and low-income groups reside in older and poorer quality housing concentrated in less
desirable, higher risk neighborhoods (Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014). Low-income
people frequently inhabit poorer housing quality, are exposed to poor environmental conditions,
and experience economic instability (Ross, 2013). Impoverished populations typically lack
insurance and access to financial resources that can aid in disaster recovery. Minority groups
reside in lower-quality neighborhoods in homes that appreciate at lower rates because of being
racially discriminated against in the buying, selling, and renting of housing due to racial steering,
redlining, and lender discrimination (Mearns & Norton, 2009).
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Despite confidence that impoverished, elderly and minority groups are more at risk to storms and
flooding, they uniformly display lower levels of preparedness, and respond less positively to
warnings. Since they are more reliant on informal networks, minorities in particular may receive
and confirm warning messages later, and once warnings are processed they have a reduced
likelihood of evacuating because of lower income and education levels that limit material
resources, knowledge, and skill. Their deficient preparedness and evacuation behavior is
compounded by disproportionate damage inflicted by and hence their vulnerability to flooding.
Being segregated into neighborhoods with poorer quality housing is a large influence into this
risky phenomenon (Van Zandt, et al., 2012).
When displaced, pre-existing housing and economic volatility can be worsened. Low-income
residents displaced by climatic events experience more difficulty landing on employment
opportunities than when remaining in their familiar vicinity. Migrants integrated into the fabric
of a different community after being displaced can create civic tension in host communities.
Mental illness and depression can also arise in those socially isolated following displacement
(Baussan, 2015). Considering the multiple levels minorities are vulnerable to disaster they
continue to be excluded from community post-disaster planning and recovery activities because
they have less economic power and political representation (Van Zandt, et al., 2012).

2.2.2 Disaster Impacts (Social)
In correspondence with underlying physical and social vulnerabilities, disasters bring about
physical and social impacts. The physical casualties and property damage caused by disasters are
the most tangible and widely reported impacts, but social impacts, like psychological,
demographic, economic and political develop over a longer period of time and can be more
elusive in assessing them. Loss of structures as a measure of physical impacts results from
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physical damage and destruction of property, but can also be caused by land use losses or loss of
land induced by subsidence or erosion. Damage to the built environment can be classified
broadly as affecting residential, commercial, industrial, infrastructure, or community services
sectors.
2.2.2.1 Psychological & Demographical
Psychological impacts bridge emotional signs such as anxiety, depression, and grief, and
behavioral effects like sleep and appetite changes, ritualistic behavior, and substance abuse.
Typically, since the observed effects are mild and temporary, few disaster victims require
psychiatric diagnosis. Most benefit more from a crisis counseling orientation than from a mental
health treatment orientation, especially if their normal social support networks of friends,
relatives, neighbors, and coworkers remain largely intact. However, the youth, elderly, disabled,
and racial and ethnic minority segments of the population require special attention and active
outreach. The major demographical impacts of disasters are likely to be the temporary
immigration of construction workers after major disasters and the emigration of population
segments that have lost housing (Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006).
2.2.2.2 Economic
The ultimate economic impact of a disaster depends upon the disposition of the damaged assets.
Disaster losses are initially borne by the affected households, businesses, and local government
agencies whose property is damaged or destroyed. The property damage caused by disaster
impact creates losses in asset values that can be measured by the cost of repair or replacement.
Some of these assets are not replaced, so their loss causes a reduction in consumption (and, thus,
a decrease in the quality of life) or a reduction in investment (and, thus, a decrease in economic
productivity). In addition to direct economic losses, there are indirect losses that arise from the
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interdependence of community subunits. The relationships among the social units within a
community can be described as a state of dynamic equilibrium involving a steady flow of
resources, especially money. Specifically, a household’s linkages with the community are
defined by the money it must pay for products, services, and infrastructure support (Lindell,
Prater, & Perry, 2006).
2.2.2.3 Political
Disasters are capable of inciting political behavior that deviates from the norm that is generally
free from civic disturbance. Disaster impacts can give rise to social activism that disrupts the
political landscape, especially during the seemingly long-drawn-out process of recovering from a
disaster. The disaster recovery process is a source of many victim grievances that cultivates
opportunities for conflict within and conflict between communities and authorities. Threats that
undermine existing patterns of civil governance can bubble up when individuals sharing a
common grievance about the handling of the recovery process coalesce to seek reparations for
their grievances. While it is uncommon for authorities to leverage disaster impacts as an
exploitive opportunity, communities of minority groups with marginal political influence or are
disregarded by elites can fall victim to detrimental change. Disasters can aggravate preexisting
political tension, but generally, disaster impacts might not produce a worse outcome than a
renewed set of victims and grievances, and a resultant modest shift in the political agenda
(Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006).

2.3 Planning Approaches
Given the complexity of coastal flooding and storm type disasters, many approaches and
strategies have been employed to reduce their impacts and the vulnerability of those at risk.
Collectively, planning strategies can eradicate social and environmental injustices, reduce
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exposure, foster social connectedness, ensure preparedness, maintain resilience, enhance
adaptive capacity, alleviate vulnerabilities, and guarantee swift and efficient recovery.
Although each planning approach holds a unique assortment of attributes that distinguish each
from one another, there are considerable overlaps in policies and outcomes. Individually, the
outlined disaster planning approaches can achieve different types of resilience and in different
magnitudes, but in certain coordinated efforts, multiple approaches in concert can attain positive
results in surplus of their efficacy in isolation. Each planning approach represents a manner in
which to reduce vulnerabilities of populations to disaster, but it is also possible to make plans
that are insufficient and incapable of fulfilling their objectives pertaining to disaster resilience.
Thus, each approach is accompanied by particular details and qualities that optimize their
efficacy in the realm of vulnerability reduction and ultimately toward long-term resilience. The
collection of detailed approaches shape the evaluation protocol that I employ later on to assess
the desirability of their intended and engendered outcomes.

2.3.1 Risk Reduction
Since risks tend to lack evidence, public residents and officials tend to be apathetic toward risk
consideration, especially climate change risks. With insufficient incentives for local jurisdictions
to combat individualized risks, few at-risk communities have taken initiative. Left to their own
devices, relatively few at-risk communities would be expected to initiate risk-reduction actions.
Hazard mitigation plans are evidence of the nonexistent or sluggish response by communities to
local risks (Berke & Lyles, 2013). Planners have had to overcome the debilitating obstacles of
inadequate public buy-in and oppositional community groups motivated by proposed policies
they seek to vanquish (Burby, 2003).
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Risk reduction and general climate combatant efforts are not lost causes, however. Engaged and
educated planners and publics can alter the perception of risk for the better. Risk reduction
occupies the space between adaptation and climate mitigation and such could be considered a
modest climate adaptation approach but an assertive approach to mitigation.
2.3.1.1 Coastal Hazard Mitigation
The predominant goal of hazard mitigation planning is to decrease hazard exposure and physical
vulnerability to hazards in a particular area. State planning for mitigation to achieve resiliency
has chiefly been shaped by the role the federal government has played in assisting disaster
inflicted localities. State mitigation plans can serve a critical role in cultivating
intergovernmental coordination, allowing for local plans to more easily comply with broader
state goals, and establishing resilient conditions in communities to resist or absorb and swiftly
recover from disasters. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 strongly encourages all state and
local governments to prepare hazard mitigation plans based on a participatory process and
technical vulnerability analysis or hazard assessment (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012).
The DMA of 2000 was passed as an amendment to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, and it repealed the previous mitigation planning provisions and
replaced them with a new set of requirements that emphasized the need for states and
municipalities to coordinate mitigation planning and implementation efforts (FEMA, 2013). The
act reallocated the focus of disaster resistance toward pre-disaster hazard mitigation measures
that are cost-effective and designed to reduce damage and destruction (Disaster Mitigation Act of
2000). A state mitigation plan is continued as a requirement for disaster assistance, and states are
granted the authority to recommend a minimum of five local governments to receive mitigation
assistance. Additionally, state and local governments alike are required to develop a hazard
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mitigation plan in order to remain eligible for pre- and post-disaster mitigation funding.
Communities with an adopted and federal approved hazard mitigation plan are eligible for
funding via the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Hazard Mitigation Assistance, and the PreDisaster Mitigation Program (Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Planning
Committee, 2011; FEMA, 2013).
Central to the hazard mitigation planning process, the hazards assessment, dissects a
community’s exposure to hazard agents such as floods, storm surge, wave action, or wind. The
assessments identify the potential exposure of populations, businesses, and the built
environment. Physical characteristics of the built environment are also equally as critical, with
features such as wind protection in buildings, structural elevation relative to potential floods, and
engineered or natural environmental features not being overlooked. Solutions are devised
accordingly to fill gaps in communities’ overall protection and absorption of hazards and
disasters (Van Zandt, et al., 2012).
Generally, three types of responses are commonly employed to mitigate coastal hazards under
the direction of hazard mitigation plans. An argument can also be made for a fourth approach
being the discouraged “do nothing” approach where the risk of damage to and loss of property is
simply accepted.
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Table 1. Three Hazard Mitigation Responses
Structural response: the
building of protective
structures to defend coastal
property against damage by
flooding or erosion
_________________________________________

Non-structural response:
actions like planting
vegetative cover, re-shaping
of bluffs, or avoidance of
hazards by siting buildings in
safe locations

Insurance response:
purchasing of insurance
against the coastal hazards
_________________________________________

_________________________________________



Only effective if structures
are soundly designed and
constructed





May accelerate the loss of
a natural shield from
erosion if designed
improperly
Structural solutions require
strict maintenance to
ensure they retain
marginal effectiveness



Protective devices are
typically high dollar









Strengthening of
landforms

Use of appropriate design
features in buildings to
protect against flooding
Siting of development
entirely out of hazard areas
avoids difficulties and
high costs
Often used in combination
with structural response









National Flood Insurance
Program allows structural
and non-structural
measures
Insurance against property
damage caused by
flooding is offered
Property owners in
participating communities
may purchase insurance
from NFIP
NFIP also provides for the
sale of insurance to
property owners against
flood-related erosion
damage

(New York Department of State, 2007)
2.3.1.2 Disaster Risk Reduction
Disasters occur when natural or technological hazards interact with socioecological systems.
Disaster impacts arise due to interactions among hazard exposure, physical vulnerability, and
social vulnerability (Peacock, Van Zandt, Zhang, & Highfield, 2014). Consequently, local
governments’ responses to climate risks are commonly linked to hazard mitigation and disaster
preparedness strategies. Disaster risk reduction emerged out of lasting efforts to deliver
emergency disaster response and recovery services for inflicted communities. Actual disaster risk
reduction planning to enable coordinated large-scale governmental and non-governmental
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organization response often accompanies major catastrophes. As a response to climate change,
disaster risk reduction encompasses several phases – disaster risk assessment and preparedness
planning, response, relief and recovery for managing disaster, and structural and nonstructural
hazard mitigation activities (Solecki, Leichenko, & O'Brien, 2011).
Proficient disaster risk reduction does incorporate local vulnerabilities and risks in precise
locations, such as communities potentially or actually affected. Disaster risk reduction remains
an event-driven approach to adapt to disasters and emphasizes short-term interventions and
actions particularly through humanitarian assistance agencies like the Red Cross and donor
programs, because it is limited in being merely a mitigation approach despite including people
into the equation (Birkmann & Pardoe, 2014).

2.3.2 Disaster Recovery
Though disaster risk reduction is classified as a mitigative approach to planning for disasters,
considering it is event-based, much of the outcomes coincide with disaster recovery. The
conventional view of disaster recovery is of responding to a disaster declaration in a manner that
pieces communities back into working order as they were prior to the event. Following disaster
there is ample opportunity to rebuild communities in an adaptive way while considering future
climate change and to bring attention to policy failures (Birkmann & Pardoe, 2014; Corbin,
2015). More often than not, impacted infrastructure is rapidly re-built back to pre-disaster
conditions and standards. This conventional stability and persistence view of disaster recovery
overlooks the internal social dynamics of coastal climate events and incidentally dismisses a
possible need to promote transformative change (Birkmann & Pardoe, 2014).
Social awareness calls for recovery planning to be proactive and forgo the conventional reactive
attitude that drives technical measures (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy,
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2015; Corbin, 2015). Also, rather than only concentrate on post-disaster states that are more
desirable than pre-disaster, disaster recovery can recognize the importance of improved predisaster conditions. In high pressure situations after disasters, opportunities for change are
rapidly squandered as demand for resources politically and financially prohibits any considerable
deviation from the norm (Corbin, 2015). Bouncing back to pre-disaster conditions under stressful
conditions can only remain as a resilient state until the next event of equal or greater risk
(Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). Long term recovery requires
planning for post-disaster recovery in the pre-disaster phase (Schwab, 2014). Pre-disaster
planning can assure that communities and officials are more prepared to maneuver through
complicated and high pressure situations for a variety of post-disaster scenarios (SerraoNeumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015).
Table 2. Four Stages of Housing Recovery Following a Disaster
Emergency shelter

Spontaneously sought locations that are intended to be a refuge and
provide protection from the elements during a developing disaster
Temporary shelter
Offer food preparation and sleeping facilities in the short-term
following a disaster and sought from those with immediate and
greatest needs
Temporary housing
Allows disaster victims to reestablish household routines, though in
non-preferred locations or structures
Permanent housing
Reestablished household routines for disaster victims in preferred
locations and structures
Source: (Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006)
2.3.2.1 Recovery Plan
In order to siege opportunities before they vanish, a community should have a recovery plan in
place long before a disaster strikes. A recovery plan is a policy document that guides short-term
emergency and restoration protocol and long-term redevelopment decisions. A plan that is
admired by all that are subject to its recommendations considers the problems and opportunities
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for recovery and establishes responsibility among recovery officials. Pre-disaster recovery plans
have been fashioned by local officials in one of two ways. The first being a recovery plan that is
prepared as a stand-alone plan that is more manageable, viable, technically sophisticated, and
less demanding. The second is of a recovery plan as a component of a jurisdiction’s
comprehensive plan. The integrated approach is more capable of mobilizing additional resources,
correlating recovery with other planning facets, and coordinating with existing symbiotic
regulatory tools (Berke & Campanella, 2006). Altogether, recovery plans should accommodate
for vulnerable populations, disaster mitigation, and long-term gain in considering pre-planning
for rebuilding (Corbin, 2015).
Planning should account for how post-disaster recovery efforts can be restrained by any
combination of limited funds, lacking consensus and agreement, weak community networks, and
inherent lines of communication and planning tools (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch,
& Choy, 2015). Without trusted community networks to help negotiate the bureaucracy of
disaster recovery, low-income victims of extreme weather may also receive fewer benefits
(Baussan, 2015). For other barriers to be overcome and for commitment to be maximized in the
recovery process requires early and persistent participation by all pertinent stakeholders
including especially those that are affected and marginalized (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman,
Schuch, & Choy, 2015; Corbin, 2015; Berke & Campanella, 2006). On occasion dramatic events
can empower traditionally marginalized groups to advocate for policy proposals and capture the
attention of particularly persistent policymakers to be more receptive of change (Corbin, 2015).
A whole-community approach to emergency management policies that fosters community
involvement and engagement with community nongovernmental leaders and state agencies can
help to determine the unique needs of communities in emergency situations (Baussan, 2015).

48

2.3.2.2 Community Betterment
The concept of betterment has emerged as an approach that forgoes the trend of rapid
reconstruction and rebuilding of affected communities after being stricken by disasters. While
reconstruction post-disaster is often seen as an opportunity to build better and more resilient
structures, under a betterment approach reconstruction must also add ‘value beyond what existed
before the disaster’. Hence, under a betterment approach to reconstruction there are opportunities
for considering future spatial and societal impacts caused by climate change. However,
reconstruction usually happens at a fast pace and conflicts arise between groups and institutions
because different goals are not given sufficient attention in time, resources and values.
Betterment extends beyond physical structures, including improved urban planning practices,
greater social equity and economic development focused on the strength of local industries
(Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015).
In terms of adaptation, betterment is synthesized by disaster risk reduction and climate change
adaptation. Integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation demands greater
collaboration between communities of policy makers, practitioners and researchers. Experiences
from disaster stricken areas highlight the challenges involved in advancing planning strategies to
incorporate trends put forward by concepts such as betterment. In post-disaster situations, overall
impression that there is compression in time and space under which recovery efforts such as
reconstruction work occurs impedes more robust solutions advocated by the betterment concept
(Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015).

2.3.3 Climate Adaptation
Climate adaptation has been a localized focus for community action to combat regional climate
impacts utilizing organized resources (Picketts, et al., 2012; Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015).
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Modelling climate change impacts is an intellectually demanding and knowledge-intensive
endeavor and thus typically occurs at scales larger than the specific options for responding to
impacts account for. Because of its rootedness in scientific inquiry, the adaptation planning
process resembles the rational model, from scoping the problem, to analyzing and weighing
alternative adaptation strategies, and to implementing plans (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). The
combination of resource intensity and modernity of climate has as of yet removed climate
adaptation planning from political influence in confining it to nongovernmental organizations or
environmental departments of local government (Solecki, Leichenko, & O'Brien, 2011). The
conundrum of its current authority is that adaptation planning requires in addition to technical
capacity and financial assets, political support in order to find success (Shi, Chu, & Debats,
2015).
Climate adaptation can either be anticipatory or reactive depending on when it occurs in relation
to a hazardous event. Anticipatory adaptation occurs before climate impacts are experienced and
thus is proactive while reactive adaptation is just the opposite, occurring after impacts have been
experienced. Adaptation can also either be private, initiated by individuals, households or private
entities, or it can public, undertaken by government to allow desired public outcomes to come
into fruition. Adaptation can be impulsive or impromptu as an autonomous adaptation, or it can
take the form of a planned style, where a calculated, deliberate course of action is taken
(Glavovic & Smith, 2014).
If local governments were to champion adaptation planning efforts they would be tasked with
translating scientific forecasts of future climate conditions into tangible impacts on local
activities through risk and vulnerability assessments, and deciding on adaptation opportunities
for unpredictable climate impacts across long planning horizons (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015).
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Local and regional government authority over climate adaptation efforts can translate into swift
planning for specific impacts close to home, strategies that provide tangible benefits to residents,
and policies derived from input and contribution of local stakeholders (Picketts, et al., 2012).
Strategies that have been established under adopted adaptation plans include investments in
ecological and engineering infrastructure, institutional reforms to existing plans, codes, insurance
policies, and development approval processes, as well as programs to alter cultural and
behavioral practices (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). These devised strategies are frequently tied to
specific urban sectors, such as water supply and sanitation, public health, energy, and
transportation as opposed to communities (Solecki, Leichenko, & O'Brien, 2011).
An exceptional policy portfolio is one that exemplifies anticipatory governance and adaptive
thinking. To recall, adaptive and anticipatory policies embody flexibility. Flexible policies are
flexible because they consider both contingency and robustness. Contingent policies are tailored
to a specific future, while robust policies are those that have a positive effect across many
possible futures and can preserve future options. If a particular policy is preferred under one set
of changes but not under other sets of changes, then the policy is contingent. If a future outlined
by a particular scenario does not materialize, then the policy aligned with that scenario will
remain unused, but without such a policy a community risks being unprepared. The worst case
option is an instance of a contingent policy. Robust policies offer a vigorous decision that yields
preferable results under multiple scenarios, and include two options. The no-regrets option is
justified by current climate conditions, and further justified when climate change is considered
across many possible scenarios. The low-regrets option is low cost in the short term and can be
adapted over time to address several possible scenarios. This latter option allows for the
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distribution of costs over time as opposed to one-time lump sum investments to carry out a
particular policy that might be abandoned (Berke & Lyles, 2013).

2.4 Planning for Vulnerable Groups
2.4.1 Fundamental Considerations
There are generalized public risks and susceptibility to extreme flooding and coastal storms that
planners account for, but when planning for the most socially vulnerable and low-income
segment of the public, special consideration should be given for certain socioeconomic
limitations. Beyond their recognized characteristics that make them vulnerable to these disasters,
low income groups are constantly faced with deficient resources, knowledge of risks, and
capacity/influence that exacerbate their situation and less frequently get addressed by planners.
2.4.1.1 Resources
Those living in poverty are more likely to experience wage and food insecurity, lack homeowner
or renter insurance, have fewer backing social resources, have access to transportation, and
experience housing instability. Insufficient access to any one of these resources diminishes the
ability of an impoverished family to properly prepare for and endure a disaster unscathed.
Because of their economic vulnerability, low income households are unable to absorb the
financial impact of a disruptive severe storm event. Necessary storm-related preparations in the
form of food, fuel and logistics impose an unfathomable demand on the finances of these
households. Living month to month, they lack the disposable income to bail themselves out of
making risky decisions. Often working temporary or part-time jobs, they lack the luxury of
supporting themselves for several days away from home that would require setting aside enough
cash or credit, sacrificing pay, and sacrificing the ability to pay next month’s rent or mortgage
payment and other mandatory expenses. These households also often have minimal or limited

52

familial or social networks to rely upon in these times of financial strain (Behr & Diaz, 2014;
Baussan, 2015).
Familial and social networks made up of extended family, friends, associates and colleagues are
a component of social capital. The presence of these networks influence evacuation and
sheltering decisions that low income households make as they may coordinate financial,
emotional and knowledge-based resources with members of their networks. Low income
households that have deficient social capital are both unable to bear the financial strain of a
disaster and have no means to evacuate or seek shelter if no emergency facilities are nearby
(Behr & Diaz, 2014). The social capital of many low income households is a direct reflection of
their housing situation.
The place of residence is arguably the most vital resource financially and in preventing potent
impacts and harm from coastal disasters. An unfortunate truth is that even when low-income
households are also homeowners they tend to miss out on adequate recovery assistance funds.
Housing assistance after extreme weather events often favors middle-class victims as award
amounts are based on housing values rather than the cost of repairs. Housing serves as a lifeline
between the low-income household and the elements, with construction, age, weatherization and
location all contributing to the effectiveness of their defense. Low-income housing is more often
than not poorly constructed, aging, in less desirable neighborhoods that lack quality services, and
are unfortified (Ross, 2013).
2.4.1.2 Perception of Risks
Failure to acknowledge the risks associated with weather events made worse by climate change
is as a matter of fact, a generalized public dilemma. Vulnerable groups are one segment of the
latent public that place a low priority on action except that they happen to be more at risk.
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Planning domains like hazard mitigation and disaster risk reduction lack publics that have the
same degree of appreciation of the problems as planners.
Countless studies have shown that the public is aware of the risks from climate change and
natural hazards but yet assign low priorities to taking action. By involving stakeholders, planners
can increase public understanding of these issues and persuade potential constituency groups of
the need for action. Planners motivate broader involvement by directly engaging more groups
and by providing public forums for increasing awareness and understanding that public risks are
mass-produced and shared problems (Burby, 2003; Berke & Lyles, 2013).
Connecting back to resources, a low-income household’s assessment of impending risk is shaped
by their social resources or capital, as are their preparation, evacuation and sheltering decisions.
Through their peer networks, households gather knowledge of available resources, and exit
strategies, routes and destinations. Without peer anecdotes, isolated households can become
complacent toward their safety when more frequent less severe storms given them a false sense
of security. The most severe storms that are the largest threat to vulnerable groups are often
thought of as off in a distant future or not a threat to their community as low-income households
have dodged these storms before (Behr & Diaz, 2014).
Until members of the at-risk public experience a severe hazard event or comprehend their
urgency through engagement, they will continue to place them at a low level of priority for their
own consideration. Disasters offer an opportunity for the public to become familiar with the
response and recovery process and learn how to better prepare for the next event. Unfortunately,
though, for those that are most vulnerable, they may not get a second chance to demonstrate their
disaster readiness and learning progress from one event to the next (Schwab, 2014).
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2.4.1.3 Capacity & Influence
Residents of low-income communities are not as able to inform or influence government
officials or are able to recover as quickly or completely as individuals who live in more
financially secure neighborhoods (Baussan, 2015). Evidence from hurricanes in the 1990s and
2000s revealed that income was a critical factor in the amount of damage and pace of recovery.
Owner-occupied housing and housing located in higher income neighborhoods suffer less
damage and recover more quickly than multifamily housing (Peacock, Van Zandt, Zhang, &
Highfield, 2014). Lower income minority neighborhoods in cities that endured substantial
damage from a hurricane were more devastated and slower to receive back their original
residents and return to normal than neighborhoods that were predominantly middle to upper
income and non-minority (Green, Kouassi, & Mambo, 2013).
Residents in more whole and connected communities have means to assist in recovery and
prevent displacement while identifying local needs for officials during an extreme weather event,
although many low-income neighborhoods are disengaged and declining (Baussan, 2015). With
rental households often left out of outreach efforts or are deemed inaccessible, low-income
families are regularly unaware of actions taking place or resources available considering a
majority of low-income households are renters. Higher-income evacuees are able to secure
surplus housing in a community during a disaster thanks to heightened knowledge and eligibility,
and thus they restrict the ability of low-income renters to find affordable housing in the wake of
being displaced. Even when low-income families seemingly benefit from government decisions,
without consulting with affected individuals, officials may bring low-cost housing up to safety
standards and unknowingly price families out such that they are no longer able to find safe and
affordable housing (Ross, 2013).
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Without consulting with residents of poor neighborhoods, weaknesses in evacuation plans may
never get exposed. Disaster plans of vulnerable communities are not saturated with local
knowledge nor are they consistent with local conditions, concerns, and capacities of
disadvantaged citizens. One study found that, in the comprehensive planning process, of the
typical stakeholders included, groups representing disadvantaged people living in hazardous
areas were present in 5% of jurisdictions (Burby, 2003). Compared with middle and upper
income families, those belonging in the lowest income groups are inherently limited in selfgovernance (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011).
Accompanied by the general apathy toward disaster preparedness and mitigation among lowincome groups is uncertainty, distrust and suspicion that further strains their ability to influence
as they are more consumed by discrimination and inequality (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock,
& Rausch, 2011). Directly correlated with having deficient social capital, isolated residents are
less likely to be rescued, seek medical help, evacuate, and receive assistance from others. The
highest prevalence of isolated individuals with few social ties is in poor African American
communities (Aldrich, 2014). Getting often-neglected stakeholders into the planning process
provides planners with an important tool for increasing their political effectiveness (Burby, 2003;
Berke & Lyles, 2013). The economic situation of individuals and the sensitivity and disposition
of personnel and officials present formidable barriers and opportunities for achieving full
recovery and ultimately resiliency (Green, Kouassi, & Mambo, 2013). Breaking down barriers to
resiliency among marginalized low-income groups hinges on planning that is in conjunction with
a process whereby officials, residents and organizations work together to build community
capacity to take on locally defined priorities (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch,
2011).
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2.4.2 Community Resilience
A thriving community is a united district where face-to-face interaction is fundamental to
building trust within and throughout. Individual members of the community can feel empowered
through collective action to hold each other and their authorities accountable. A strategy for
building capacity to achieve disaster resiliency within low-income groups finds a balance
between engagement of local residents, reinforcement of expert and local knowledge, and
activities that match marginalized populations’ values and accountability with goals within the
community. Accountability and autonomy together grant low-income groups the authority to
develop their own plans and to strive for communal ambitions (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen,
Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011).
2.4.2.1 Combining Approaches
The concept of community resilience is a framework for enhancing disaster resilience at the scale
of the community that borrows from the strengths of disaster preparedness, response and
recovery, and climate adaptation (Cutter, Ash, & Emrich, 2014). Communities themselves are
agglomerations of individuals and groups in a somewhat defined area that may have similar
ideals, goals and perspectives, and certain cultural and social attributes. Community resilience
describes the collective ability of a neighborhood or geographically defined area to deal with
stressors and efficiently resume the rhythms of daily life through cooperation following shocks
(Aldrich, 2014). A resilient community resembles a system of resilient socioecological systems.
Communities as systems of systems are expected to function proficiently, but watchful design
and engineering goes into ensuring they function effectively and resiliently in the face of crises
like coastal disasters (Schwab, 2014).
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Steps taken to make coastal communities more resilient can also make them more equitable in
the long run. Efforts to achieve coastal resilience must acknowledge the disparate vulnerabilities
of individuals and groups, as well imbalances in the distributions of benefits and costs associated
with resilience outcomes. Resilience policies and projects should aim to reduce burdens on the
most vulnerable in communities, and seek to distribute benefits and amenities fairly and in ways
that fully benefit all socio-economic groups. Coastal resilience should be understood as a unique
opportunity to raise the life prospects and living conditions of the most disadvantaged in the
community and remove or at least reduce vulnerabilities as the next storm hits. Hurricane
Katrina unabatedly demonstrated that the drivers and root causes of poverty and inequity need to
be confronted if disaster risk is to be reduced (Glavovic & Smith, 2014).
2.4.2.2 Social Policy
Applying a social justice lens to climate change helps to direct policies toward priorities that
most directly resonate with the communities that are most vulnerable to its destructive
consequences (Mearns & Norton, 2009). Social capital and social equity are two concepts of
social theory that can be adapted to the urban environment specifically in identifying unique
attributes and areas of need in communities (Aldrich, 2014). A perennial need in dealing with
coastal flooding and storms is to help poor and vulnerable people manage climate risks. Climate
risk reduction and poverty alleviation can both be achieved mutually and fully when social
policy approaches to adaptation are prioritized. Social policies have the added advantage of
empowering the poor and helping them to realize the voice and political prowess needed to
access risk management tools. Social policy can play a concerted role for climate change
adaptation due to its unique ability to unveil an arena of policies where equitable outcomes are
attained (Mearns & Norton, 2009).
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The earliest known definition of social capital identified social capital as good will, fellowship,
mutual sympathy, and social interaction among a group of individuals and families who make up
a social unit. Several disciplines have adopted the concept of social capital which identifies how
involvement and participation in groups can have positive outcomes for the individual and the
community. A more recent definition refers to social capital as the aggregate of the actual or
potential resources that are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition. This characterization is
expanded to the role of social capital in generating benefits beyond individuals at the
neighborhood and community level. From a community perspective, social capital is the features
of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate action and cooperation
for mutual benefit (Aldrich, 2014).
Social cohesion and networks have been a proven method for nurturing long-term resilience
during and after catastrophe. Social capital can be utilized as an asset for experts to be
communicated what resources are accessed through social networks, levels of trust in
communities, collective action, and other public goods by individuals. Disasters have become
platforms for reform in communities wherein practitioners have accounted for the increase in
those that are at risk to disasters and that disasters disrupt the fabric of community life and stress
social systems (Aldrich, 2014). In times of stress and crises social networks and relationships can
serve as critical support systems (Glavovic & Smith, 2014). Friendships, neighborly relations,
well-developed patterns of community and neighborhood socializing and sharing exemplify
ways that a community can be prepared for an extreme flood or severe storm (Glavovic & Smith,
2014). Incorporating social enhancement and maintenance into resilience fostering can counter
the perception of a paradoxical relationship between resilience and equity (Baussan, 2015).
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Integrating goals of equity, in the context of low-income communities, climate resilience is not
necessarily about bouncing back, but rather about bouncing forward to eliminate inequities and
the unsustainable use of resources. Shifting the pattern of attention in low income areas from
stagnant underfunded initiatives and infrastructure to enhancing social cohesion reinforces
climate resiliency and improves fiscal and human health. Improvements to hard infrastructure
often comes at a cost to soft infrastructure, that includes institutions vital to maintaining the
health, cultural, and social guidelines of a community. Planning for resilient communities that
neglects reinforcing social interconnectivity overlooks the ability of social cohesion to protect
highly vulnerable communities from the adverse impacts of dangerous coastal events (Baussan,
2015).
Table 3. Capacity Building to Maximize Interaction
Time banking and community currency Provide incentives or rewards for those who volunteer
Focus group meetings and social events Casual atmosphere to personalize planning and air
out issues related to planning
Visioning, charrettes and workshops For establishing goals and deciding on strategies that
are consensus driven
Planning community layout and Careful planning of the physical layout of
architectural structures communities, neighborhoods, and housing
complexes can affect creation and maintenance of
social capital
Source: (Aldrich, 2014; Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011)
Breaking down barriers to disaster resiliency hinges on community planning that embraces the
idea that public officials, local people, and independent mediating organizations work together in
a process aimed at building community capacity to engage, organize, and take action on locally
defined priorities (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011). Given the importance of
social capital in determining resilience to shocks, NGOs and government agencies have adopted
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a number of policies and programs shown to increase reservoirs of trust and deepen networks.
The various methods build on existing networks and community activities as spaces for
incorporating disaster issues and resilience actions or create whole new networks and activities
focused specifically on disaster issues (Aldrich, 2014).

2.5 Plan Qualities
In a broad sense, two dimensions of plan quality principles are conceived for application in plan
quality evaluations. The internal plan quality dimension captures principles that guide the
content and format of the key components of a plan. The external plan quality dimension serves
principles related to how well the plan is compatible with its local situation to maximize its
efficacy and influence. Goals, fact base, policies and actions, and implementation and monitoring
make up those internal plan quality principles. To be expected, inter-organizational coordination
and participation then compose the external dimension of plan quality (Berke, Smith, & Lyles ,
2012).
Goals, affected by the expanse of values, convey a vision for future desired conditions. Fact base
delivers the empirical basis to which key hazard risks, susceptibilities and vulnerabilities are
identified and prioritized for policy making to be free from gaps. Policies and actions ensure that
the vision laid out in plan goals is achieved by guiding decisions influenced by fact and
experience. Implementation and monitoring involves the coordinating of organizational
responsibilities, timelines, and funds to implement a plan. Monitoring specifically, involves
tracking the extent to which policies are carried out and how conditions have changed over time.
Inter-organizational coordination is then a recognition and demonstration of the interdependence
of actions among local and regional entities. Rather relatedly, participation is a recognition and
demonstration of the role formal and informal actors such as governmental bodies, private-sector
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institutions, nonprofits, and individual citizens have in preparing plans (Berke, Smith, & Lyles,
2012).

2.5.1 Goals
Typically, goals for resilience are conservative and conventional in accounting for efficiency and
public safety but not other arguably more important values for long-range resiliency, like social
and environmental equity. Maintaining efficiency and public safety are bases for persistence
rather than constructive transformation that result from capitalizing on those windows of
opportunity (Berke & Lyles, 2013). Goals that guide all other principles to secure long-term
resilience and promote equity are transformative goals with a vision for building back better, and
restorative goals for minimizing losses (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014).
Within a disaster recovery plan, goals are attentive to the nature and magnitude of a disaster, the
needs of individuals and households, broader community characteristics, and a wide range of
appropriate housing options to meet disaster needs and enable individuals, households, and
communities to rebuild quickly and effectively (Cantrell, Nahmens, Peavey, Bryant, & Stair,
2012).

2.5.2 Fact Base
A fact base that does not capture the whole picture is already debilitating for future action
considering policymakers cannot change what is not measured. An inadequate fact base is based
solely on maps that delineate hazards, and quantified current property and population exposure to
hazards. These are neglecting potential future levels of exposure and alternative future scenarios
of exposure and do not account for uncertainty and the possibility for a range of future changes
(Berke & Lyles, 2013; Baussan, 2015).
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A comprehensive fact base identifies localized hazards, estimates population and property
exposed, and models disaster impact scenarios of varying severity and exposure from changing
development patterns (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014; Glavovic & Smith,
2014).
2.5.2.1 Vulnerability Index
Agencies can create a social and climate vulnerability index to reduce vulnerability and increase
resilience in low income communities. Data from the index would also help planners and
emergency preparedness personnel understand the geography and manner to which resources
should be focused (Baussan, 2015).

2.5.3 Policies
Regardless of goals, action all too often focuses on structural projects rather than on
comprehensive strategies that coordinate multiple economic, environmental, and social policies
and investments (Berke & Lyles, 2013). A superior array of policies is one that is proactive not
reactive (Glavovic & Smith, 2014).
2.5.3.1 Preparedness, Recovery & Restoration
Building back better can be realized through action by removing blight, smart growth, enhancing
public safety, and distributing services and facilities equitably among others. Actions such as
repairing and replacing development, and resuming economic activity satisfy restorative goals
(Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014).
In planning for disaster recovery, policies should support individuals, households and
communities in returning to self-sufficiency as quickly as possible, affirm and fulfill
fundamental disaster housing responsibilities and roles, increase collective capacity and ability to
meet the needs of those affected, build capabilities to provide a broad range of flexible housing
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options (sheltering, interim housing, and permanent housing), better integrate disaster housing
assistance with related community support services and long-term recovery efforts, and improve
disaster housing planning to better recover from disaster. These policies might also be temporary
building moratoriums, graduated standards for activating building acquisition and relocation,
post-disaster housing siting and supply for sheltering, interim housing and permanent housing,
provisions for adjusting public facility capital improvements, provisions for changing land use
regulations, changing building code standards (Cantrell, Nahmens, Peavey, Bryant, & Stair,
2012; Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014).
2.5.3.2 Infrastructure & Assets
Government policies should generally minimize displacement under extreme flooding and
disaster scenarios. In tackling inequities governments can enhance the affordable housing stock,
invest in urban infrastructure improvements, and improve access to public transportation
particularly in low income neighborhoods. Weatherizing existing low income housing as a
preventative measure for expecting the worst, and prioritizing post-disaster repairs to have the
greatest impact in low income areas can increase climate resilience. In the event that portions of
or whole communities are displaced, voluntary buyout programs should be in place and
community relocation programs should be devised with communities to not sacrifice social
connectedness or economic vitality (Baussan, 2015).
2.5.3.3 Awareness & Knowledge
Operating in the space where climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction overlap, policies can
encompass awareness, training, education and capacity building programs targeted for specific
communities including those most vulnerable. Sufficient resources should be reserved to sustain
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them, and they should be presented in a way so as not to inject fear to citizens that might occur
with negative messaging (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015).

2.5.4 Inter-Organizational Coordination
Unlike the first three principles, inter-organizational coordination can either be present or not
present in plans and not just of good quality or bad quality. Pulling from climate change
adaptation, coordination would look like an enhancement of the role of local government, and
adequate resources provided in support of collaborative governance and local capacity building,
local advocacy and disasters as opportunity (Glavovic & Smith, 2014). In recognizing that
recovery tasks are interconnected and that a systems approach to institutional management can
enhance adaptive capacity, inter-organizational coordination applies systems thinking (Schwab,
2014).
2.5.4.1 Plan Integration & Horizontal Coordination
Invaluable collaboration is achieved when there is effective horizontal and vertical integration
and coordination of actions across a region or system. In a unified region or system, there is a
free flow of information, transparent communication, shared resources, and parallel practices
(Schwab, 2014; Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). Significant
interoperability between organizations at all levels is key to a whole government approach
whereby policies, programs and actions are developed and implemented across a number of
distinct actors (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). This is accomplished
by decentralizing implementation where decision-making authority to carry out operations is
spread out across departments, and accountability is emphasized in decision-making (Schwab,
2014). Other components of coordination could be identifying representatives to serve on local
recovery task forces charged with directing rebuilding, identifying external organizations to
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serve as sources of resources from the network of disaster assistance, and identifying and
building trust with elected and civic leaders of climate and economically vulnerable communities
via vulnerability indexes (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014; Baussan, 2015).

2.5.5 Participation
An absence of robust participation in plans is rooted in the limited support for pre-disaster
planning with considerable public indifference and local official reluctance to act on public risks.
As a result, forward movement on action has been sluggish and limited (Berke & Lyles, 2013).
Reserving a place for inclusive and continued participation can ignite communities and planners
to improve on their plans, and if a standard of excellence is established, momentum may gather
to increase the speed of learning and quality in plans (Brody, 2003).
2.5.5.1 Diverse Communication
Residents often become disconnected from the planning process when abstract policy issues are
addressed during the development of the comprehensive plan, though they are more engaged
when they become aware of the impacts of hazards and climate risks on their personal property
and safety. This type of awareness can be achieved through targeted information dissemination
in linking planning problems to specific sites or properties, and presenting problems to the public
in a way that is comprehensible during the planning process. Positive and committed leadership
in government, the private sector and the community is required to improve the communication
about climate risks and establish planning and decisions horizons focused on combating future
vulnerabilities. Community engagement processes and community partnerships for action can
inform leadership. A bottom-up approach to community engagement should be positioned that
facilitates a consultative partnership supporting, rather than being replaced by, strong leadership.
(Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). Leadership within low income
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communities should be championed by state and local organizations by supporting community
engagement programs (Baussan, 2015).
2.5.5.2 Capacity Building
Informed, engaged and prepared communities, inclusive of all citizens, that compliments
leadership requires a community with high adaptive capacity capable of managing risks
especially during the response and recovery phases and seizing opportunities that arise as a
consequence of disasters (Brody, 2003). Informed and prepared communities also need the
support of awareness, training, education and capacity building programs (Serrao-Neumann,
Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). Stakeholder groups can boost collective planning
capacity by bringing knowledge, expertise, and resources to the planning process. Stakeholder
participation can also educate the public through involvement in the process, which can facilitate
and increase the pace of collective learning, and help prepare for the impacts of climate change
to ensure that a range of development priorities are not undermined in the future (Brody, 2003;
Glavovic & Smith, 2014).
2.5.5.3 Participation Techniques
Participation in the planning, response and recovery process can take on different forms and
involve many actors. Participation can and should occur in the pre-event phase and after to
adaptively manage the recovery process and fit transforming conditions and needs. Participation
involves community liaison designation, citizen advisory committees, public meetings, media
releases through radio, television and local papers, and in public notices, public surveys and
online. Participation should have record of all involved by including a narrative on participants,
how they participated, and how they affected the progression of the plan (Berke, Cooper,
Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014)
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2.5.6 Implementation and Monitoring
Elements of implementation often do not assign organizational responsibility or identify
timelines and sources of funding for carrying out action, and monitoring programs often fail to
specify indicators and sources of data to track progress toward plan goals and assign organization
responsible for data collection (Berke & Lyles, 2013). Monitoring is necessary to ensure that
decisions in the recovery process align with the community’s vision and long-term recovery
goals and objectives outlined in the pre-disaster conceived recovery plan. It also ensures
accountability, transparency, and equity in the recovery process in being able to set a time-table
for reaching milestones and clearly communicate progress to the public and stakeholders.
Monitoring allows damage and economic loss assessments to be reviewed and the need to
modify or supplement post-disaster actions to be evaluated. Reviewing priorities for
implementation on a regular basis is necessary post-disaster to accordingly adjust as
circumstances warrant. The result of monitoring might be recommendations for enactment,
extension, or repeal of emergency ordinances and procedures that affect long-term development
(Schwab, 2014).
Implementation and monitoring is represented in post-event roles and responsibilities, predisaster maintenance to keep implementers familiar with the plan, criteria to guide determination
of partial or full activation of the plan, monitoring indicators to track outcomes, use of recovery
funds and evaluate and adapt policies, and a space provided for learning and increased financial
support in climate change adaptation policy and practice (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, &
Horney, 2014; Glavovic & Smith, 2014).
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Chapter 3. Methods
3.1 Research Strategy
The core of this assessment is to analyze the ability of jurisdictional plans to tackle the
intensifying coastal perils of storms and flooding, specifically for the low-income segment of the
population that is statistically more vulnerable to these dangers. In order to successfully arrive at
conclusive evidence of whether or not these plans are accomplishing that feat, I package
recommendations from peer reviewed studies and protocol items from related evaluation
protocol into a replicable plan evaluation protocol explicit to reducing the vulnerability and risks
of low-income populations.
The hazard mitigation, climate adaptation, emergency management, and disaster recovery plans
of the two coastal cities of Norfolk and New York serve as the subject of evaluation. New York
and Norfolk, VA are two cities that have been on the forefront of planning for coastal storms,
flooding and climate change. As noted earlier, both cities have also experienced a federally
declared disaster since 2010, both of which were hurricanes that brought damaging winds and
widespread flooding, in Hurricane Irene for the City of Norfolk, and Hurricane Sandy for the
City of New York. This is important as it means that both Norfolk and New York have received
federal disaster relief and recovery funding, and have had motive to invest in improving their
pre-event planning.
To further emphasize the focus on reducing the vulnerability of the low-income portion of the
most susceptible populations, certain customary principles in disaster plan evaluation protocol
are omitted in place of more appropriate indicators. The resulting fine-tuned evaluation protocol
is in the perspective of the planner and plan creator who plans for an area with a fairly high
number of low-income residents, even if wealthy residents are also present. As income inequality
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has increased in New York where low-income neighborhoods stagnate, and whole portions of
Norfolk are overcome by poverty, both cities satisfy the low-income condition of the evaluation
protocol. Ultimately, though the specially designed evaluation protocol correlates content present
in plans with a determination of plan ability, the framework that is laid out on planning for lowincome vulnerable populations in the literature review shapes the interpretation of the plans’
proficiency in reducing vulnerability to low-income persons.

3.2 Preliminary Data Collection
The accumulation of plans from Norfolk and New York is the preliminary data collection phase
while the principal data collection phase involves dissecting the quality and content of these
plans as it relates to each item in the evaluation protocol. The score given to each protocol item
or indicator for each particular evaluated plan represents points of data to be analyzed once all
plans have been evaluated completely.
Prior to evaluating the plans, to offer additional context to patterns of vulnerability in both cities
and areas where social impacts are most likely to occur following a disaster, I conduct
vulnerability assessments incorporating pieces of information that are most widely cited as
indicators of vulnerability to coastal storms and flooding. This information provides a
benchmark to validate that the plans are or are not justified in their approaches to enhancing the
preparedness and adaptability of low-income communities particularly vulnerable. The
vulnerability indexes that are created influence the plan evaluation process in relation to content
relevant to low-income and other vulnerable populations.

3.2.1 Plan Assimilation & Refinement
Plans to be examined in detail under the evaluation protocol were predominantly assimilated
from electronic sources. Government and organization, academic and private sector sites, and

70

academic journals were perused to acquire plans of interest. News articles, press releases,
PowerPoint presentations, links from related sites, and journal articles offered knowledge of the
existence of plans not immediately apparent in initial searches. Around twenty plans were
identified for each city that included action for coastal hazards and climate change risks such as
sea-level rise, flooding events, and coastal storms. The plans were produced over a period from
around 2003 to the present and represented private-sector, local government, regional
government, academic, and state plans. To limit the reach of plans that would be included in the
evaluation I placed a limit on the date to be no earlier than 2011 for Norfolk and no earlier than
2012 for New York, or around the time that each had a federal disaster declaration. The list of
plans was narrowed down to six for each city. Individually the plans were quite different from
each other without substantial overlap for its respective jurisdiction, though they had
counterparts across jurisdictions. Collectively, the plans represent collaborative private sector
efforts, nonprofit endeavors, resilience-themed comprehensive plans, 100 Resilient Cities funded
reports, neighborhood scale plans, federally required hazard mitigation plans, and HUD funded
disaster recovery plans.
3.2.1.1 Norfolk Plans
Specific plans for Hampton Roads and Norfolk were obtained from websites for the HRPDC; the
City of Norfolk; Hampton Roads and Norfolk’s emergency management agencies; state divisions
like the Department of Housing and Community Development, the Department of Environmental
Quality’s Coastal Zone Management program, and the Department of Conservation and
Recreation; the Mitigation and Research Institute and the Center for Sea Level Rise at Old
Dominion University; Resilient Virginia; Wetlands Watch; federal agencies like HUD and
FEMA; Structures of Coastal Resilience; and Norfolk Resilient City.
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One criteria for plan selection was that the city of Norfolk must be within the geographic scope
of the plan, though it was not required that it be the focus of attention. The second requirement
was that the plan, as a means to capture a broad spectrum of plans, must address coastal storms,
climate change (as adapting to), sea level rise, flooding, and/or coastal erosion.
Once all pertinent plans for Norfolk were retrieved as complete documents, they were compiled
into a full list by name of the document, planning domain or approach, name of the organization
responsible, sector the organization belongs in, geographic scope of the plan, and date of
publication. Each of these characteristics are important as they may come into play when
interpreting and forging conclusions of plan evaluation data, to what degree a plan
underperforms or outperforms its scope, and to understand unforeseen factors influencing the
quality of the plans. All plans were published either around the time of Hurricane Irene or later,
though plans published most recently were included more often.
Table 4. Final List of Evaluated Plans for Norfolk, VA
Document Title

Domain/
Approach

Organization

Sector

Jurisdiction Publish
Date

RE.invest City Report 2015
Norfolk
Southside Hampton Roads
Hazard Mitigation Plan

Risk reduction

Re:Focus Partners

Non-profit

Norfolk

2015

Hazard
mitigation

HRPDC

Regional
government

8/1/2011

PlaNorfolk 2030

Hazard
mitigation
Regenerative
design
Community
resilience, risk
reduction
Risk
reduction,
climate
adaptation

City of Norfolk
Wetlands Watch,
ODU, Hampton U
Commonwealth of
Virginia

Local
government
Non-profit,
academic
State
government

Southside
Hampton
Roads
Norfolk
Norfolk

1/1/2016

Hampton
Roads

10/1/2015

Norfolk Office of
Resilience

Local
government

Norfolk

10/28/2015

Tidewater Rising Resiliency
Challenge
ThRIVe: Resilience in
Virginia
Norfolk Resilience Strategy
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3/26/2013

3.2.1.2 New York Plans
Specific plans for New York were acquired through websites for the Department of City
Planning; the City of New York; New York’s emergency management division; state divisions
like the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery; New York’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency;
and Rebuild by Design.
Both criteria were similar as for Norfolk, though the first requirement for New York plans was
that the plans be either synonymous with the city itself geographically or be for a subarea of the
city like a borough, group of neighborhoods, or neighborhood. The second requirement was that
each plan must address coastal storms, climate change (adapting to), sea level rise, flooding,
and/or coastal erosion.
Once all pertinent plans for New York were retrieved as complete documents, like Norfolk’s
plans, they were compiled into a full list by name of the document, planning domain or
approach, name of the organization responsible, type of organization or its sector, geographic
scope of the plan, and date of publication. All plans were published either around the time of
Hurricane Sandy or later. Emphasis was placed on plans that were published most recently.
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Table 5. Final List of Evaluated Plans for New York City
Document Title

Domain/
Approach

Organization

Sector

Jurisdiction Publish
Date

Lower Manhattan Protect
and Connect: NDRC Phase
2 Application

Mitigation,
regenerative
design,
preparedness
Risk
reduction,
adaptation
Hazard
mitigation

New York City Office
of
Recovery and
Resiliency
Department of City
Planning

Local
government

Manhattan

10/1/2015

Local
government

Bronx

10/1/2015

NYC Emergency
Management

Local
government

New York
City

1/31/2014

Adaptation,
mitigation,
community
resilience
Adaptation,
mitigation,
recovery,
preparedness
Regenerative
design

The City of New
York

Local
government

New York
City

4/22/2015

The City of New
York

Local
government

New York
City

6/11/2013

Bjarke Ingels Group

Privatesector

Manhattan

6/1/2014

Resilient Neighborhoods:
Edgewater Park
The City of New York
Hazard Mitigation Plan
2014
One New York: The Plan
for a Strong and Just City

PlaNYC: A Stronger, More
Resilient New York

The Big "U": Rebuild by
Design

3.2.2 Plan Background & Status
Accounting for the varying uses of plans from information document to policy document to
implementation roadmap, the background and status of each plan is identified and noted. To
ascertain an understanding of the generalized characteristics, introductory or appended
information that does not contribute to the plan evaluations, is scanned. In regards to status,
many plans written and published by local governments describe briefly the approval process
and the data of plan approval by a respective governing body as a matter of protocol. Others,
chiefly those created by consultants, non-profits and academia do not always make this
information public in the document itself. Local governments typically are responsible for
adopting consulted plans and putting the recommendations and information to use. Most recent
budget and financial report information for Norfolk and New York City are inspected to find
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current, past or future spending on plans, policies, and programs based out of the evaluated
plans. Whatever progress reports, annual updates, or press releases exist for the evaluated plans
are also gathered and examined for key status information. All of this accessory information does
not affect the plan evaluations in any way, but it does influence the analysis of the plan
evaluations, specifically as to the connection between quality vs. scope, and quality vs. adoption.

3.2.3 Vulnerability Assessment
A vulnerability assessment of the two examined cities is conducted by collecting and analyzing a
pool of information that illustrates the characteristics of these urban centers and of their
inhabitants. This information is specifically representative of the social and physical
vulnerability, and hazard exposure of the neighborhoods that make up their composition. Social
vulnerability is comprised of socioeconomic status, household composition, minority status,
housing type, transportation availability, and community facilities. All of the data except for
community facilities can be assembled from the U.S. census and American Community Survey
(Berke, et al., 2015). Physical vulnerability is composed of limited infrastructural conditions and
construction data. Hazard exposure for neighborhoods in the two cities consists of concentrations
of people and buildings located in flood-prone areas.
3.2.3.1 Census Data
Specific social vulnerability data points for each block group in both Norfolk and New York City
are collected from the 2010 U.S. Census. The 12 variables of data gathered from the census are
measures of social vulnerability from the Social Vulnerability Index for Disaster Management
developed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control. The Social Vulnerability Index typically
includes 15 variables, however 3 were excluded that were not included in the most recent U.S.
Census (Berke, et al., 2015).
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Table 6. Social Vulnerability Index for Disaster Management Using Census Variables

Domain
Socioeconomic status

Household consumption

Variable

Description

% Individuals below poverty

Individuals below poverty =”under
.50” + “.50 to .74” + “.75 to .99”

Per capita income

Mean income computed for every
person in census block group

% Persons with less than high
school diploma

Percentage of persons 25 years of
age or older, with less than a 12thgrade education

% Persons 65 years of age or older
% Persons 17 years of age or
younger

Minority status

Housing/Transportation

% Male or Female householder, no
spouse present, with children under
18

“Other family: male householder,
no wife present, with own children
under 18 years” + “Other family:
female householder, no husband
present, with own children under 18
years”

% minority

Total of the following: “Black or
African American alone” +
“American Indian or Alaska Native
alone” + “Asian alone” + “Native
Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander
alone” + “some other race alone” +
“two or more races” + “Hispanic or
Latino – White alone”

% Persons 5 years of age or older
who speak English less than well

For all age groups and all
languages- the total of the persons
who speak English “not well” or
“not at all”

% multiunit structure

Percentage of housing units with 10
or more units in structure

% mobile homes

Percentage of housing units that are
mobile homes

Crowding

At household level, more people
than rooms. Percentage of total
occupied housing units with more
than one person per room

No vehicle available

Percentage of households with no
vehicle available
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3.2.3.2 Vulnerability Mapping
The data points for each data category are compiled and mapped by block group GIS layer for
both the City of Norfolk and the City of New York. The census data provides socioeconomic and
demographic information that might not be obtainable otherwise but is limited in its picture of
social vulnerability. To supplement this data, several GIS datasets of community facilities are
acquired from each city’s respective open data site. Facilities such as hospitals, police and fire
stations, schools, senior and day care centers, shelters and other miscellaneous facilities are
mapped to overlay on top of the census tracts. The GIS data depicts the social resources of
people inherent in their proximity to critical facilities.
To convert the qualitative associations of the facilities data into quantitative the distance between
and from each spatial feature is measured. That is, the straight-line distance from each feature
representing a specific feature is calculated city-wide. The distance is depicted as equally spaced
rings where each ring symbolizes a set range of distance. The distance values are then averaged
across census tracts so that each census tract can then contain a value for its average distance
from a specified type of facility. Distance from critical facilities together with census
characteristics of the population make up the complete social vulnerability index.
In order to maintain accuracy and objectivity, first, percentile ranks are calculated for each data
point. Otherwise, each data point would unequally contribute to the overall measure of social
vulnerability. For instance, the percentage of those in poverty would inhabit a completely
different numerical range than per capita income. Also, several data points would need to
flipped, like per capita income, where the lower values represent the higher rank values and the
higher values represent the lower ranks. Once all census tracts have rank values between 0 and
100 for each social vulnerability data point, they are all combined into a complete measure of
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social vulnerability. Since 17 individual data points were utilized in calculating the social
vulnerability of all census tracts for Norfolk – 13 census data points and 4 types of facilities –
values for social vulnerability can range from 0 to 1700, as a raw calculation. For New York
City, in the same manner, 13 census data points were used and 10 types of facilities. The social
vulnerability values for both though are further normalized, for the purposes of mapping, as
percentile ranks.
Physical vulnerability is then representative of the structural and infrastructural vulnerabilities of
neighborhoods. In theory, the clearest image of structural vulnerability would be the structural
condition of buildings of significant use or importance, however, no such information exists on
any scale for either city. Still, road and shoreline conditions, green space, and building age and
cost information supply enough data to formulate an acceptable physical vulnerability index.
Road conditions only exist for New York City, while shoreline conditions such as wetlands,
beaches, and green space exist in GIS form for both.
Green space itself could be considered a quality of life measure, but for these purposes it is an
indicator of the permeability and thus regenerative ability of the environment in each census
tract. Green spaces are treated similarly to facilities, where the average distance from green space
is the desired permutation for each census tract. Building age and cost data is collected through
the American Community Survey and so it exists for both cities as well. Specifically, for housing
cost, the percentage of housing that costs in the lowest or two lowest cost categories for New
York and Norfolk is desired. All four data points (three for Norfolk) are normalized the same
way through percentile ranks and added together to determine physical vulnerability. The
physical vulnerability index is then similarly mapped, after normalizing and combining data
points, by census tract to be illustrated at the same scale as the social vulnerability index.
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Finally, mapping hazard exposure is more straightforward than social or physical vulnerability.
Since hazard exposure is the proximity of buildings and people to hazard-prone areas, mapping it
involves depicting the structures and population inhabiting areas in or near flood zones, storm
surge zones, or future flood zones based on sea-level rise. Hazard exposure is precisely the
product of density and exposure – in this instance flood exposure. Relying on census data and
buildings GIS data, population and building density relying on tract areas, are calculated for each
census tract. Both of these are overlaid on top of the 100-year flood zone, category 1-3 storm
surge areas, and sea-level rise mapping.
Flooding, storm surge and sea-level rise are all joined spatially, but each occurs in differing
severities to warrant their depiction. The various flood zones are treated as a hierarchy of flood
intensity and frequency. Values are assigned according to the number of different flood zones
from current 100-year flood zone to 2050 category 3 storm surge zone, where the current flood
zone is assigned a value of 1 and less frequent and future flood zones are assigned values higher.
The distances from the lowest chance flood zone is measured and added to the value of that zone.
All areas inside of the flood zones receive values according to which they are inside. The high
and low values are reversed and normalized by percentile rank. To abide by the accepted
equation for hazard exposure, the normalized density (population + building) is multiplied by the
normalized exposure values. The resulting values for hazard exposure are again normalized
through percentile ranks for mapping purposes. The hazard exposure index itself is thus the
approximate number of buildings and people located within different degrees of at-risk areas
measured according to density and the size of the at-risk area within each census tract.
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3.2.3.3 Vulnerability Index
Once all three – social vulnerability, physical vulnerability and hazard exposure – are mapped by
census tract, they can be combined into a single measure for social impacts, the intersection of all
three. To emphasize the focus on social vulnerability while also applying equal weight to each
data point within the indexes, each data point is multiplied by a constant such that the collection
of data points representing vulnerability and exposure add up to a total out of 100. The census
blocks with resulting values closest to 100 are considered most likely to experience social
impacts in the event of a disaster. Creating an index where values for total vulnerability are
distributed between 0 and 100 is accomplished by normalizing the minimum and maximum
scores for each measure of vulnerability before multiplying each by a constant.
Since census tracts are not synonymous with neighborhood boundaries, neighborhood locations
are mapped for each city alongside their census tracts data to aid in vulnerability determination.
Neighborhood vulnerability potential is determined by observing the proximity of neighborhoods
to their census tract counterparts. Whichever census tract a neighborhood is most closely related
with becomes the basis for the level of vulnerability that is observed for a neighborhood.
Because of the amount of estimation that goes into juxtaposing neighborhood units to census
spatial forms, the neighborhood units are categorized as having either above average, near
average or below average vulnerability. Neighborhoods with above average vulnerability are
those at or above the 60th percentile compiled vulnerability score. Below average vulnerability is
assigned for those at or below the 40th percentile. While near average vulnerability is determined
as a value between 40th and 60th percentiles. Mapping is color coded according to each 10-point
percentile range to dramatically simplify the process of categorizing the vulnerability of
neighborhoods.
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3.3 Plan Evaluation & Content Analysis
3.3.1 Coding Instrument
The coding instrument was developed based on a derivation of coding items to serve as a
recording unit for the plan content data. Within the coding instrument, the protocol items are a
holistic list of coding indicators that represent all relevant or necessary criteria adapted for this
study. The items are selected to assess how well each of the plan quality principles for coastal
storms and flooding are accounted for in the plans – specifically in enabling low-income
populations to be better prepared and adaptable. The content analysis itself cannot forge a
conclusion about whether a plan is of superior quality in that regard. The content analysis instead
relies on the replicable coding instrument to generate reliable information regarding the content
of plans (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012; Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014; Lyles
& Stevens, 2014).
To further emphasize the attention given to planning for the low-income, items that contribute
more to the preparedness and adaptability of these groups are distinguished from other coding
items. Their distinction lies in their weight that is greater than all other general population
planning indicators. The weighting of coding items is done categorically, by criteria, rather than
individually as all items are linked to similar items by a common criterion. Their specific
weighting is detailed in the scoring process. These weighted items are cited as quality indicators
that specifically enhance their ability to be prepared and adapt, or they are discussed in research
and interpreted as influential indicators created for the coding instrument. All of these more
heavily weighted items are subject to influence by the vulnerability index conducted prior to
coding. Much of the lesser weighted criteria is still relevant to a degree in planning for low-
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income populations, though they are decidedly less important than the others holding greater
weight either from emphasis or prevalence in the literature.

3.3.2 Direction-Setting Principles
The direction-setting principles for content analysis embody the vision and objectives of a plan.
These principles encompass goals, fact base, and strategies/actions. Each of these principles are
broken down into one or more criteria of which the protocol items are nestled under. General
context and the overarching vision of the plan both greatly influence how the plan will transpire
through goals especially, in deciding on what information is needed, and in making decisions on
what strategies and actions to implement.
3.3.2.1 Goals
The principle of goals encompasses future desired conditions that the plan intends to achieve that
reflects the breadth of values influencing the plan. In addition to general guidelines goals in all
plans should follow, in applying to vulnerability reduction, this principle is divided up into the
criteria of coordination, equity and social cohesion, restoration, adaptation and anticipation,
minimal impacts, and sustainability. Though goals illustrate the intentions and purpose of a plan,
no items under that principle receive added weight, even for equity and social cohesion, as goals
do not specifically translate into anything physical or measurable.
3.3.2.2 Fact Base
The fact base of a plan to reduce vulnerability to coastal hazards is the evidence-based
foundation to derive the characteristics of the people in harm’s way that contributes to their
susceptibility. Therefore, the fact base is partial to the vulnerability assessment, but also includes
more generalized existing conditions that set the standard. The vulnerability assessment, setting
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the standard for the rest of the document, receives weight equal to that of other more critical
planning criteria, and is thus subject to the results of the mapped vulnerability index.
3.3.2.3 Strategies/Actions
The strategy and action indexes are determinants of the approach that a particular plan takes to
combat coastal storms, flooding, and climate change. These criteria are of the more ubiquitous
awareness/knowledge and coordination, but also include the more specific smart growth and
development, preparedness and response, structural and infrastructural controls, design tools,
recovery and restoration, households and individuals, and community assets and services.
Awareness/knowledge, smart growth and development, preparedness and response, recovery and
restoration, households and individuals, and community assets and services are all weighted to
be subject to the result of the vulnerability index.

3.3.3 Action-Oriented Principles
The action-oriented principles are linked to the process and implementation of a plan. These
particular principles are of inter-organizational coordination, participation, implementation and
monitoring.
3.3.3.1 Inter-organizational Coordination
Inter-organizational coordination is included as a principle for the mobilization of knowledge
and resources, adherence and cooperation with other planning domains and organizations,
exchange of ideas, and intergovernmental support. Thus, criteria for this principle include plan
integration and horizontal coordination. Vertical coordination is typically also essential for plans,
specifically with the state and federal level, though is not included as an indicator of quality in
planning for vulnerable populations. The pooling of resources to support actions that benefit the
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poor manifests through coordination, but is merely an indirect effect on the low-income
population and so is weighted no differently than other general population criteria.
3.3.3.2 Participation
Participation is a measure of how the public is engaged to build a knowledgeable and
empowered constituency able to devise a plan that reflects local values, risks, needs, capabilities,
and enables ongoing public involvement. Participation consists of items that support the planning
process, public engagement techniques, and stakeholder/public involvement in the process.
Participation, viewed as a cornerstone in planning for low-income communities, is weighted and
influenced by the vulnerability index for all three criteria.
3.3.3.3 Implementation
Implementation ensures that the document is not just a collection of information, but a plan that
achieves what it recommends. To do this requires meticulous detail for each policy and program,
and universality in language and understanding. Two types of implementation are pertinent for
the purposes of this evaluation – responding to and recovering from coastal storms and flooding,
and implementing policies and programs. Principles of implementation in the protocol are then
responsibilities of organizations, responsibilities of individuals, timeline, and finances. Among
implementation items, the responsibility of individuals is weighted with other more essential
criteria.
3.3.3.4 Monitoring
The notion of accountability, important in following through on reducing vulnerability to lowincome populations, is central in monitoring plans. Monitoring occurs during implementation of
the plan to track its performance. The principle of monitoring in the protocol then encompass
monitoring implementation, self-monitoring, and updating the plan. Because of the political
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capacity bestowed on communities in monitoring the process, items for monitoring
implementation and self-monitoring are weighted.

3.3.4 Coding
The principles of the coding instrument can be separated into those that set the direction or
purpose of the plan and those that involve action. A total of 100 protocol items for content
analysis are divided up among the direction-setting and action-oriented plan principles. Each
planning principle has certain criteria that all protocol items meet. For example, a plan principle
might be the fact base of the plan, a criteria for fact base could be a vulnerability assessment, and
a protocol item within that criteria could be identifying socially and physically vulnerable
populations. Coding of each plan under the evaluation protocol is on an item-by-item basis rather
than by criteria. A code assigned for a particular protocol item corresponds with a numeric value.
A majority of items are coded using an ordinal 0-2 scale, while introductory and vision items are
coded using a binary 0-1 scale. 0 denotes that the item does not exist or is not mentioned in the
plan, 1 denotes that it exists or is mentioned in the case of a binary scale or that the particular
item is mentioned but not detailed in the case of an ordinal scale, and 2 denotes that the item is
mentioned and described in sufficient detail. In order for an indicator to be coded with a 2, when
applicable, the item should be denoted by a clear and detailed narrative description with lists,
tables, figures and maps etc. (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012; Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, &
Horney, 2014).
3.3.4.1 Coding Process & Reliability
Because coding the content of these plans is the most subjective and contingent data collection
procedure, the various pieces that contributed to this process were arranged in a manner that
maximize objectivity. The coding instrument reliably captures the meaning of desired content
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through the consistent use of items concocted from contemporary literature, other precedent
coding instruments, and my own interpretation of the literature. Where items breed subjectivity
in their vague phrasing, relatively speaking, informative comments are placed to accompany
each item and reinforce the structure and accuracy of the coding procedure. To further minimize
subjectivity, I conceived of an overwhelming majority of the coding indicators directly through
the literature I investigated rather than relying on personal inspiration. In most instances the
indicators were conceived by triangulating the literary interpretations of items that determine
plan quality. An issue that has been commonly expressed in coding plans using a succinct
instrument is to experience fluctuating results because fewer opportunities exist to remedy
human errors in coding. Many items representative of a type of content or approach reduce the
chance that a particular piece of content will be omitted or that errors in coding will invalidate
the results. Also, since I am the only coder, it is not necessary to instruct and acquaint other
potential contributors with the prerequisite knowledge. This eliminates the natural effect of
multiple coder subjectivity, but also a check on the potential subjectivity as a result of my
exclusive coding (Norton, 2008).
The actual coding of a plan first requires reading through plans as a basis to grasp their
organization and become acquainted with the arrangement of content. After a preliminary “runthrough” of a plan, I scrupulously search through sections of the specific plan that would contain
certain types of content. Key words are flagged to identify any associations that might satisfy the
meaning behind comments accompanying coding indicators. When words and phrases closely
match an indicator’s phrasing, a score is applied according to the detail included in that
indicator’s comment. Once a section that includes a portion of content has been completely
examined in this way, the corresponding portion of the coding instrument is revisited to both
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ensure items were coded correctly and that if indicators were not coded because no content
closely matched, then they are now coded accordingly. Although, due to the time-consuming
nature of constantly revisiting the wording of every coding indicator, and because after enough
practice the wording becomes ingrained, I eventually search sections and keep note of pertinent
content to code accordingly, through memory of the criteria. Nonetheless, this incremental and
adaptive procedure is repeated until all coding principles and criteria have been assigned a score
throughout.
3.3.4.2 Spatial Coding for Vulnerability
Before tallying the coding results, and during the coding process, the 54 coding items that are
weighted as a result of their subjectivity to the vulnerability index are supplementary scored
according to the mapped spatiality of vulnerability. In order to correlate the two processes, the
coding indicators for one weighted criterion or category that were identified in an evaluated plan
are observed at the spatial level. That is, any mention or detail of the location (neighborhood or
sub-area) within the city of a particular quality or piece of content is recorded. Using a table of
neighborhoods and block groups with their level of vulnerability specified as either below
average, near average, or above average, coding content is tallied for spatial reference into
whichever neighborhood it falls within, or census block if, due to vagueness, a neighborhood
label cannot be assigned. This is done for all plan content that satisfies one particular criterion.
Once all spatial references for a criterion are recorded, a count is made of the number of spatial
references. On a criterion by criterion basis, spatial references for neighborhoods of average
vulnerability are negated while below average references are subtracted from above average
references. If the operation results in a value of 1 or greater than a score of 1 is tacked on to that
criterion’s total coded score – the total of scores coded for each coding item within a single
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criterion. If the result is a value less than 0 then a value of 1 is subtracted from that criterion’s
total coded score. In the instance that the count for above average and below average
neighborhoods is equal, the score for a criterion is left unchanged. Additionally, if no spatial
references are mentioned in the plan for a specific criterion, then this spatial coding process is
not applicable and thus the score is also left unchanged. The value that is added or subtracted
from a criterion’s total coding score acts as a potential bonus point or penalty.

3.4 Data Manipulation & Interpretation
The scores assigned for each coding indicator in the evaluation protocol determine how the data
will be interpreted and the results of the interpretation.

3.4.1 Scoring
3.4.1.1 Total Score & Weights
After all plans are scored according to each coding indicator within the protocol, each plan’s
scores are tallied to determine a total score. The total score generates an idea of the amount of
items present and level of detail of those items for each plan. The total score does not however
convey the breakdown of scores for specific items and criteria.
To calculate the total score of a plan’s evaluation, first, weights are applied to each of the 100
coding indicators. The 54 indicators that were subjected to the vulnerability index receive larger
weight than the other 46 indicators that are more broadly applicable for the general population.
Hypothetically, a plan could receive a score of up to 200 in the absence of weighting. The score
is normalized, however, to be out of 100, where the 54 vulnerability-specific indicators
contribute to 75% of the score and the other 46 only 25% of the score. To achieve this result,
each of the 54 indicators are multiplied by a ratio of 75/108 or about 69.4%. The other 46
indicators are multiplied by the ratio 25/92 or roughly 27.2%. The vulnerability-specific
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indicators thus receive about 2.5 times as much weight as the other indicators. Including the
spatial coding associated with the vulnerability index, the maximum possible score could be 109,
in the event that each vulnerability-specific criterion receives a bonus point. In the absence of
this supplementary coding, the highest score is 100.
3.4.1.2 Spatial Coding Scores
Similarly to the regular plan evaluation scoring, for the spatial coding, after all additive or
deducted points are tallied, the value assigned to each eligible plan criteria is totaled for every
plan. Since 13 plan criteria are coded spatially, each plan can receive up to an additional 13
points added on to its overall evaluation score. The average total spatial coding score is then
calculated for each city’s set of plans. Finally, to add tangibility, the percentage that would be
added or subtracted from each plan’s weighted evaluation score is calculated. The total spatial
coding score of each plan is multiplied by the fraction of a percentage point that each weighted
coding value is worth, 0.694.
3.4.1.3 Plan Principle Percentages
To accompany overall weighted plan evaluation scores, each plan’s score is broken down into
grouped totals for each of the seven plan principles. The maximum total score for each principle
is equal to two times the number of indicators among them. Principles like fact base and interorganizational coordination appear to have lower scores than all others, but they merely consist
of fewer indicators or content. Once calculating the proportion of the total amount that each plan
scores for each principle do fact base and coordination more closely resemble other totals. The
proportions are determined by calculating the ratio of principle subtotals to maximum principle
subtotals. Since the weighted plan evaluation totals are out of 100, the proportions indicate which
principles the plans performed better in and which they performed worse in. For instance, a plan
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that received a total weighted score of 50 points could have an implementation score of 40% of
the total with a participation score of 60% of the total, to balance out to its overall score.

3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Statistics describing and summarizing the spread, commonalities, and central tendencies in the
data are attained to analyze and reach certain conclusions.
3.4.2.1 Criteria Statistics
During the process of tallying all scores, the codes applied to indicator are grouped into subtotals
for each criterion. The maximum value for each subtotal would be two times the number of
coding indicators among each particular criterion for general population criteria. For vulnerablespecific criteria, the maximum value would be the same plus one point for coding spatially. As
an example, the vulnerable assessment criterion inside the fact base principle has three indicators
that satisfy its determined requirements for quality. Since the vulnerability assessment criterion
is specific to vulnerable populations, it can receive a subtotal value of up to seven. The existing
conditions criterion on the other hand can only receive a subtotal value of up to six since it
applies to the general population, even though it also contains three indicators.
These subtotals are then averaged by dividing the number of contained indicators by the total
score applied for all those indicators for the entire set of plans. This average would be, for a
subtotal summing three indicators, the mean of eighteen individual scores. Similarly to mean,
standard deviation is calculated for each identical subset of scores. For determining the minimum
and maximum of each subset, averages are also generated of the scores applied to each indicator
for an entire set of plans. The maximum value is the highest average value for a criterion’s set of
indicators. The minimum value is the lowest average value indicator. Descriptive statistics in this
manner are calculated universally for all criteria for both sets of plans. The statistics are then
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packaged and presented as groups of criteria under respective plan principles, direction-setting
and action-oriented.
3.4.2.2 Evaluation Score Statistics
Once all plan evaluation score totals are tallied including applying weights, descriptive statistics
are calculated for each set of scores. Mean and median are computed to measure central tendency
and be able to contrast the scores of each set of plans. Standard deviation and range disclose the
spread of scores among each set of plans, and minimum and maximum simply indicate potential
outliers in the scores.

3.4.3 Evaluation Scores by Initiative
Relying on the accumulated plan background information for support, the sets of plans for both
cities are paired up based on any combination of parallels in approach, type, economic sector,
geographic scale, and/or initiative. Not all of the plan pairs are of the same initiative per se, but
each one is consistent enough to be decidedly referred to as a type of initiative. After pairing the
plans in this way, the average weighted evaluation scores are computed for each set, regardless
of the difference in performance. The scores are then further presented by reproducing the plan
principle percentage scores for the plans as pairs. The proportions are created by totaling the
indicator score averages for each pair of plans again within each individual plan principle. The
plan evaluation scores are thus essentially recreated in the format of the plan evaluation tables,
but for the set of six pairs where each coding value is an average out of two.

3.5 Data Analysis
Analyzing the results of the research requires examining trends in the data individually and
finding associations when paired together with the prevailing research findings. The conditions
revealed and outcomes produced across the two jurisdictions by the vulnerability mapping and
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spatial coding processes are highlighted, as are the results of the plan evaluations, the heart of the
analysis.

3.5.1 Vulnerability & Spatial Coding Analysis
While maps were created representing social vulnerability, physical vulnerability and hazard
exposure independently, only the maps portraying social impacts potential – the product of the
three measures of vulnerability – are interpreted. After all, this dimension of vulnerability was
the impetus behind the supplementation of evaluating plans for their content geographically.
To provide evidence supporting the results of the geographic portion of the plan evaluations, the
two maps, one for each city, are deciphered by locating areas with clear concentrations of low or
high impacts potential.
The scores assigned to plan criteria for the spatiality of content, influenced by the vulnerability
maps, are then examined individually. The bonus points or penalties incurred by each plan is
observed. Later, the spatial coding results are associated back with the vulnerability mapping.
The spatial coding indicates which areas are receiving more than their fair share of investment
and which areas are not, when correlated with the inventory of areas with a high impacts
potential and those without. Again pulling in research to tie in to spatial content, the types of
outcomes to expect in impact prone areas is inferred.

3.5.2 Plan Quality Analysis
An analysis of the plan quality according to the statistics and qualitative associations linked to
the data is explored. The analysis begins with an overall look into the quality of the plans
individually and collectively for Norfolk and New York City for the general population and how
they are either meeting or transcending the limits of their scope or approach. The plan quality
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scores are then linked to adoption and reliance on plans through recent government spending
trends and budget leveraging.
3.5.2.1 Planning to Prepare and Adapt
The normalized plan evaluation scores for each plan are indicators of their quality and potential
to adequately meet the needs of the general population and especially the most vulnerable in the
face of worsening coastal hazards. The total evaluation score for each plan is compared with one
another, with the highest score denoting the plan that has the greatest potential to improve the
preparedness and adaptability of the population. Certain plans may receive higher overall scores
simply due to a broadened vs. narrow scope and/or a primary vs. secondary focus. That is, a
comprehensive plan that addresses flooding hazards complimentary to economic development or
housing will have an advantage score-wise over an emergency management plan that is produced
not typically by urban planners and tailored for a specific purpose while meeting certain
protocol.
The initial analysis of the plan content is organized akin to the character of the plan evaluation
protocol itself. The content observed in the two sets of plans is extracted and dispersed among
the direction-setting and action-oriented segments of the plan. More successful evaluation scores
with certain types of goals can be equated with a certain type of vision. Despite being
autonomous documents each city’s set of plans are analyzed as a unit rather than as they were
originally intended in conception. Analyzing their content in this manner allows more dominant
themes to emerge that might not have been as perceivable in investigating a single plan. Thus, it
becomes possible to speculate within the analysis the intentions of the plans’ authors and
influential decision-makers. The observed action-oriented content that typically follows later on
in the plans can either be associated back with conclusions and hypotheses of the direction-
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setting content or serve as a departure from the chronicled prevailing direction of each city’s set
of plans.
3.5.2.2 Plan Adoption vs. Plan Quality
The plan adoption information compiled from within plans, from progress reports and plan
updates, and from financial/budget releases is revisited to compare the plan quality scores of
plans with their adoption and reliance. To be able to anticipate what might ensure in the coming
years, the progress reports and financial information are summarized independently of the plans
themselves and their quality. The implementation and monitoring actions declared in the plans
can then be validated or discredited through this information. Rather than report on the adoption
and implementation of coupled plans, the analysis is instead returned to investigating the
individual plans, since each plan is carried out autonomously.
Many published local and regional government plans, as a matter of requirement for their
advertisement for public use, have been adopted. Several of these plans may emerge as superior
quality in planning for vulnerable populations and be adopted, but have had little visible impact
on the community because of inattention and lax reliance on them by governments. On the
contrary, in-house plans may prove to be severely underperforming in quality yet be
apportioning off local resources and funds, and be idealized by their creators. A detailed
assessment is made of plans on one end of the spectrum, the other end of the spectrum and
everywhere in between, in terms of adoption, reliance and quality. In the instance that specific
information on the progress of implementation exists for a plan then the quality of the
implemented actions is outlined based on their performance in the plan evaluation.
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3.5.2.3 Planning for the Vulnerable
Plan evaluation scores are revisited to dissect the results as evidence to support the degree to
which these plans are enabling the vulnerable and low-income populations to be better prepared
and adapted to coastal storms and flooding. Each plan quality principle broken up into multiple
criteria and their subordinate indicators contributes to the adaptability and preparedness of the
general population, but only certain criteria and indicators represent enhancements for the lowincome population. Since some of these criteria and indicators arose out of socially intent
literature repackaged in frameworks for special low-income considerations and community
resilience, the composition of the analysis mirrors these frameworks. These frameworks,
underscoring the many deep-seated facets of vulnerability among the poor, allow the analysis to
plunge deeper into the details of the plan quality and content.
To begin, the quality of vulnerability assessments is commented on in relation to theoretical and
empirical declarations for locating and understanding vulnerable populations. Then, theoretical
associations are made between the quality of awareness and capacity building programs and
formulas for informing risk and strategies to these vulnerable low-income groups. The quality of
preparedness and emergency operation strategies and actions to involve individuals together
relate to the ability of the plans to prepare and involve the poor. The types of smart growth and
housing strategies together with recovery actions in the plans then illustrate how well they are
solving potential affordability and disaster housing crises before and after extreme events. To
discern the wealth-building and quality of life enhancing abilities of the plans, the quality of
household and individual strategies, and community asset and services strategies are critically
examined. The extent to which the plans are expanding the capacity and ensuring just
representation of the low-income groups is discovered through the quality of inclusion in the
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planning process and the landscape of engagement. To round off the analysis, monitoring and
individual responsibility quality is critically reviewed by way of the findings on accountability
and responsibility.
During extrapolation of the evaluation results – both for the indicator and criteria performance
and for the performance of the spatial coding – the vulnerability assessment itself is embedded in
the analysis of the plans for low-income population beyond what is directly interpreted from the
evaluation results. Characteristics of the mapped vulnerability add an additional layer to surmise
the capabilities of the plans in context with the distribution of social and physical vulnerability
and hazard exposure. Further associations can then be made between the vulnerability
assessment, evaluation results and community resilience/low-income frameworks to equate
quality with identified needs. Particularly, characteristics of the vulnerability assessment can be
linked with restated literature on low-income linked vulnerability to chronicle the shortcomings
and successes of the analyzed plans in fulfilling their moral obligations for low-income
communities.

3.5.3 Making Conclusions & Recommendations
Leveraging the foretold analysis as a template, I make conclusions for each of Norfolk and New
York on their progress they have made to reduce vulnerability and increase the adaptability and
preparedness for future coastal disasters. Relying on the literature for extra support,
recommendations are made regarding what could be done better or differently, and what is
notably missing in the plans that have been published and adopted in the last several years.
Analyses of the quality of each city’s plans allows for recommendations to be made for the two
urban centers, what each could benefit from the other, and generally which city has been more
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innovative and on track with recent theoretical and empirical verdicts on planning to allow for
the most vulnerable residents to adapt and prepare for the worst.

3.6 Limitations & Potential Problems
3.6.1 Data Availability
Because of the scope of this study, not all information and knowledge that could have
contributed to evidence that supports the conclusion was available. Limited information was
available in the time frame of this study to conduct a comprehensive vulnerability assessment
that accounts for social behavior and capital, political power, hazard and disaster awareness, etc.
of the residents at the neighborhood level in each city. In-person surveys, interviews and
assessments might have strengthened the ultimate conclusion or lead to an entirely different
conclusion. Furthermore, while the cities may have reported on the progress of their plans, not all
aspects of implementation and monitoring can be known without an assessment from the
perspective of the low-income residents themselves. Lastly, the range of variability of plans may
be so great that it becomes challenging to compare them with one another and also when several
plans may be missing substantial content.

3.6.2 Inter-coder Reliability
When a single coder is employed, the audience has no means of assessing whether the judgments
made represent those that would have been made by others using the same protocol to evaluate
the content. This limitation can hypothetically be reduced by employing two or more coders. The
process of using two or more coders enables the audience to be provided with information
regarding inter-coder reliability, or the degree to which members of a designated community
concur on the readings, interpretations, responses to, or uses of given texts or data. When a single
coder is used in content analysis, individual biases will affect the coded data and the analytical
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results derived from the data (Stevens, Lyles, & Berke, 2014) Without a second individual to
code the plans, the reliability of the plan evaluation data in this study can be put into question,
though as outlined earlier, there are also benefits to employing a single coder to obtain the
results. Nonetheless, the results of the plan evaluation analysis lay heavily on my own judgment
of the content within the plans and my interpretation of the results.
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Chapter 4. Results
4.1 Introduction
Presented in proceeding are the results of the two sets of six plan evaluations outlined in the
previous chapter that are central to subsequent declarations and conclusions. Remaining
consistent with the order of research, observations from the vulnerability mapping process are
shared, including data sources used, the influence of individual variables on the distribution of
vulnerability, and areas with distinctively higher or lower than average vulnerability. Next, the
results of the spatial coding process, which utilized the vulnerability maps for reference, are
presented. Even though the spatial coding process was conducted after the plan evaluation
process, the final evaluation scores could not be tallied until each plan evaluation was
supplemented with the bonus scoring. Thus, the entire plan evaluation results are introduced as
the final round of data collection. Once all data results are shared, descriptive statistics
generating evidence for trends in the plan quality and content are provided.

4.2 Plan Background
4.2.1 Plan Compliance
4.2.1.1 Hazard Mitigation
In compliance with the Commonwealth of Virginia Hazard Mitigation Plan and the Disaster
Mitigation Act and its subsequent amendments, Southside Hampton Roads has continually
released a hazard mitigation plan of its own, partially funded by FEMA, to remain eligible for
disaster assistance funding. Similarly to the state hazard mitigation planning process, the regional
hazard mitigation planning is iterative and is updated at regular intervals of every five years
(Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee, 2011). The first rendition of
the Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Plan was contracted out to a private company,
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without having the internal knowledge and expertise to conduct a sufficient assessment in-house.
The entire series of hazard mitigation plans for the sub-region is paid through by the same
FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant under the Disaster Mitigation Act (Southside Hampton
Roads Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee, 2011).
New York City’s Hazard Mitigation Plan also meets all requirements under the Disaster
Mitigation Act, while expanding on the role of the plan. The New York State Department of
Homeland Security and Emergency Services promotes the production of jurisdictional hazard
mitigation plans across the state, like New York City’s, through planning initiatives and select
grants. As is the case with the Southside Hampton Roads Plan, NYC’s plan is a living document
to be refined and updated every five years (NYC OEM Hazard Mitigation Unit, 2014).

4.2.2 Planning Initiatives
4.2.2.1 RE.Invest Initiative
The RE.Invest Initiative is a partnership between Re:Focus Partners and the Rockefeller
Foundation, both of whom have resilience at the core of their goals. The Rockefeller Foundation
supplied a stream of funding and oversight for the eight selected partner cities to use public
resources more efficiently and attract new sources of private investment (Gardner & Damm,
2013). The initiative joined the ranks of others to apply a personal approach to enhancing
community resilience, while taking into account locational attributes and character. The
RE.invest report specialized for Norfolk focused on rethinking stormwater, energy and
communications infrastructure based on the team’s findings that these systems embodied gaps in
investment that undermine the ability of Norfolk to achieve resilience. The team then designed
and engineered projects that fell into one or more of those categories, for various locations
around the city (Re:focus Partners, 2015).

100

4.2.2.2 Rebuild by Design
The Rebuild by Design competition was launched by the executive ordered Hurricane Sandy
Rebuilding Task Force in June of 2013. It was intended to be a multi-stage planning and design
competition to promote resilience in the region most greatly affected by Hurricane Sandy. HUD
administered the competition in partnership with philanthropic, academic and nonprofit
organizations. The competition aimed at promoting place-based resilience-enhancing strategies
that could be replicable and scaled up to be applied to the region (Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding
Task Force: Rebuild by Design, 2014).
By June 2014, the interdisciplinary selection committee identified seven winning entries to
receive a cut of $930 in Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR)
funds that would be directed toward implementing the first phase of the projects. Four affected
regions including New York City incurred further funding from HUD’s CDBG-DR in October
2014 to supplement Sandy recovery and assist in implementing the winning ideas from the
Rebuild by Design competition (Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force: Rebuild by Design,
2014). The competition’s mission, to cultivate holistic designs that resolve reoccurring flooding
and other vulnerabilities pre-disaster, was supposed as a directive to rethink the traditional
rebuilding disaster response.
4.2.2.3 Rising Resiliency Challenge
The Tidewater Rising Resiliency Design Challenge, born out of the Dutch Dialogues, was the
product of years-worth of deliberation between local government, nonprofits and outside
consultants, to fill a void in adaptation work. The Dutch Dialogues was a series of brainstorming
discussions and workshops spanned over several days hosted by an international panel, notably
from the Netherlands, that is accustom to adapting to sea level rise. The panel handed off
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responsibility to the coalition of local stakeholders representing higher education, local
government, the general public, and the private and non-profit sectors (Dutch Dialogues
Virginia, 2015).
The Tidewater Rising Resiliency Challenge arose from the series of sessions to carry on the
progress made in envisioning site-specific regenerative strategies by scaling down. The exercise
facilitated by a collaboration between professors at Hampton University and Old Dominion
University assigned their students from backgrounds in architecture and civil engineering to
explore viable place-based solutions to sea level rise and coastal vulnerability. Their work
centered on the Chesterfield Heights neighborhood in South Norfolk, after whittling away three
other candidate neighborhoods located in Hampton, Newport News and Portsmouth. The
selected Chesterfield Heights neighborhood fronts the Elizabeth River and is adjacent to several
low income neighborhoods of interest (Stiles, 2014; Stiles Jr., Andrews, & Erten-Unal, 2015).
4.2.2.4 Resilient Neighborhoods
Resilient Neighborhoods is an initiative administered by New York’s Department of City
Planning that rides the momentum started by Rebuild by Design, New York State’s Community
Reconstruction Program, and other place-based resilience initiatives. The initiative was launched
in 2013 to work with communities adjacent to or in the floodplain so that they conform to the
newly codified Flood Resilience Zoning Text Amendment, adopted in October 2013. After
firsthand experience of coastal flooding risk, land use, zoning, and development is revamped
through infrastructure investment and other policies and programs. All of the neighborhood
studies under the initiative are funded by HUD’s Community Development Block Grants for
Disaster Recovery. A similar initiative – PLACES (Planning for Livability, Affordability,
Community, Economic Opportunity and Sustainability) – was started to address affordable
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housing, economic development and community resources, in accordance with Housing New
York, the city’s housing plan published in 2014 (Resilient Neighborhoods, 2016).
4.2.2.5 100 Resilient Cities
The challenge is a global initiative evoked to inspire cities to join the resilience movement and
combat their most pervasive problems in innovative ways. The pioneer of the 100 Resilient
Cities movement, the Rockefeller Foundation, engaged in a selective process to grow the
network of cities that are extended the opportunity to participate. A panel of experts comprised
of 100 Resilient Cities’ team members reviewed the many applicant cities that sought inclusion.
The selection process consisted of three separate rounds of cities to be awarded membership into
the network. Both Norfolk and New York City were among the first 32 cities to spearhead the
challenge beginning in December 2013. Subsequent groups of 35 cities in 2014 and 33 cities in
2016 followed their lead in devising resilience strategies (100 Resilient Cities, 2016).
As members of the network of 100 Resilient Cities, participants gain access to financial and
logistical guidance; expert support for development of a custom-fit resilience strategy; solutions,
service providers and partners from the various sectors for formulating and implementing; and
mutual accountability from the global network of cities (100 Resilient Cities, 2016). 100
Resilient Cities’ City Resilience Framework, the foundation of its advisory approach, was
developed by Arup in collaboration with the Rockefeller Foundation. The Framework is built
upon the four dimensions of urban centers – health and wellbeing, economy and society,
infrastructure and environment, and leadership and strategy. The four dimensions and set of three
drivers that influence each dimensions are ubiquitous across all city reports (The City Resilience
Framework, 2016).
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4.2.2.6 National Disaster Resilience Competition
More recently, coinciding with broad adoption of resilience, HUD organized a competition
among communities that suffered from a federally declared natural disaster occurring between
2011 and 2013, to devise innovative solutions for recovering from these prior disasters and
improving their ability to withstand and more swiftly recover from future disasters and hazards.
The National Disaster Resilience Competition (NDRC), in partnership with the Rockefeller
Foundation, was a two-phase competition that awarded up to $1 billion in HUD Disaster
Recovery funds to eligible communities (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
2015). The NDRC also pulled from the successes of the Foundation’s Rebuild by Design
competition to inform a participatory and stakeholder-driven process (Gonzalez, 2016).
The first phase of the competition requested applicants to frame their ideas for recovering from
the effects of the affecting disaster, advancing community development objectives, and to
improve the ability to absorb or rapidly recover from the effects of future events, threats or
hazards (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2015). Applicants were required
to consult with stakeholders, and frame the recovery needs, personalized risks and
vulnerabilities, and associative development opportunities within the targeted area. The intention
was for applicants to demonstrate a connection between unmet recovery needs from the
applicatory declared disaster to the revealed objectives (Taffet, 2014).
Those applicants that were selected to proceed into the second phase of the competition then
were required to conceptualize their ideas into a resilience-enhancing disaster recovery or
revitalization project that addresses their identified risks, vulnerabilities, and development
opportunities (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2015). Phase 2 applications
were deemed worthy of funding if they demonstrated how the proposal would help the target
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community recover from the effects of the disaster, achieve community development objectives
like economic development, and enhance the community’s ability to remain resilient when
confronted with a future extreme event or stressor. The implementation proposals were also
required to include a benefit-cost analysis to further their case for funding (Taffet, 2014).

4.3 Plan Leadership Composition
4.3.1 Norfolk’s Plans
4.3.1.1 Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Plan
Planning Committee: Municipal Planning, Emergency Management, Administration, and Utility
representatives from the cities of Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach, county of
Isle of Wight, and towns of Smithfield and Windsor.
Planning support from the Hampton Roads Planning District Commission and Salters Creek
Consulting.
Sponsored by the Virginia Department of Emergency Management and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
4.3.1.2 PlaNorfolk 2030
Contributions from Norfolk City Council, Norfolk City Planning Commission, Norfolk Design
Review Committee, Norfolk Historic and Architectural Review Committee, City of Norfolk
Administration, and the Norfolk Department of Planning and Community Development.
4.3.1.3 RE.invest Initiative
Planning comprised of team members from RE.focus Partners. Initiative supported by the
Rockefeller Foundation.

105

4.3.1.4 Tidewater Rising Resiliency Challenge
Partnership between the Department of Architecture at Hampton University and the Department
of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Old Dominion University. Support from Skip Stiles
of Wetlands Watch.
4.3.1.5 Norfolk Resilience Strategy
Norfolk Office of Resilience.
Resilience Steering Committee: City Administration, non-profit leaders, business leaders, higher
education, Hampton Roads Planning District Commission, City Planning Commission, City
Council.
Coastal Resilience Working Group: Department of Public Works, Department of Planning,
Department of Utilities, Department of Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of
Development, City Administration, Non-profits, Businesses, Higher education
Neighborhood Resilience Working Group: City Administration, Police Department, Department
of Human Services, Department of Planning, Department of Public Health, Norfolk
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Department of Neighborhood Development, Department
of Public Works, Department of Fire and Rescue, Social service organizations
Economic Resilience Working Group: Department of Economic Development, Economic
Development Authority, Office of Budget and Strategic Planning, Commission on Poverty
Reduction, Business leaders, Non-profits, Chamber of Commerce, Higher education
4.3.1.6 ThRIVe: Resilience in Virginia Phase 2 NDRC Application
Oversight from the Governor’s Commission on Climate Change. Leadership from the Virginia
Department of Housing and Community Development. Support from the City of Norfolk (Office
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of Resilience), City of Chesapeake (Redevelopment and Housing Authority, Department of
Public Works), and the City of Newport News (Fire Department, Division of Emergency
Management, Engineering Department, Planning Department, Codes Compliance Department,
Development Department).

4.3.2 New York City’s Plans
4.3.2.1 New York City Hazard Mitigation Plan
Planning Team: Office of Emergency Management, Department of City Planning, Office of
Long-Term Planning and Sustainability.
Mitigation Planning Council Steering Committee: Dept. of Buildings, Dept. of Environmental
Protection, Dept. of Parks & Recreation, Dept. of Transportation, Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, Regional Plan Association, Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, Mayor’s Office of
Housing Recovery, Police Dept., Fire Dept.
Mitigation Planning Council: 39 agencies, public authorities, non-profits, private utility
providers from 2009 Hazard Mitigation Plan plus City University of New York, HRO, Mayor’s
Office of Environmental Remediation, Office of Management and Budget, Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner.
4.3.2.2 PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York
Building Resiliency Task Force: real estate owners, property managers, architects, engineers,
contractors, utility representatives, subject matter specialists, city officials, code consultants,
coast estimators, attorneys (steering committee, working groups, buildings committees)
Lead City Agencies: Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, Dept. of Parks &
Recreation, NYC Economic Development Corporation, Dept. of Environmental Protection, Dept.
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of City Planning, Dept. of Small Business Services, Mayor’s Office of Housing Recovery
Operations, Dept. of Housing Preservation and Development, NYC Housing Authority, NYC
Industrial Development Authority, Dept. of Citywide Administrative Services, Office of
Emergency Management, etc.
4.3.2.3 BIG “U” Rebuild by Design Report
Co-leadership from Bjarke Ingels Group (BIG), and One Architecture. Support from private
firms Starr Whitehouse, Buro Happold, Level Infrastructure, Arcadis, James Lima Planning &
Development, Green Shield Ecology, AEA Consulting, Project Projects, and the School of
Constructed Environments at Parsons the New School
4.3.2.4 Edgewater Park Resilient Neighborhoods Report
Leadership from New York Department of City Planning.
4.3.2.5 OneNYC
Project Director: Office of Sustainability
OneNYC Team: 70 leaders from deputy mayoral offices, mayoral offices, social service
organizations, private sector boards, NGOs, non-profits, commissions, and municipal agencies
representing health, economic development, housing, environment, transportation, utilities,
technology, finances, sustainability, recovery, emergency management, and resident services.
Steering Committee: Deputy Mayor, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget,
Deputy Mayor for Strategic Policy Initiatives, Advisor to the Mayor for Recovery, Resiliency,
and Infrastructure, Office of Operations, NYC Planning Commission, Department of City
Planning, Office of Recovery and Resiliency
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4.3.2.6 Lower Manhattan Protect & Connect Phase 2 NDRC Application
Leadership from Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency, Department of Housing
Preservation and Development, New York City Economic Development Corporation, New York
City Housing Authority, and the Trust for Public Land.

4.4 Vulnerability Assessment
Maps depicting social vulnerability, physical vulnerability, hazard exposure, and most
importantly social impacts potential were created. All maps shared are of the social impacts
potential, an index of social vulnerability, physical vulnerability and hazard exposure, in each
respective city. In reaction to conducting content analysis, seldom did the plans of interest
provide measures of vulnerability mapped equivalently to the maps to follow, much less rely on
them.

4.4.1 Norfolk
The measure of potential for social impacts among each census tract not purposefully but
coincidentally favors social vulnerability more heavily than physical vulnerability or hazard
exposure. Each available type of geographic data was represented consistently across all used
variables. There was more data available to illustrate social vulnerability. Variables included the
12 census data points, distance from facilities such as public transportation, emergency facilities,
hospitals, and police and fire stations, housing age and cost, parks, population and building
density, and distance from flood zones. Each variable was standardized by converting data points
into percentile ranks to ensure each one has equal effect on social impacts potential.
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Figure 2. Norfolk's Potential for Social Impacts by Census Tract
All census and other geospatial data are mapped at the census tract level. Norfolk Naval Station
is depicted as excluded for its absence of available data. Generally, areas of Norfolk with the
highest impacts potential/vulnerability are those tracts located along the southern shore of the
Lafayette River that cuts through the center separating northern neighborhoods from those to the
south. Incidentally, a majority of neighborhoods with the highest level of vulnerability are
synonymous with those having the greatest concentration of affordable housing and city-owned
public or mixed-income housing. With 80 census tracts and as many individual neighborhoods,
maps are separated into northern and southern halves to zoom in on and declutter neighborhood
names.
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Figure 3. Norfolk's (North) Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations
Neighborhood labels overlaid on top of the vulnerability data represent names applied to civic
league territories. Many are not identical in size and location to census tracts, although are useful
in identifying neighborhoods nearest to and intersecting census tracts.
In far northern Norfolk, along the shoreline, areas of heightened impacts potential are
concentrated on the eastern end. The western half of the East Ocean View, eastern half of the
Cottage Line, northeastern section of the Bayview, and the Camellia Gardens neighborhoods all
experience the greatest potential for social impacts. Despite the Willoughby Spit in the far
northwest being almost entirely within the flood plain, its density is extremely low in comparison
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with the rest of Norfolk. Its population and building density being at the bottom causes its hazard
exposure (1.4) to be well below average (29.4) despite the high probability of flooding.
Compounding this is the fact that almost all of its census-based vulnerability statistics are below
average. However, since Willoughby and the rest of the shoreline neighborhoods are distant from
many facilities, their facilities access is above average.
The worst social vulnerability in this region is in lower East Ocean View and Camellia Gardens.
Most noticeably, this high social vulnerability stems from housing and transportation, though
also in every other category. Other neighborhoods in the northern half with high social
vulnerability (between 85 and 90 compared to the average of 57) include all those bounded by I64, Little Creek Road, and Military Highway such as Partra, Chesapeake Gardens, and
Oakwood. In spite of the prevalence of minority and low economic status in these
neighborhoods, impacts potential is less, between 550 and 750, than in the poorer shoreline
neighborhoods, between 840 and 900. These inland neighborhoods have slightly better access to
facilities and are less prone to flooding.
As noted before, many of the neighborhoods to the south and east of the Lafayette River have
some of the highest levels of vulnerability. One neighborhood, bounded by Military Highway
and Wayne Creek, Norview, has among the worst overall vulnerability. In particular, it is
physically vulnerable. Norview consists of predominantly out-of-date single family homes with
little open space to absorb the impacts of flooding. And while it is relatively average in most
social vulnerability indicators, its hazard exposure is in the top tier with the combination of a
high built density and close proximity to the flood plain.
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Figure 4. Norfolk's (South) Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations
To the southwest of Norview is Fairmont Park which stretches from Chesapeake Boulevard to
Tidewater Drive east to west and from Wayne Creek to the Lafayette River north to south.
Hazard exposure is above the average of 29.3 at 58.1 in the northern half and 54.5 in the
southern half of the neighborhood, but it is not as high as in some other neighborhoods bordering
the Lafayette River. The flood plain largely inundates peripheral areas of the neighborhood
nearest to the two bounding waterways. Like Norview, there are many aging single-family
homes, but also many older multifamily units. Similarly, Fairmont has little buffer against
flooding with a high built density and a negligible amount of open space. On whole, Fairmont
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Park has a potential for impacts that is well above the city-wide norm at between 850 and 890
that mostly accounts for its hazard exposure and physical vulnerability than social vulnerability.
The five most vulnerable neighborhoods of Highland Park, Colonial Place, Riverview,
Lindenwood, and Barraud Park all border the Lafayette River to the north. Highland Park,
Colonial Place and Riverview are all fairly compact low-lying neighborhoods meaning they are
partially surrounded by the flood plain. Hazard exposure is expectedly high, especially in
Colonial Place/Riverview where it is the highest in all of Norfolk at 93.7 due to the combination
of high density and flood probability. Social vulnerability is relatively average in these three
neighborhoods (slightly higher in Highland Park), but physical vulnerability is again high in
Colonial Place/Riverview. Upstream in Lindenwood/Barraud Park, hazard exposure is also
above the 29.4 average, though much less than in the downstream neighborhoods, at 47.9. Social
vulnerability is instead the Achilles heel of Lindenwood/Barraud Park. A vast majority of
residents are rent strained, poverty is substantially high, educational attainment is low, access to
transportation is poor, and the neighborhood is almost entire made up of minority groups.
The three census tracts bordering the Elizabeth River that have an impacts potential value of 800
or above also have astronomically high social vulnerability. Neighborhoods in these tracts such
as Tidewater Gardens, Grandy Village, Oak Leaf Forest and Diggs Town are all known for their
public housing developments. South Brambleton, Chesterfield Heights, and
Campostella/Campostella Heights are other neighborhoods inside of these tracts. Tidewater
Gardens and South Brambleton together have the highest percentage in several census variables.
They are also even more flood prone than Colonial Place/Riverview. However, because
Tidewater Gardens/South Brambleton are fairly low density and have a subsequently high
amount of open space, hazard exposure is only slightly above average at 38.5, and physical
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vulnerability is on the low end. Grandy Village/Chesterfield Heights also have high percentages
in census variables but not as high as in Tidewater Gardens/South Brambleton. Furthermore,
even though poverty is prevalent, few residents are rent strained, as affordable single family
homes are the dominant housing type especially in Chesterfield Heights. Chesterfield
Heights/Grandy Village fare a little better in floods than Tidewater Gardens/South Brambleton
with a hazard exposure of 31.7, but they are much more vulnerable physically. South of the
Elizabeth River, Campostella/Oak Leaf Forest/Diggs Town actually have a hazard exposure that
is less than average at 17.5. Due to both aged and poor quality housing, these neighborhoods
have among the highest physical vulnerability, and score low in several socioeconomic
indicators.

4.4.2 New York City
The geography of impacts potential in New York City is several times more complex than in
Norfolk, although the vulnerability of many of these locations in the city surfaced during and
after Hurricane Sandy. New York City dwarfs the number of census tracts in Norfolk with a total
of 2,167. More geographic data exists for each census tract making it possible to measure certain
variables that data did not exist for in Norfolk. Data employed for New York City not available
in Norfolk include road conditions, wi-fi access, access to evacuation centers and homeless
shelters, access to medical and care facilities, and access to food pantries/soup kitchens. Unlike
the vulnerability maps created for Norfolk, these maps are further divided into one for each of
the five boroughs. Trends in vulnerability are described more broadly as a result.
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Figure 5. New York City's Potential for Social Impacts by Census Tract
Notable hot spots across the city with higher than average social impacts potential include much
of the Bronx and northern Manhattan, eastern lower Manhattan, scattered neighborhoods along
the Brooklyn/Queens riverfront, Southern Brooklyn, the far eastern shoreline, and northern
Staten Island.
4.4.2.1 Bronx
On the whole, the Bronx is the most vulnerable borough of New York City, with the most
prominent pockets of vulnerability located at the southern end nearest to Manhattan. Boroughwide, the Bronx has an average impacts potential of 623 compared with the average of 542
citywide. Specifically, the impacts potential from Hunts Points heading west and from the
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Melrose neighborhood south is about 783 (among 32 census tracts). The social vulnerability
averages at about 73.3 and hazard exposure around 55.7 in these neighborhoods compared to
citywide averages of 52.3 and 36.1, respectively, and Bronx-wide averages of 62.5 and 37.9,
respectively. Of the census tracts in the Bronx with impacts potential under 500, a considerable
amount of them are of parks and open space. Many of these parks stand out as islands of low
vulnerability in a sea of high vulnerability. Along the riverfront from Hunts Point to Marble Hill,
these 16 census tracts have an average social vulnerability of 75.5. This scale of social
vulnerability exists nowhere else along a waterfront. To illustrate the magnitude of vulnerability
in the Bronx, 36.3% of its census tracts have an impacts potential above 680 compared to only
19.2% in all of New York City. At about 14% of the city’s total territory, the Bronx contains
around 30% of New York’s extremely vulnerable tracts.

Figure 6. Bronx, NY Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations
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4.4.2.2 Manhattan
Stark contrasts exists between less vulnerable and more vulnerable areas in Manhattan. From
about Carnegie Hill north, high vulnerability is fairly concentrated. Meanwhile, from Carnegie
Hill south to Stuyvesant Town none of the tracts here have an impacts potential as high as the
average in the Bronx. About 34.7% of New York’s tracts have an impacts potential either below
384 or above 680. In Manhattan, about 40% of tracts have impacts potential values at those two
opposite ends of the spectrum. Thus, Manhattan has a higher inequality of impacts potential,
mostly from the unequal distribution of social vulnerability. 44.8% of New York City census
tracts have a social vulnerability above 62.4 or below 40.6. In Manhattan, 70.5% of census tracts
have a social vulnerability in these two zones. Two hotspots of vulnerability in Lower Manhattan
are the Lower East Side and Two Bridges below Chinatown. These two neighborhoods contain
12 census tracts with impacts potential above 750 yet they are located adjacent to the major
economic hub that is Lower Manhattan. The East Harlem Neighborhood alone also contains 9
census tracts with impacts potential values this high. Overall, Manhattan has the highest hazard
exposure of all of the boroughs with a value of 44.4. Specifically, from Midtown southward, in
this densest of places, hazard exposure averages around 51.3.
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Figure 7. Manhattan, NY Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations
4.4.2.3 Queens
Unlike, Manhattan and the Bronx, Queens has a wider dispersion of vulnerability and few
concentrations of extremely high vulnerability. As would be expected, generally the higher
potential for social impacts occurs on the periphery nearer to bodies of water rather than in the
interior. A couple notable vulnerable locations are in north and western Queens. The
neighborhoods of North and South Corona has an average impacts potential of 694 and an
average hazard exposure of 52.3. The Ravenswood and Long Island City neighborhoods,
bordering the East River, have an average impacts potential of 635 and an average hazard
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exposure of 55.7. Small pockets of high social vulnerability are in these four neighborhoods and
also in Jackson Heights and Jamaica Hills, though the latter is far from any water.

Figure 8. Queens, NY Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations
4.4.2.4 Brooklyn, and Queens Beachfront
Brooklyn is not unlike Queens in that of the vulnerable areas, most of them are nearer to the
waterfront than the interior. However, unlike Queens, Brooklyn has several areas where the
potential for impacts is more pervasive. Although the Rockaway Peninsula is part of Queens, the
distribution of vulnerability follows the trend of Brooklyn. In northwestern Brooklyn
Williamsburg stands out in an area of low to moderate vulnerability. Between the 25 census
tracts of Williamsburg, the potential for social impacts averages around 701.4. Williamsburg is
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relatively equally influenced by social, physical, and exposing characteristics. To the southeast is
Canarsie that is not quite as distinctly vulnerable but is comparable in size. Canarsie is bordered
by water on three sides and has an average impacts potential of 673.7 among its 24 census tracts.
In far southern Brooklyn, where the Bath Beach, Gravesend, Homecrest, Gerritsen Beach,
Sheepshead Bay, Manhattan Beach, Brighton Beach, Coney Island and Sea Gate neighborhoods
are all located, the impacts potential is highest. The region, home to almost 285,000 residents,
has an average impacts potential of 709.8. Like Williamsburg, southern Brooklyn has above
average values across all vulnerability types but none that are astronomic.

Figure 9. Brooklyn, NY and Queens Waterfront Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood
Locations

121

On the Rockaway Peninsula, southeast of Coney Island, a deep division is present. The Peninsula
transitions gradually from west to east, where impacts potential starts between 250 and 450 in
Breezy Point and ends at between 650 and 900 in Edgemere and Far Rockaway. The entire
peninsula is highly susceptible to flooding, but since the western tip is sparsely populated its
hazard exposure is much lower, as is its social vulnerability.
4.4.2.5 Staten Island
Broadly speaking, Staten Island has a lesser potential for social impacts than any of the other
four boroughs. Even still, it has its fair share of tracts holding high vulnerability, almost
exclusively in the northern part of the island. Staten Island has an impacts potential that is lower
than the 542 citywide average at 488 on average. Both its social vulnerability and hazard
exposure are somewhat less than their counterpart citywide averages. Its hazard exposure
averages close to 33.5 (2.5 less than the city) while its social vulnerability is close to 46.6 (5.7
less than the city). Focusing in on the 31 census tracts on the northern brim of Staten Island
uncovers an average impacts potential misaligned to this overall average. The waterfront
neighborhoods stretching from Howland Park in the northwest to Shore Acres in the northeast all
boast a combined impacts potential of 640, slightly higher than the Bronx-wide average. Their
average social vulnerability is 56.9 and their average hazard exposure is 47.8. As would be
expected, no other series of census tracts have above average combined vulnerability.
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Figure 10. Staten Island, NY Potential for Social Impacts, with Neighborhood Locations

4.5 Spatial Coding
The results of the aforementioned vulnerability assessment served as the foundation to equate the
spatiality of plan content with. Relying on the automatic divisions in the legends of each series of
vulnerability maps, the top four categories counted as high vulnerability and the bottom four
counted as low vulnerability. Those varying number of categories in between denoted medium
vulnerability. On occasion, geographic references in plans would indicate areas larger than one
or two neighborhoods, which in that instance, would sometimes render the level of vulnerability
as undetermined. Only if more tracts implied higher vulnerability than otherwise, were broad
references labelled as high vulnerability, and to the opposite effect, if more tracts implied lower
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vulnerability, the reference was labelled as low vulnerability. The middle category had, in effect,
no influence on spatial coding scores as it either represented an indistinguishable value or
moderate value.

4.5.1 Norfolk Spatial Scores
The desired outcome from spatially coding the content of evaluated plans coming out of Norfolk
and Hampton Roads would be the discovery that these plans are allocating their ideas, resources
and processes to areas that most need them. If that were to be the case, then the plans overall
should be scoring higher with the addition of the spatial coding scores than without. For Norfolk,
on average, that is the case, however, only minimally.
Table 7. Spatial Coding Scores for Norfolk, VA
RE.Invest
Report

Southside
Haz. Mit.

PlaNorfolk
2030

Resilience
Strategy

Rising
Resiliency

Vulnerability
Assessment
Awareness/Knowledge

-1

Smart growth &
development
Preparedness & response

1
-1

Recovery & restoration
Households &
individuals

-1

Community assets &
services

-1

Planning process

-1

Public engagement
techniques

-1

Stakeholders/Persons
involved

-1

Responsibilities

-1

Monitoring
implementation

-1

1

% Added to Score

Average
1

0.17

1

1

0.17

1

1

0.67

-1

-0.33
1

1

-1

1

0.33

1

0

1

1

0.17
-0.17

1
1

1

1

Self-monitoring
Total

ThRIVe
NDRC
App

1

0.17

1

0.33

1

0

1

1

1

0.33
0.17

-9

0

4

2

10

5

2

-6.25%

0%

2.78%

1.39%

6.94%

3.47%

1.39%
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After summing the total spatial codes awarded to all plan criteria for each plan and then
averaging them across all plans for Norfolk, the end result is an added 2 points to each plan. This
equates to a supplementary 1.39 percent added on to the total plan evaluation scores, after
normalizing them to be out of 100. A total of 2 additional points also means that even though
more plans received bonus points rather than penalties as a result of the process, the chance that
any single plan criterion received one additional bonus point is roughly 1 in 6. While it is true
that there were nearly as many negative points as positive points given, around 44 perent of
eligible plan criteria received any score for spatial references. 19 of the 23 positive points given
to plan criteria were distributed to only 3 of the 6 plans. PlaNorfolk and the ThRIVe NDRC
received a modest 4 and 5 points out of 13, respectively. The Rising Resiliency Challenge Report
collected nearly half of all positive scores given across the 6 plans in receiving 77 percent of the
total possible bonus points awarded to a single plan.
The average spatial code value given to each plan criterion ranges from -1/3 to +2/3. Smart
growth and development received by far the most positive coding scores with four to reach an
average of 2/3. Recovery and restoration, stakeholders/persons involved, and monitoring
implementation were all 2nd with a total of 2 positive points granted or an average of 1/3 among
all 6 plans. Most other plan criteria received an insignificantly positive or negative value from
spatial coding. The only two negative total values is planning process with -1/6 and preparedness
and response with -1/3 or 2 out of the 6 receiving a negative point.
Certain plans commonly had multiple spatial references satisfying a single plan criterion. For
instance, Table 7 above shows that a single point was awarded to the PlaNorfolk evaluation
under Smart growth and development. It received that point because there were more spatial
references describing smart growth and development in vulnerable neighborhoods than
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invulnerable ones. The complete data table that was utilized during the coding process shows
that there were actually 8 more spatial references in vulnerable neighborhoods (23 in high
vulnerable neighborhoods and 15 in low vulnerable neighborhoods). PlaNorfolk did indeed have
the largest average margin for points given. The ThRIVe NDRC Application was shortly behind
in terms of margin, while all other plans only referenced a handful of neighborhoods total.

4.5.2 New York City Spatial Scores
Initial reactions assert that plans in New York City more often than not received positive values
for a set of spatial references. Digging deeper, it is quite apparent that four plans collected all of
the positive coding scores and the other two were coded minimally. Erasing those other two
plans from the bunch and the New York City plans would add close to 11 points to their overall
evaluation scores or about 7.5 percent. However, due to the inclusion of the Edgewater Park
Report that is exclusively for a neutrally vulnerable neighborhood, and the city’s Hazard
Mitigation Plan, the average score added is 7.17 points or about 5 percent. Of the four plans that
received the most positive spatial coding scores, all of them were relatively close to receiving the
maximum number of additional points. Both the Lower Manhattan NDRC Application and One
NYC received 77 percent of the maximum possible bonus points, PlaNYC received 85 percent of
the maximum possible points, and the BIG U Rebuild by Design Report only missed out on one
point in receiving 92 percent of the maximum total possible.
Average spatial code scores assigned to the plan criteria ranged from .17 to .83. No plan criterion
had an average coding value of 0 or less meaning the spatial coding process ubiquitously aided
the evaluation of vulnerability-specific criteria. The lowest average value of .17, for selfmonitoring, was this low not because of negative values counteracting the positive but since
spatial reference only existed for one plan. Two of the three average values that equaled 1/3 were
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reduced from negative values in preparedness and response, and monitoring implementation in
the city’s hazard mitigation plan. The third, households and individuals, was positively coded in
just two plans. The five criteria with values above half had a majority positive scores because
there were spatial references in at least all four of the highest scoring plans. Smart growth and
development, recovery and restoration, and public engagement techniques were most frequently
associated with distributing to highly vulnerable areas. All three criteria had the highest average
score of .83, with the city’s hazard mitigation plan serving as the critical piece to bring them to
this value.
Table 8. Spatial Coding Scores for New York City
Lower
Manh.
NDRC
Vulnerability Assessment

Edgewater
Report

NYC
Haz.
Mit.

1

One
NYC
-1

Awareness/Knowledge

PlaNYC

BIG U
Rebuild

Average

1

1

1

0.50

1

1

1

0.50

1

0.83

Smart growth & development

1

1

1

1

Preparedness & response

1

-1

1

1

Recovery & restoration

1

1

1

1

Households & individuals

1

Community assets & services

1

1

1

Planning process
Public engagement
techniques
Stakeholders/Persons
involved

1

1

1

1

1

Responsibilities
Monitoring implementation

1

1

0.83

1

0.33

1

0.67

1

1

0.67

1

1

1

0.83

1

1

1

0.67

1

1

1

0.50

1

1

0.33

1

0.17

-1

Self-monitoring
Total
% Added to Score

0.33

10

0

0

10

11

12

7.17

6.94%

0%

0%

6.94%

7.64%

8.33%

4.98%

Though New York City’s plans evidently fared well in the spatial coding process, if the margin
between high vulnerability and low vulnerability spatial references was taken into account,
scores would have been even higher. All of the plans, with the exception of the Edgewater Park
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referenced over 15 distinct locations in relation to content satisfying the 13 plan criteria.
PlaNYC, the city’s de facto comprehensive plan, referenced locations representing every
vulnerable region of New York, in accordance with the vulnerability maps. Consequently,
though PlaNYC received 11 of the 13 bonus points for spatial coding, the average margin for
each set of references to warrant a point was an impressive 25.4. By comparison, the BIG U
Rebuild by Design report had an average margin of 4.75, despite receiving an additional bonus
point. OneNYC and the Lower Manhattan NDRC Application came in with a margin of 8 and
9.2, respectively.

4.6 Plan Evaluation Scores
Reiterating the coding process, the scores applied to plans for their content reflect the determined
satisfaction for each coding indicator and the distribution of desirable content to expressed
locations. The separately scored spatial codes were added after all indicators were properly
scored to be included in the overall total and the totals broken down by plan principles and
criteria. The following scores represent the raw data culminating from the plan coding and
spatial coding processes prior to standardizing through weight. The highest possible score for
each plan principle is as follows: goals – 44, fact base – 12, strategies – 66, coordination – 8,
participation – 28, implementation – 16, monitoring – 26.

4.6.1 Norfolk Plan Evaluations
Goals are not vital in determining the quality of a particular plan per se, but, since they correlate
with the accompanying content, can foretell the substance of a plan and its value. The goals in
Norfolk’s plans satisfied the requirements to receive between 15 and 31 points out of the
possible 44. The 15 points met by the RE.Invest Report equals roughly one third of the possible
points while the Resilience Strategy’s 31 equals about 70 percent of the total. The scores given to
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each plan for their goals turn out to be a mild predictor of the entire performance of plans in their
evaluation. The total score applied to a plan according to the quantities in each section is
essentially an average performance across all sections not accounting for the size of each section.
Using this baseline, most plans performed exceptionally well in goals considering their final
total. The RE.Invest Report, which performed worst in the evaluation, should hover close to 14
percent in each principle based on its total score, however, its 15 points in goals is nearly 3 times
what would be expected. The two highest coding values for goals occurred with, coincidentally,
the two best performing plans of the Resilience Strategy and the ThRIVe NDRC Application.
The 31 points and 29 points the Norfolk Resilience Strategy and ThRIVe NDRC Application
received for goals, respectively, is still above what their total scores would imply they might
receive.
The two plans that performed best in fact base, which included existing conditions and the
vulnerability assessment, received 75 percent and 83 percent of the total possible points. The
coding values for the strategies principle more closely matched the overall plan evaluation scores
than even goals. The proportion of possible points that each plan received for its strategies were
all within 8 percentage points of their respective total score values. The Southside Hazard
Mitigation Plan scored worst in strategies compared to its score with 33 percent compared to
37.35, while PlaNorfolk scored the best with 59 percent compared to 51.78. The percentages for
coordination were ubiquitously higher than the average percentage across all plan principles.
Participation scores were fairly divided between the better scoring plans and the poorer scoring.
The three overall highest scoring plans received just over double the amount of points (17.3) on
average in participation than the three overall lowest scoring plans (8.3). Implementation and
monitoring scores were low across the entire set of plans, ranging from 4 percent to 50 percent of
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the maximum possible points. The two lowest scoring plans, the RE.Invest Report and the Rising
Resiliency Challenge Report, scored about a quarter of the possible points or less. The lone plan
that scored higher in implementation and monitoring than in other principles, on average, was the
Southside Hazard Mitigation Plan, faring considerably better in monitoring than any other plan.
Table 9. Norfolk, VA Plan Evaluation Scores

Principle
Goals

Fact Base

Strategies

Coordination

Participation

Implementation

Monitoring

Score
% of
Possible
Score
% of
Possible
Score
% of
Possible
Score
% of
Possible
Score
% of
Possible
Score
% of
Possible
Score
% of
Possible

Total Weighted Score

RE.Invest
Report

Southside
Haz. Mit.

PlaNorfolk
2030

Resilience
Strategy

Rising
Resiliency

ThRIVe
NDRC
App

15

20

20

31

22

29

34%

45%

45%

70%

50%

66%

2

9

5

7

6

10

17%

75%

42%

58%

50%

83%

11

22

39

41

23

43

17%

33%

59%

62%

35%

65%

3

4

8

8

4

7

38%

50%

100%

100%

50%

88%

3

9

16

19

13

17

11%

32%

57%

68%

46%

61%

2

6

7

8

4

8

13%

38%

44%

50%

25%

50%

1

13

10

10

7

8

4%

50%

38%

38%

27%

31%

13.86

37.35

51.78

58.64

36.26

59.36

Together, the set of plans varied greatly in their overall performance from the plan evaluation
process. The standard deviation of 17.41 reinforces the fact that none of the plans score within 5
points of the average overall score of 42.87. Even though the top three scoring plans are about 9
points or more higher than the average, the abysmally low score of 13.86 by the RE.Invest
Report sways the average significantly. In a way, the spatial coding process sort of reconciles the
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dismal performance. The RE.Invest Report was the only plan to have its score reduced, since its
spatial references were exclusively for low vulnerability neighborhoods. Had the spatial coding
not supplemented the plan evaluation scores, the report would have actually scored 9 more points
than it did, increasing its total score to around 20.
Table 10. Norfolk, VA Plan Evaluation Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Median

Standard
42.87 Deviation
44.57 Range

17.41 Minimum
45.5 Maximum

13.86
59.36

4.6.2 New York City Plan Evaluations
Of the six evaluated plans from New York, five of them received a total score of 60 or more,
above the highest scoring plan from Norfolk. Rather remarkably, a majority of the plans did not
score particularly high in goals, in comparison with their total evaluation scores. The plans
generally scored better on the heart of the plan content than on this precursory content. Four of
the six plans scored three quarters or more of the possible points in fact base, and the other two
still scored a majority. With strategies, for the most part, the evaluated plans performed
exceptionally well. Only one plan, the BIG U Rebuild by Design Report, scored a worse
percentage in comparison with its total score on strategies. The top four scoring plans received
between 77 and 86 percent of the possible points.
The highest minimum score of points received for a principle was with coordination. Like with
strategies, five of the six scored better in comparison with their average scores across all
principles, in coordination. Even the Edgewater Park Report, which scored only 36.99, received
63 percent of the coordination points. Participation saw the highest average point totals among
the five top scoring plans. Other than the Edgewater Park Report that received just under half,
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the plans collected between 79 and 93 percent of the participation points. The scores for
implementation were more varied than with any other principle. The bottom half of plans
received 25, 44 and 56 percent of points, whereas the top half received 75, 88 and 94 percent.
The City’s hazard mitigation plan was the only to receive over 90 percent of points in both
participation and implementation. Monitoring was far and wide the worst performing principle
after the results of the plan evaluations. The four plans that performed better than the average
total score for all plans captured only between 31 and 50 percent of the points (three of them all
receiving 31 percent). The BIG U Rebuild by Design report was the only to receive enough
points to be close in comparison to its total score with 54 percent of monitoring points.
Table 11. New York City Plan Evaluation Scores
Principle
Goals

Fact Base

Strategies

Coordination

Participation

Implementation

Score
% of
Possible
Score
% of
Possible
Score
% of
Possible
Score
% of
Possible
Score
% of
Possible
Score
% of
Possible

NDRC
P&C

Edgewater
Report

NYC Haz.
Mit.

One
NYC

PlaNYC

BIG U
RbD

30

18

27

22

20

20

68%

41%

61%

50%

45%

45%

9

7

9

7

9

10

75%

58%

75%

58%

75%

83%

52

26

55

57

51

35

79%

39%

83%

86%

77%

53%

6

5

7

8

5

7

75%

63%

88%

100%

63%

88%

22

13

26

22

24

24

79%

46%

93%

79%

86%

86%

7

4

15

12

14

9

44%

25%

94%

75%

88%

56%

Score
% of
Possible

8

4

13

8

8

14

31%

15%

50%

31%

31%

54%

Total Weighted Score

66.43

36.99

75.54

70.77

68.57

60.66

Monitoring
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As further indication of the more successful performance of New York City’s plans, the average
score was roughly 20 points more than the Norfolk city average. The standard deviation of 13.73
would imply that the scores were valued slightly more tightly. This is reinforced when
considering that four of the plans scored within 8 points of the average, a feat not one of
Norfolk’s plans can claim in regards to its average. The median value being four points higher
indicates the skewness influenced mostly by the minimum score, put forth by the Edgewater
Park Report that is over 20 points lower than the 2nd lowest score. Still, at 36.99 points, the
Edgewater Park Report outperformed Norfolk’s two lowest scoring plans.
Table 12. New York City Plan Evaluation Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Median

Standard
63.16 Deviation
67.5 Range

13.73 Minimum
38.56 Maximum

36.99
75.54

4.7 Evaluation Statistics
The ensuing descriptive statistics are the result of the complete scores for all coding indicators
for each set of plans. The mean, standard deviation, and minimum/maximum are calculated for
each plan criterion in regards with the scores of the coding indicators contained within. The
mean value would be the average score between 0 and 2 given to the division of indicators across
a set of six plans. The standard deviation is the spread of those coding indicator scores, and the
minimum/maximum are the lowest or highest single average coding indicator score. A plan
criterion containing a single coding indicator would report the same value for minimum and
maximum.
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4.7.1 Norfolk
4.7.1.1 Direction-Setting Principles
The plan evaluation results revealed that Norfolk’s plans performed well under goals. Goals are
merely representative of a literal sense of direction-setting and can be pertinent to any amount of
issues and populations. Investigating the breakdown of goals, it becomes apparent that the best
performing segments of goals were the more interchangeable items. Goals – general was most
frequently coded with the maximum value or close to it, with a mean of 1.5. As its name alludes,
general goals includes common practice items such as tangibility, relevance and articulation. The
types of goals that are counterparts to vulnerability-specific items like equity and cohesion,
restoration, and adaptation/anticipation were coded with the minimum value most often, with
averages all under 1.
The ever-important vulnerability assessment was one of the lowest average scoring criteria in the
plan evaluation among Norfolk’s plans. Two of the three indicators shared a maximum average
value of 0.5 and the third indicator was rarely present with an average of 0.17. Existing
conditions on the other hand inflated the average scores for fact base in each plan. The combined
mean between existing conditions and vulnerability assessment of 1.08 conceals the low average
value for the vulnerability assessment.
The strategies and actions in Norfolk’s plans were coded more liberally on the front end of the
nine criteria or groups of strategies. The high coding scores for coordination actions matches the
prevalence of coordination in other parts of the plan and plan evaluation. The more traditional
structural strategies were fairly frequent in the plans with a mean of 1.22 and maximum indicator
score of 1.83. The two most prevalent vulnerability-specific strategies in the plans were
awareness/knowledge and smart growth. Their respective averages of 1.25 and 1.39 were
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bolstered by the high coding values for “data collection/assessment tools” and “community
educational awareness” for awareness/knowledge and “preventative development” for smart
growth/development. Design tools were the least prevalent generalized strategy type in the plans
with an average of 0.58 and minimum indicator score of 0.33. Of the lowest scored vulnerabilityspecific strategies, preparedness/response and households/individuals both averaged 0.5 or less.
Two of the coding indicators for households and individuals were not present in any of the plans
and as such, have an average score of 0. “Flood insurance” slightly remedies the low scores with
an average score of 1.33. The coding indicator scores were unanimously low under preparedness
and response as only one of them, “emergency services and resources distribution”, had an
average score approaching 1.
Table 13. Norfolk, VA Direction-Setting Coding Scores
Principles (# of indicators)
Goals

Mean

St.
Dev.

Min

Max

General (3)
Coordination (3)
Equity & Cohesion (4)
Restoration (3)
Adaptation/Anticipation (4)
Minimal Impacts (3)
Sustainability (2)

1.50
1.11
0.79
0.67
0.92
1.33
1.08

0.71
0.76
0.72
0.77
0.83
0.59
0.79

1.00
0.50
0.67
0.33
0.17
1.17
1.00

2.00
1.83
1.00
1.17
1.67
1.50
1.17

1.72
0.44

0.57
0.61

1.50
0.17

1.83
0.50

1.25
1.67
1.39
0.46
1.22
0.58
0.60
0.50
0.80

0.78
0.59
0.99
0.59
0.73
0.79
0.57
0.72
0.86

0.83
1.33
1.00
0.33
0.67
0.33
0.33
0.00
0.17

1.83
1.83
1.50
0.83
1.83
0.83
0.83
1.33
1.33

Fact Base
Existing Conditions (3)
Vulnerability Assessment (3)

Strategies/Actions
Awareness/Knowledge (4)
Coordination (3)
Smart Growth (3)
Preparedness/Response (4)
Structural (3)
Design Tools (2)
Recovery & Restoration (5)
Households & Individuals (4)
Community Assets & Services (5)
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4.7.1.2 Action-Oriented Principles
The scores received by plans for their inter-organizational coordination were greatly boosted by
the perfect score of “organizational and agency coordination” in horizontal coordination and
formidable score for “coordination with other plans” under plan integration. The average score of
1.17 for nonprofit coordination lead horizontal coordination to have the highest mean of 1.58
among the action-oriented criteria.
Among participation scores, planning process was the lowest, although it only includes two
coding indicators. Planning process consisted of “description of participation” that averaged 0.83
points and “participation schedule” that averaged 0.67 points. The average indicator scores for
public engagement techniques varied greatly, likely in part due to the spread of seven indicators.
“Practice emergency protocol” was seldom present with an average score of 0.17 while “public
meetings/workshops” was much more common at 1.5 points on average. “Focus groups” was the
2nd most common indicator in the plans at 1.33 points on average. As a whole, between the seven
indicators the average score was slightly below 1.
Implementation scores were rather low, with the exception of the single-indicator timeline and
finances, compared with most direction-setting principles. Organizational responsibility scores
were lowest of all, averaging just .28 and not including an indicator that scored on average more
than 0.5. “Recovery responsibilities” did not exist in any of the six plans. “Immediate
responsibilities” did not fare much better by scoring 0.33. As a criterion, individual responsibility
averaged more than either of these two indicators, but it also included one that averaged just
0.17, volunteers.
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On a criteria basis, monitoring was emblematic of poor performance. The single mildly prevalent
criterion, monitoring implementation, averaged 0.97, though it constituted of an indicator
averaging 0.17 – “review stakeholder membership” – and one averaging 1.5 – “monitoring
performance of actions and policies”. No indicators averaged as high as 1 point within either
self-monitoring or plan updating. “Manage conflicts/resolve disputes” was not present
whatsoever, and both “review biases/assumptions” and “ensure accountability, transparency,
equity” averaged just 0.17 points. Plan updating had two indicators that averaged 0.17 points –
“update vulnerability assessments” and “update organizational makeup and responsibility” – and
two that averaged 0.83 points – “review assessments and changing conditions” and “update goals
and policies”.
Table 14. Norfolk, VA Action-Oriented Coding Scores
Principles (# of indicators)
Inter-Organizational
Coordination

Mean

St.
Dev.

Min

Max

Plan Integration (2)

1.25

0.97

1.00

1.50

Horizontal Coordination (2)

1.58

0.67

1.17

2.00

Planning Process (2)

0.67

0.75

0.67

0.83

Public Engagement Techniques (7)

0.90

0.74

0.17

1.50

Stakeholders/Persons Involved (5)

1.03

0.72

0.33

1.50

Organizational Responsibility (3)

0.28

0.46

0.00

0.50

Individual Responsibility (3)

0.72

0.67

0.17

1.00

Timeline (1)

1.33

0.82

1.33

1.33

Finances (1)

1.50

0.84

1.50

1.50

Monitoring Implementation (5)

0.97

0.71

0.17

1.50

Self-Monitoring (4)

0.33

0.55

0.00

0.83

Updating Plan (4)

0.50

0.72

0.17

0.83

Participation

Implementation

Monitoring
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Collectively, the average coding score for general population action-oriented indicators was
about 0.87 versus 0.81 for vulnerable-specific action-oriented indicators (with spatial codes
added on). By comparison, the 33 general population direction-setting indicators averaged about
1.15 versus 0.76 for the 28 vulnerable-specific indicators. Clearly plans performed most
successfully on general direction-setting items and only marginally better on all direction-setting
items as opposed to all action-oriented. The scoring gap was close between vulnerable and
general items among action-oriented indicators compared to the nearly half point difference
between general and vulnerable direction-setting indicators. However, there are 62 directionsetting coding indicators and only 39 action-oriented indicators in total.

4.7.2 New York City
4.7.2.1 Direction-Setting Principles
The scores under the evaluation of New York City’s plans started out in a similar manner to the
scores for Norfolk’s plans. The highest scores among goals were for the commonplace general
goals (1.5). The indicator “objectives linked to goals”, as evidenced by its perfect average score
of 2, was universally present and the only one to be so in goals. The complete picture of coding
values for goals, if relied on as a predictor of content to come, would foretell that the plans
would score much better on the general population indicators than on the vulnerable-specific
indicators. Together with general goals, the plans also scored well with minimizing impacts
(1.39) and sustainability (1.42), both of which could arguably equate with content for the general
population. The plans scored poorly in equity/cohesion and adaptation/anticipation goals with
scores averaging 0.63 and 0.75 on average. Both “connecting with socioeconomic factors” and
“accounting for all scenarios” scored just 0.33 on average and were never present as prescribed

138

in any of the plans. The scores for restoration goals were neither low nor high with an average
value of 1 for all 3 of its indicators.
Fact Base is again a tale of two criteria. Existing conditions averaged a near perfect 1.89 points,
influenced by the actual perfect score of 2 points by “land use and development trends” and the
1.83 points given to both “geographic extent” and “demographics and economic characteristics”
on average. Vulnerability assessment received just shy of a point one average, with indicator
averages ranging from 0.33 to 1.33. Socially and physically vulnerable populations were most
often identified (1.33 points) while local knowledge was least often included in the vulnerability
assessments (0.33 points). Maps depicting social and/or physical vulnerability were present in
any form in only half of the plans and as such, that pertinent indicator scored 0.67 points on
average.
Most strategies criteria scored fairly well or better. Coordination strategies fell just short of a
perfect coding score with 1.94 points on average, supplemented by the 2 points received by both
horizontal and vertical coordination. The two other general population criteria of structural
strategies and design tools both scored somewhat less than coordination and close to the average
scores for all strategy types of 1.39. The average coding score for general population strategies
was 1.64 for only 8 indicators compared to an average of 1.31 points for 25 vulnerable-specific
indicators. Both, however, are above the equivalent averages for the strategy scores in Norfolk’s
plans. Awareness and knowledge (1.63), smart growth (1.72), and community assets and services
(1.6) all scored higher than the overall strategies average, but their combined averaged scores
were diminished by the coding values for preparedness and response (1), recovery and
restoration (1.2) and households and individuals (0.79). Households and individuals, the lone
strategy grouping that averaged less than 1 point, would have scored greater than 1 had it not
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been for the two indicators that scored 0 in all plan evaluations, as they did for Norfolk plan
evaluations. Like with Norfolk, “Flood insurance” again scored quite well in averaging 1.83
points.
Table 15. New York City Direction-Setting Coding Scores
Principles (# of indicators)
Goals

Mean

St.
Dev.

Min

Max

General (3)

1.50

0.79

0.83

2.00

Coordination (3)

0.94

0.80

0.83

1.17

Equity & Cohesion (4)

0.63

0.77

0.33

1.00

Restoration (3)

1.00

0.77

1.00

1.00

Adaptation/Anticipation (4)

0.75

0.74

0.33

1.17

Minimal Impacts (3)

1.39

0.78

1.17

1.67

Sustainability (2)

1.42

0.79

1.33

1.50

Existing Conditions (3)

1.89

0.32

1.83

2.00

Vulnerability Assessment (3)

0.94

0.73

0.33

1.33

Awareness/Knowledge (4)

1.63

0.72

1.17

1.83

Coordination (3)

1.94

0.24

1.83

2.00

Smart Growth (3)

1.72

0.70

1.17

1.67

Preparedness/Response (4)

1.00

0.88

0.17

1.33

Structural (3)

1.61

0.78

1.33

2.00

Design Tools (2)

1.25

0.75

1.00

1.50

Recovery & Restoration (5)

1.20

0.72

0.67

1.50

Households & Individuals (4)

0.79

0.91

0.00

1.83

Community Assets & Services (5)

1.60

0.73

1.17

1.83

Fact Base

Strategies/Actions

4.7.2.2 Action-Oriented Principles
Plans performed exceptionally well on certain action-oriented criteria, but not as much so on a
couple criteria – mainly in monitoring. The coordination indicator scores ranged from medium to
peak value. Plan integration’s average was formidable at 1.42 where “coordination with other
plans” was more prevalent with a score of 1.83. “Coordination with housing/poverty reduction
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plans” was less extensive in the plans with an average of 1 point. Both indicators within
horizontal coordination performed well under the plan evaluations. “Coordination with other
organizations” impressed in scoring 2 points in every plan while “coordination with nonprofits”
was shortly behind at 2 points in two-thirds of plans to average 1.5 points.
At face value, it appears that, in participation, planning process scored perfectly on both
indicators. However, participation criteria benefited greatly from the spatial coding process.
Seven-tenths of a point on average was added to all of the participation criteria, resulting in a
larger effect on the two indicators of planning process. The spatial code additions had a lesser
effect on the average scores for the seven public engagement technique indicators and the five
stakeholders/persons involved indicators. Still, “description of specific outreach and
participation: averaged 1.83 points and “participation schedule” averaged 1.5 points. The results
for the public engagement scores were quite mixed. While overall, the scores averaged 1.4,
including the spatial coding, “practicing emergency protocol” scored 0.83 on average and
“volunteer opportunity” averaged just 0.67 on average. The best performing public engagement
indicators were “focus groups” at 1.83 points, “public meetings/workshops” at 1.67 points, and
“information distribution” also at 1.67 points on average.
The sole vulnerable-specific criterion of implementation performed moderately well in
comparison with the average implementation scores. All implementation indicators combined
averaged 1.27 points. Meanwhile, the three indicators contained within individual responsibility
scored 1.44 points on average after including the 0.5 point average added from the spatial
coding. Organizational responsibility and timeline hovered around a point, and finances scored
1.83 points on average. The most popular indicator other than finances was individual
responsibility’s “public officials and employees” with an average score of 1.67 points. Also
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under individual responsibility, “volunteers” and “public participants” scored 1 and 1.17 points
on average, respectively.
The six evaluated plans were most deficient in monitoring by a sizable margin. Whereby none of
the criteria under coordination, participation, or implementation averaged less than a point in
their evaluation scores, two of the criteria in monitoring averaged less than 0.6 points.
Monitoring implementation, the only criterion to average greater than 1 point, ranged from
averaging 0.17 points with “reviewing stakeholder group membership” to 1.67 points with
“monitoring performance of actions and policies”. “Ensuring progress is clearly communicated”
also fared well, scoring 1.5 points on average. Self-monitoring’s score of 0.54 was this low zeros
across the board for “reviewing biases and assumptions” and “managing conflicts/resolving
disputes”. “Assessing community engagement and reactions” prevented self-monitoring from
dipping any lower by averaging 1.67 points and being present to some degree in all six plans.
Plan updating received the lowest scores on average of all criteria, direction-setting or actionoriented. None of its indicators scored 0 points on average, however, both “updating
vulnerability assessments” and “updating organizational makeup and responsibility” scored 0.17
points and “updating goals and policies” scored 0.5 points on average.

142

Table 16. New York City Action-Oriented Coding Scores
Principles (# of indicators)
Inter-Organizational
Coordination

Mean

St.
Dev.

Plan Integration (2)

1.42

0.79

1.00

1.83

Horizontal Coordination (2)

1.75

0.62

1.50

2.00

Planning Process (2)

2.00

0.65

1.50

1.83

Public Engagement Techniques (7)

1.40

0.75

0.67

1.83

Stakeholders/Persons Involved (5)

1.60

0.78

0.67

2.00

Organizational Responsibility (3)

1.00

0.97

0.83

1.17

Individual Responsibility (3)

1.44

0.67

1.00

1.67

Timeline (1)

1.00

0.89

1.00

1.00

Finances (1)

1.83

0.41

1.83

1.83

Monitoring Implementation (5)

1.03

0.76

0.17

1.67

Self-Monitoring (4)

0.54

0.78

0.00

1.67

Updating Plan (4)

0.46

0.72

0.17

1.00

Min

Max

Participation

Implementation

Monitoring

Altogether, the action-oriented coding indicators were coded with scores of 1.22 on average. The
13 general population action-oriented indicators scored below this average at 1.08 points, and the
26 vulnerable-specific action-oriented indicators scored above this average at 1.29 points (with
spatial codes added on). The first half, in effect – the direction-setting indicators – was coded on
average with a score of 1.27 overall. The first half of the evaluation’s 33 general population
indicators scored almost identically at 1.26 points on average and its 28 vulnerable-specific
indicators scored exactly 1.27 on average.

4.7.3 Plan Quality by Initiative/Approach
Plan quality scores can also be grouped by the plan design or approach as a method to convey the
general advantages of each. Average scores are taken by plan principle and overall evaluation
score for each approach that comprise of one plan from Norfolk and one from New York. Not all
pairs of plans carry the same exact approach under each initiative/type, but they are
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overwhelmingly similar. Each pair shares a common characteristic that binds them together to be
analyzed as a combination against other all other attached pairs. Characteristics like type are
shared by the hazard mitigation plan, comprehensive plan, and private-sector report pairs;
approach shared by the hazard mitigation plans; sector or organization type by the private-sector
reports; scale by the neighborhood reports; and initiative shared by the 100 Resilient Cities
initiative plans and NDRC applications.
Table 17. Plan Commonalities by Matched Pair
Initiative/Type

Hazard
Mitigation

Comp
Plan

PrivateSector Design
RE.invest
report

Neighborhood
Scale
Rising
Resiliency

100 Resilient
Cities
Resiliency
Strat.

Norfolk plan

Southside

PlaNorfolk

NYC plan

NYC Haz Mit

Commonality

Type/Approach

NDRC
Application

PlaNYC

BIG U RbD

Edgewater Park

OneNYC

Lower Manh
P&C

Type

Sector/Type

Scale

Initiative

Initiative

ThRIVe

The gap in performance among the duos of plans dominates the story. The scoring disparity is
more pronounced from the plans in Norfolk than those in New York. Although none more so
than with neighborhood plans that both plans score poorly, because of the impact that the
RE.invest report’s score has on private-sector plan performance, both plan types fall far behind
all others.
Again, the RE.invest Report deserves the bulk of the blame, but the private-sector reports fared
worst in goals, fact base and strategies in comparison with other plan pairs. In other words, they
scored lowest on the direction-setting half of the plan evaluation. The low average score in fact
base is entirely because of the outstandingly low performance by the RE.invest Report.
Ironically, the BIG U Rebuild by Design report had the highest total fact base score of all plans.
The BIG U does in fact contribute to the low private-sector scores in goals and strategies,
however.
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On the other hand, the neighborhood plans scored worst on average in the action-oriented half of
the evaluation. Thus, they exhibited the lowest scores in coordination, participation,
implementation and monitoring alike. The pair of plans scored worst, out of all plan principle
totals, on the two that would occur post-planning phase – implementation and monitoring.
Implementation received only about a quarter of the total points on average and monitoring
received even less, only 21% of the total points on average. Participation also received a slightly
troubling score, with 46% of the total points between the pair.
Then, the hazard mitigation, comprehensive, 100 Resilient Cities, and NDRC plans were more
triumphant in their measured quality. The only plan that did not receive at least a decent
evaluation score (above 50 points) was the Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Plan.
At only 37.35 points in total, it counterbalanced the 75.54 points total, highest overall, by the
New York City Hazard Mitigation Plan. Unlike the neighborhood plans, the hazard mitigation
plans scored well in the post-planning phase principles of implementation and monitoring. In
what is widely a poor performing plan principle, they were the only pair of plans to average half
of the possible points in monitoring. Together with the pair of comprehensive plans, the
mitigation plans also scored two-thirds of the available implementation points.
Of all the plan combinations, the two pairs that received the most significant guidance and
funding were on average the best performing. The 100 Resilient Cities scored the highest with
64.7 points on average, and the NDRC applications scored inconsiderably less with 62.89 points
on average. Both pairs scored exceptionally well on strategies, collecting over 70% of the
possible points. They specifically performed well on awareness, smart growth, preparedness, and
community asset/service strategies. Between the two pairs of plans, the average score for smart
growth strategies was actually greater than 100% of the possible points by virtue of favorable
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spatial coding outcomes. The 100 Resilient Cities reports were completely coordinated, accruing
100% of the available points in inter-organizational coordination. Both pairs also received 70%
or more of participation points, though were average or slightly below in their monitoring
performance.
The Hazard Mitigation and Comprehensive Plans scores, though above average, rely on higher
level mandates and local revenue for success in plan quality. The Comprehensive plans scored
best in coordination and participation and worst in goals and monitoring. The comprehensive
plan, with a versatile approach, also scored fairly well in strategies, with an average score just
below that of the 100 Resilient Cities and NDRC application reports. Averaging all twelve of the
plans together, the hazard mitigation, comprehensive, 100 RC, and NDRC plans exceeded the
private-sector and neighborhood plan scores by almost 25 points.
Table 18. Plan Evaluation Scores by Matched Pair
Hazard
Mitigation

Principle
Goals
Fact Base
Strategies
Coordination
Participation
Implementation
Monitoring

Comp
Plan

PrivateSector
Design

Neighborhood
Scale

100 Resilient
Cities

NDRC
Application

Avg. Score

23.5

20

17.5

20

26.5

29.5

% of Possible

53%

45%

40%

45%

60%

67%

9

7

6

6.5

7

9.5

% of Possible

75%

58%

50%

54%

58%

79%

Avg. Score

38.5

45

23

24.5

49

47.5

% of Possible

58%

68%

35%

37%

74%

72%

5.5

6.5

5

4.5

8

6.5

% of Possible

69%

81%

63%

56%

100%

81%

Avg. Score

17.5

20

13.5

13

20.5

19.5

% of Possible

63%

71%

48%

46%

73%

70%

Avg. Score

10.5

10.5

5.5

4

10

7.5

% of Possible

66%

66%

34%

25%

63%

47%

13

9

7.5

5.5

9

8

50%

35%

29%

21%

35%

31%

56.45

60.18

37.26

36.62

64.70

62.89

Avg. Score

Avg. Score

Avg. Score
% of Possible

Total Avg. Score
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4.8 Plan Status & Progress
4.8.1 Hazard Mitigation Plan
4.8.1.1 Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Plan
Each year following the 2011 update of the Southside Hampton Roads Hazard Mitigation Plan,
each locality that contributed to the plan must report on the progress they have made in
implementing the actions recommended for themselves as a part of their continued membership
in the Community Rating System (CRS). Norfolk's report is provided to the National Flood
Insurance Program and their City Council to serve as the implementation actions within the
city’s Flood Mitigation Plan (Tajan, 2014). Norfolk’s most recent update report came in 2014, as
the HRPDC began the process of producing a regional hazard mitigation plan to be completed by
late 2016 the year after. The implementation report by the City of Norfolk was published on their
flood awareness webpage for citizen review and also provided to the NFIP. Goals and objectives
from the 2011 plan are reiterated in the 2014 update so that actions detailed toward reaching
those goals can be more understandable to the public. Progress made on all 14 of the proposed
mitigation actions for the City of Norfolk are summarized throughout the report (Tajan, 2014).
4.8.1.2 New York City Hazard Mitigation Plan
The annual updates to the New York City Hazard Mitigation Plan are less of a progress report
and more of an amendment to the plan. The 2016 Annex was issued with the intention of keeping
the 2014 plan up-to-speed with the latest changes, public input, risks, and strategies. Like an
implementation report, it does include the monitoring of activities that had occurred since the
approval of the plan by FEMA in 2014. Since the 2015 version of the hazard mitigation plan
annex all of the new information and edits occurred with the planning process, the risk
assessment, and mitigation strategies. Updates to the planning process exhibit continual meetings
to inform about new mitigation tools and overlapping with other plans. The risk assessment had
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events added that occurred since the 2015 update. The strategies update summarizes the results
of the first phase of mitigation actions that had since completed, and introduces the mitigation
actions database (Office of Emergency Management, 2016).

4.8.2 PlaNorfolk/PlaNYC
Both cities have issued implementation/progress reports showcasing the work completed toward
meeting certain milestones or benchmarks as specified in the initially released reports.
4.8.2.1 PlaNorfolk 2030
Norfolk conducted a two-year metrics analysis and implementation analysis of the
PlaNorfolk2030 comprehensive plan adopted on March 26, 2013. The implementation status
report and metrics report were both published in March 2015 and summarized in the
Implementation and Metrics Evaluation. The city tracked the implementation progress of all 542
of the actions proposed in PlaNorfolk. Each action was categorized based on its status in March
2014, as complete, continuing if it was an ongoing action and had commenced, underway if the
action had a specific timeframe and had commenced, or not started. Actions were then
categorized as complete or underway, not started – immediate or ongoing timeframe, or not
started – short-term, mid-term and long-term timeframes, as of March 2015. Of those 542 total
actions, at the two-year point, 84 percent of them were on target, 4 percent were lagging behind
schedule, and the remaining 12 percent had not started (Department of Planning and Community
Development, 2015).
The metrics analysis performed by the city served as a platform for measuring the success at
achieving the outlined goals. PlaNorfolk included 102 separate metrics distributed throughout.
Metrics are subsidiary to outcomes that are then grouped by goal. Actions are also divided up
amongst outcomes, but are generally more populous per outcome. Of the 102 plan metrics, 35
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percent of them were making progress (best possible rating), 23 percent were lacking progress,
24 percent were making unclear progress, and the last 18 percent did not have any available data
(Department of Planning and Community Development, 2015).
4.8.2.2 PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York
Because New York uniquely approached its comprehensive plan from two different vantage
points that work reciprocally but with two vastly different purposes, it released two versions of
PlaNYC – one emphasizing a more sustainability approach and the other a resilience one. Both
PlaNYC: A Greener, Greater New York and PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York are
painstakingly examined for their implementation progress. Though they represent two different
causes and two different reports, their symbiotic relationship is stressed in being combined into a
single implementation report.
The implementation analysis of A Stronger, More Resilient New York inhabits the second half
of the report, remaining consistent with the chronological order of the plans’ releases. The
analysis tracks the progress of all 257 of the coastline defense, building upgrade, infrastructure
protection, and neighborhood protection actions recommended in the comprehensive report. 29
of those actions had already been completed and 202 of them were currently underway at the
time of the progress report. In the first phase of implementation, A Stronger, More Resilient New
York proposed $3.7 billion worth in coastal protection across 37 initiatives. The plan addressed
building-level improvements through code legislation, regulations, incentive programs, and best
practices. Since these proposals in 2013, the implementation report identified multiple pieces of
legislation passed on that front and a Flood Resiliency Text Amendment as successes. Beyond
those, other achievements are appropriated amongst economic recovery, insurance, utilities,
fuels, healthcare, community preparedness, telecommunications, transportation, parks,
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environmental protection, water/wastewater, food, waste, and various coastal locations across the
city, in emulation of categories in the original plan.

4.8.3 RE.invest Initiative
Following the release of the RE.invest Report commissioned by RE:focus Partners in March
2015, Norfolk’s City Council agreed to incorporate the findings and recommendations for the
Hague/Ghent neighborhood and the Arts District into their suite of coastal resiliency strategies.
The flood barrier projects and other engineering upgrades proposed in the report were submitted
to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to be included in their Section 205 Flood Management
study for implementation. Those that were recommended to the U.S. ACE have completed
implementation and have no further federal funding or interest as of the City Council meeting on
December 8,, 2015. Other proposed strategies for The Hague remain speculative but are still on
the radar of Norfolk for future capital investment and/or requests for federal funds (Williams,
2015). Soon after the publishing of the infrastructure-driven report, RE:Focus Partners outspread
their resilience effort to model economic, insurance and property losses under different scenarios
to leverage catastrophe bonds supplementary to the protective structures they designed in the
RE.invest Initiative. The multidisciplinary team completed the modelling scenarios under its
RE.bound Program for three of its eight RE.invest Initiative partner cities – Hoboken, NJ, Miami
Beach, FL, and Norfolk (RE:focus Partners, LLC, 2015).

4.8.4 Rebuild by Design – BIG U
The project developed under the collaboration between Bjarke Ingels Group (BIG), One
Architecture and several other private-sector stakeholders, the BIG U was awarded $335 million
by HUD for being among the 7 winners of the Rebuild by Design contest. Since the initial
award, HUD has dedicated an additional $176 million from the National Disaster Resilience
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Competition funding, toward the implementation of The BIG U. The City of New York
committed $305 million of its capital funding to start the first phases of the East Side Coastal
Resiliency (ESCR), and Lower Manhattan Coastal Resiliency (LMCR) projects. Both the ESCR
and LMCR projects evolved out of two of the original three compartments of the BIG U. In the
BIG U plan, the ESCR was known as East River Park, while LMCR was Two Bridges and
Chinatown. A third compartment in the BIG U, Brooklyn Bridge to the Battery, is scheduled to
be implemented last, but is excluded from NDRC funding (Rebuild by Design, 2016).

4.8.5 Rising Resiliency Challenge
Since the Tidewater Rising Resiliency Challenge was not a formal planning initiative but a
collaborative academic endeavor, implementation was limited to the capabilities of those
involved and whatever grant funding was available. The Dutch Dialogues sessions, that produced
conceptual resiliency designs for the Newmarket Creek, Newtown Creek, and Ohio Creek
watersheds, coincided with the completion of the designs from the Rising Resiliency Challenge.
The neighborhood that the challenge dedicated its efforts on, Chesterfield Heights, is located in
the Ohio Creek watershed. Due to this overlap, the Dutch Dialogues borrowed the students’
design work and credited them with contribution. The collective design from the two efforts was
then included in the region’s grant proposal for the National Disaster Resilience Competition. As
will be further revealed later, some of the funding that would be received from the HUD
competition would be allocated toward the implementation of the designs for the Ohio Creek
Watershed/Chesterfield Heights (Stiles Jr., Andrews, & Erten-Unal, 2015).

4.8.6 Resilient Neighborhoods – Edgewater Park
The Resilient Neighborhoods initiative represents a micro-based endeavor enabling the City’s
Planning Department to work with neighborhood groups and community boards for arriving at
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site-specific strategies. In all, ten communities were selected to be the subject of neighborhood
scale studies aimed at supporting their continued vitality and resiliency. The Edgewater Park
study was the prototype for those to follow. The main goals of the work in the neighborhood
were to: renew the local land use and construction code in such a way as to not impede on
character but allows for flood resilient buildings; and communicate climate risk and associated
resiliency measures for residents to adopt. A month after the release of the neighborhood report,
flood resilient construction was already underway for a few homes in Edgewater Park, as the
Edgewater Cooperative planned to continue its collaboration with the Department of City
Planning (Wirsing, 2015). Within a year of the planning work in Edgewater Park, studies were
completed for nine other neighborhoods across all five boroughs by virtue of federal funding.
The Department had already located 16 other neighborhoods to be addressed in the future under
the initiative pending further funding (Department of City Planning, 2015).

4.8.7 100 Resilient Cities
4.8.7.1 Norfolk Resilience Strategy
Announced in late 2013, Norfolk was selected as a member city among the tens of other cities in
the 100 Resilient Cities challenge to manufacture a comprehensive report on engendering and
celebrating resilience. Part of the membership involves the hiring of a Chief Resilience Officer.
In Norfolk’s case, this was Christine Morris, who had been employed in various roles and
capacities across Hampton Roads (Applegate, 2014; Norfolk's Resilience Challenge, 2015;
Nyczepir, 2015). Morris, whose position was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, was tasked
with championing a whole-community approach focused on hazard mitigation, preparedness,
response and recovery from catastrophic events and chronic stresses. Complex issues identified
as most relevant to be addressed in the city’s resilience strategy include flooding, sea level rise
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and coastal erosion, violence, poverty, unemployment, and transportation (Norfolk's Resilience
Challenge, 2015; Sweet, 2014).
According to the contract agreement with 100 Resilience Cities, Norfolk is obligated to
participate in monitoring activities to enable Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, the consulting
arm of the Rockefeller Foundation, to monitor and evaluate aspects of the city’s project. 100
Resilient Cities was also permitted to conduct an evaluation of operations under the grant,
including possible visits by personnel, discussion of the grant, and review of grant related
financial and other records. The 100 Resilient Cities team had continuously issued a quarterly
report card to the Chief Resilience Officer, Morris, to provide their assessment of the progress
and development of strategies or activities under the grant. The grant to fund Christine Morris’
position and all third-party resources last for two years from June 2014 to June 2016 (Sweet,
2014).
4.8.7.2 OneNYC: The Plan for a Strong and Just City
Joining Norfolk and many others in the first wave of 100 Resilient Cities participants, New York
City honed in on its insufficient transportation system, flooding threat from sea level rise and
coastal erosion, and the present and future perils associated with tropical storms as its pillars of
resilience challenges. Its Chief Resilience Officer, tasked with finding and highlighting solutions
to these challenges, had ample experience in leveraging resilience to solve the city’s problems.
Daniel Zarrilli was appointed the position of Director of the Mayor’s Office of Recovery and
Resilience by New York’s sitting mayor, Bill de Blasio, in March 2014. With entry in the 100
Resilient Cities challenge, he quickly became the CRO. Zarrilli lead the development and
implementation of the city’s resilience strategy, OneNYC after having assisting in the
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implementation of PlaNYC: A Stronger More Resilient New York in 2013 (New York's
Resilience Challenge, 2015).
For the $20 billion in identified funds covering over 1,000 individual projects outlined in the
report, the plan includes both City and non-City assets and programs, and assumes both expense
and capital funding from the City and other sources. Many of the strategies addressing
infrastructure and coastal protection are incorporated into the Ten Year Capital Strategy whilst
others, specifically $5 billion worth, are at last reported, currently unfunded. The additional costs
would need to be incurred from increased federal or other funding and increased City capital or
expense funding (Stringer, 2016).
Since New York was one of the earliest to release its resilience strategy of the first batch of 100
Resilient Cities participants, it has had the opportunity to track the progress made since its
participation. The City released a 2016 progress report to its OneNYC report. The progress
report is organized in the same manner as the full report – broken down by its different visions
for the city - except each vision is instead inundated with milestones for each initiative and the
progress made toward reaching the milestone. The latest available accomplishments are
compared with the corresponding figures from the original report. According to the 2016 report,
95% of the 202 initiatives outlined in OneNYC had been launched and underway. Moreover,
90% of indicators signaling progress are on track as intended (Department of City Planning,
2016).

4.8.8 NDRC – ThRIVe/Lower Manhattan Protect & Connect
The state of Virginia and New York City were among the 40 finalists selected to participate in
the second round for implementation. Since the entire state of Virginia did not experience the
brunt of the effects of Hurricane Irene, the state application honed in on Hampton Roads
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(ThRIVe: Resilience In Virginia, 2015; Gonzalez, 2016). Virginia’s ThRIVe: Resiliene In
Virginia and New York City’s Lower Manhattan Protect and Connect Phase 2 Applications were
both announced as winning entries in January, 2016 and thus had access to the $1 billion in
disaster funding, alongside 11 other communities. New York City was awarded the largest
funding amount of $176 million to aid in the recovery from Hurricane Sandy, while Virginia
came in shortly behind with the third largest pay amount of $120.55 million (Gonzalez, 2016).
Both projects under the guidance of the NDRC were estimated to begin in September 2015 and
last through September 2019 (Taffet, 2014). Funding to Virginia and Hampton Roads was to
support efforts to grow the economy through water management and community revitalization
tasks. Virginia’s ThRIVE application drew largely from Norfolk’s resilience strategy under the
direction of Christine Morris. $5 million of the award, in conjunction with $7 million in state
committed funds, are directly for the Coastal Resilience Laboratory and Acceleration Center.
The Center was set up as an independent nonprofit to serve as a hub for technological,
organizational and innovation around community revitalization, water management and
resilience measurement (Rodin, 2016).
Funding to New York City was in support of the Dryline, a coastal protection system envisioned
to incorporate retail and recreational space along Lower Manhattan. The project idea was
inspired by the Rebuild by Design competition, the precursor to the NDRC (Rodin, 2016). In
sum, New York City received $4.2 billion in CDBG-DR funding from HUD for the 2015-2016
fiscal year. A portion of the funds were dedicated to the implementation of resiliency/hazard
mitigation programs like Rebuild by Design and the NDRC project while the remainder was
mostly distributed amongst home restoration and replacement programs, and small business
assistance programs (Stringer, 2016).
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Chapter 5. Discussion
5.1 Introduction
Emerging directions in research on planning to adapt to and prepare for events such as worsening
coastal storms and sea-level rise suggest that the breadth and complexity of quality is more than
meets the eye. In the past, studies investigating the quality of plans with the intention of
determining their value in regards to coping with development pressures, hazards, and climate
change have produced a legitimate argument and conclusion. When it comes to planning for
extreme flooding and coastal storms, with the acknowledgement that certain demographics are
compellingly vulnerable, the argument that content of a particular quality being present in plans
is evidence for superior adaptability and preparedness is not as decisive. Though it is immensely
supportive and implicit of exceptional plans, it does not unanimously ascertain resilience among
those that are least resilient to these worsening events. The ensuing passages aim to surmise at
the potential of these two sets of plans for Norfolk and New York City by piecing together the
various avenues of collected information and objectifying their implication using evidence of
past performance of related plans, factors that have affected these plans, and ideals for future
plans, found in recent literature.

5.2 Trends and Influences in Plan Quality
Few cities in the U.S. have integrated climate adaption and disaster preparedness and recovery
into normal planning and development activities. The plan evaluation protocol itself was
designed to measure the quality of both typical planning efforts and specialized efforts up against
the ideal plan to prepare for and adapt to the hazards of sea-level rise, extreme flooding and
coastal storms. The protocol was purposely idealistic and exhaustive with the assumption that no
planning effort would even nearly perfectly satisfy all of the content indicators. Several of the
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evaluated plans and reports exceeded the quality and capabilities of past efforts as implied in
recent studies of recovery, risk reduction and climate adaptation plans, especially in a social
capacity (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014; Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Berke,
et al., 2015). The results nevertheless still demonstrate that recent and current research is an
instructive voice that planning efforts, via the perspective of Norfolk and New York City, are
short of keeping pace with. Though, Norfolk and New York City are accompanied with certain
internal and also external circumstances that have contributed to their mildly prolific range of
efforts in recent years. Along with the internal trends in the plan quality data, external influences
are equally as important to address.

5.2.1 Motivations
In their own interest, both Norfolk and New York City have placed ample attention toward
combating the adverse impacts of a changing climate on their city, but also because of
independent circumstances. Inland cities do not as readily experience the immediate effects of
climate change, specifically sea-level rise and more intense storms. In recent surveys, of cities
that engaged in adapting to the effects of climate change, three-quarters had experienced climate
impacts, were in a state with a plan of their own, and many were at or near the coasts (Chu).
Neither Norfolk nor New York would be as motivated to understand the personalized impacts of
climate change, let alone combat them were it not for their geographic position and readily
apparent impacts. Both cities are clear anomalies in their experience of climate impacts. New
York City suffered from the most costly recent coastal storm in Sandy and Norfolk witnesses at
the very least nuisance flooding on a regular basis.
Despite the broad acceptance among academia of socioeconomic action as a more powerful tool
to minimize vulnerability to worsening climate threats, minimal evidence has indicated that plans
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are moving away from tradition because (1) social justice is an emergent theme in hazard and
adaptation planning, and (2) studies focusing on the integration of social justice into climate and
hazards plans are sparse (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015).
For independent reasons, Norfolk and New York have been coerced into taking action on social
and physical vulnerabilities, and exposure all concurrently. Not that New York City needed a
major catalyst to motivate it to tackle environmental hazards, but Sandy exposed the social
inequities that the city likely would not have been as adamant about otherwise. As for Norfolk, it
is no coincidence that the areas that experience the worst flooding are also those most overrun
with low-income affordable and public housing. Other more common motivations for initiating
action toward climate change among cities at large – demonstrating leadership, promoting
sustainable and resilient development, and improving community quality of life – all likely
equally apply in the case of Norfolk and New York (Aylett, 2014). Considering New York City
had been modelling the impacts from and strategies to adapt to climate change years prior to
Sandy whilst most cities only began mitigating climate change impacts based on international
research, it was an early national leader. Ensuring development is sustainable and resilient is of
critical importance for both cities with their coastal location and thus finite developable space.
The combination of these motives has thrust climate adaptation and flooding resilience into the
foreground of most planning activities between the two cities since 2011.

5.2.2 Connections
The rapid emergence of flooding and sea-level rise as a prime focus in planning domains
previously reserved for development, growth management and revitalization has manifested into
previously unaccustomed associations. As climate change vulnerability is increasingly
emphasized in practice and research, efforts previously operating in different spaces, like
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mitigation, adaptation, and preparedness are beginning to see overlaps (Lesnikowski, Ford,
Berrang-Ford, & Heymann, 2015; Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015).
While the social justice issues of climate change have been merely conceptual in most cities,
Norfolk and New York City are evidence that progress is being made toward climate equity
(Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014; Schrock, Bassett, & Green, 2015).
Prescriptive and investigatory studies call upon transformative goals as means to further more
equitable action (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). Through evaluation of
hazard plans, they discovered that goals have been all too often confined to standard convention
like efficiency and public safety to be considered transformative. They have neglected what has
recently been declared more essential to disaster and flooding resilience, social equity (Berke &
Lyles, 2013). Goals might seem inconsequential toward the overall performance of plans
specifically in accounting for measures of social vulnerability, but in fact the makeup of goals
observed in the plans for Norfolk and New York City were predictors of equitable action. It is
worth noting that with a future portended as being littered with extreme climatic scenarios,
breaking from conventions is of utmost importance.
A plan evaluation exclusive to goals would be negligible at best. However, the scope of the goals
present in Norfolk’s plans indicate that this foundational content might truly carry planning
efforts on a trajectory of success or lack thereof in accounting for the whole picture of
vulnerability and susceptibility. That New York’s plans display a weaker correlation between the
makeup of goals and subsequent propositions and actions does not repudiate this connection. As
a trendsetting global city, New York hardly represents a typical American city, and as is
reinforced in its plan performance. It is not the sheer level of overall performance that seems to
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separate New York from a city with typical capabilities but the manner in which it outperformed
Norfolk.
New York’s plans that were facilitated through federal and nationally-renowned partners, its
NDRC application and 100 Resilient Cities report, slightly outperformed that average of its
plans. Its hazard mitigation and comprehensive plans outperformed the average by an essentially
equal margin. In Norfolk, while its 100 Resilient Cities report and pertinent NDRC application
outperformed its average, they did so by a wide margin, and likewise of its hazard mitigation and
comprehensive plans. This trend underscores the possibilities available through strong top-level
influence and more flexible municipal capabilities to rectify complex situations. If latter content
exceeds the scope of goals then it is perhaps an indication of experience and familiarity whereas
if goals eclipse tangible ideas then it is a sign of inexperience and sometimes complacency or
overconfidence.
When organized effectively, goals can serve as benchmarks to hold plans accountable for their
aspirations. Thus, they can be prophetic of progress without symbolizing progress. To aspire for
equitable progress and resilience is to facilitate a process and plan that is inclusive, democratic,
audacious, and studious. The studious component consists of open-mindedly inquiring about the
complexities and characteristics of appropriately scaled communities. The vulnerability
assessment is the cornerstone of this inquisition. As social structures and processes have become
pervasive in understanding of vulnerability and inequality, research has urged for this to reflect
in assessments of vulnerability. Vulnerability assessments are intended as diagnostic tools to
effectuate the appropriate actions in appropriate locations (Van Zandt, et al., 2012; Baussan,
2015; Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014).
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Norfolk’s 100 Resilience Cities report and NDRC application boast the most wide-ranging and
equitable goals, but only the NDRC application is able to effectively diagnose contributors to
inequality and vulnerability. If Norfolk’s Resilience Strategy were to be self-sufficient, this
finding would severely discount the legitimacy of its proposed actions, but because of its
superior inter-organizational coordination and collaboration it can be relieved of some of the
responsibility. Multi-directional coordination in this way is conducive to the interchange of
information and ideas such that the weight of legitimacy and responsibility is shared among other
plans and initiatives. Both 100 Resilient Cities reports, Norfolk’s Resilient Strategy and New
York’s OneNYC embody this trend of shared responsibility. Though not stating it outright,
perhaps one element of the 100 Resilient Cities initiative was to maximize the immediate impact
by relying immensely on preconceived assessments of vulnerability and already tailor-made
strategies. Given the initiative is run by the financially endowed Rockefeller Foundation it is
highly possible that investments in cities had been decided strategically based on the existence of
efforts and resources in place rather than on absolute need.
Shifting back to assessments of vulnerability – the NDRC applications were not the only efforts
that adequately identified and inventoried social and physical vulnerability. The more traditional
hazard mitigation plans also sufficiently mapped and apprehended local vulnerability, but
evidently as a matter of requirement. Neither hazard mitigation plans set equity and cohesion as a
goal to achieve yet they both significantly accounted for social measures of vulnerability. That is
about all the two hazard mitigation plans had in common. Whether or not Norfolk and the other
Southside Hampton Roads jurisdictions sought to accomplish the bare minimum or to focus on
other planning efforts more fervently is unclear, but the Southside Hazard Mitigation plan is
certainly emblematic of the wide disparities in municipal capabilities between Norfolk and New
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York City. An unexpected implication is that New York City’s Hazard Mitigation might actually
be its most socially impactful plan in delving into more typical place-based strategies, embracing
diverse engagement, and being the most implementable. Of particular note is that the Southside
Hazard Mitigation plan was published in 2011, a whole year earlier than any other evaluated
plan. New York’s, contrarily, was published at the start of 2014, roughly 15 months after the
city’s experiences with Hurricane Sandy. The more than two-year span between plans could be
enough to explain the large gap in quality given the recent chronology of disasters and
research/planning focuses. An obvious conclusion to make would be that Norfolk can learn
immensely from New York’s so-called hazard mitigation effort, but it could also be that that is
not a suitable blueprint for Norfolk.
The city of Norfolk seems to have made the decision to invest greatly in its comprehensive
planning effort to serve as an appropriate home for all complex issues including flooding of the
nuisance and storm-related variety. Though Norfolk’s Southside Hazard Mitigation plan is of
lesser quality than the evaluation average, its comprehensive plan is just a step below the two
robust initiatives. One study, after evaluating the adaptive and preparedness quality of several
plan types including comprehensive plans for eight states all located in the Southeast, determined
that comprehensive plans were the least equipped to support content related to hazards and
disasters (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014).
Considering the pair of comprehensive plans outperformed the hazard plans, Norfolk and New
York City clearly debunk that judgment. Perhaps reinforcing the post-Sandy effect, the average
date of publication and adoption for all four plans converges on around 2013. The
aforementioned study evaluated plans that were adopted between 2007 and 2012. Ordinarily it
might be surprising that a plan evaluation searching for content that contributes to adaptability
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and resilience would favor comprehensive plans over hazard mitigation plans, but given the
experience of these two cities and the current landscape of research since 2012, it is hardly a
surprising result. Structural and infrastructural investments are still common in hazard mitigation
plans because they are viewed as more sound and tangible compared with socioeconomic
investments. Socioeconomic investments also do not attract as much buy-in amongst hazard
mitigation since they are perceived as a trade-off from tangible actions that are subject to federal
and state requirement (Berke & Lyles, 2013).

5.2.3 Influencing Factors
Undoubtedly much is gained from the results of the plan evaluation and the explicit content
contained within the two sets of plans, but external factors also greatly contribute to their
performance as can be assumed from other sources and the plans themselves.
5.2.3.1 State & Federal Influence
To the advantage of both Norfolk and New York City, some of the innovative practices and
investment to combat the effects of flooding and coastal storms can be attributed to federal
commitments and state-level leadership. Though most federal funding to local jurisdictions
following a disaster declaration manifests as assistance and recovery funds to provide relief from
the major financial setback that ensues, recent commitments have opened up new possibilities.
During disaster relief, the federal government follows its own protocol under the Stafford Act to
assist with a laundry list of priorities like deploying emergency support and response teams,
public facilities and public housing, insurance losses, etc. Research has found that the ability of
cities to plan for climate adaptation and preparedness does indeed depend on state and federal
policies (Chu). Adaptation at the local level does not occur independent of federal or state
government (Baker, Peterson). Consistent with the case of New York City, research also states
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that environmentally progressive cities have excelled in planning to prepare and adapt (Shi, Chu,
& Debats, 2015).
If the comprehensive plans represent local government’s best efforts to prepare and adapt to
coastal climate threats, then the 100 Resilient Cities reports and NDRC applications represent the
current capabilities of state and federal governments. The two pairs fully demonstrate the toplevel influence effect. It has also been cited that local government can lack the dedicated capacity
undertake certain specifics of climate adaptation and preparedness without the support of
foundations like the Rockefeller Foundation, that operate at the national level (Shi, Chu, &
Debats, 2015). The obvious influence of HUD and the Rockefeller Foundation on the two
initiatives, while incalculable, does not even represent the full scope of vertical influence, at least
on Norfolk. The leadership under Virginia’s Department of Housing and Community
Development, as appointed by the governor, on the ThRIVe NDRC application centered on
Norfolk certainly contributes to the application’s elevated potential. The agency was likely
selected based on the competition’s diverse requirements for recovery, revitalization and
development given their track-record in those areas. The combination of state and national stake
does not account for the entirety of the superior performance of the 100 Resilient Cities and
NDRC reports, but as has been repeatedly uncovered in other cities, it makes an impact.
5.2.3.2 Financial Streams
In what might be attempts to keep the federal response to future disasters as modernized and
mistake-free as possible, the government has dedicated billions in leftover disaster recovery
funds to coax impacted locations like New York City and to a lesser extent Norfolk to explore
creative solutions to the problems they have faced as a result of extreme flooding and coastal
storms. Rather than remain in the background as cities surge past state and federal governments
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in understanding the complexities of the various stages of disaster planning, the federal
government has taken on a listening role so that municipalities can return the favor for the
funding and resources they received. The quality of efforts that have emerged out of this give
and take has been bar none above the rest likely because of the high standards the federal
government imposes on its subsidiaries, and for the desire to constantly improve outcomes for
other locations in a manner not unlike the 100 Resilient Cities initiative.
Ordinarily, even with supplementary funds, because of political bureaucracy and prioritized
recovery needs, the two cities would be unable to devote labor and investment into exploring
radical alternatives let alone implement them. There are tradeoffs to investing in one area of need
over another as cities must prioritize certain actions over others. In many instances, cities choose
development priorities over environmental or social priorities because they are indebted to those
priorities (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). The state, federal and nongovernmental initiatives that
have surfaced since the publicity of climate-related events have provided the motivation and
resources enough for local governments to overcome this dilemma. Certain decision-makers and
representatives of vulnerable communities might advocate for transformational change, but
without grants and other outside resources, willpower is too weak, and the opposition holds too
much weight.
5.2.3.3 Regulatory Framework
Both hazard mitigation and comprehensive plans have certain requirements that they must meet
in order for the jurisdiction that is the subject of the plans, to qualify for certain state and federal
government funding. Hazard mitigation plans at the local level often conform to state hazard
mitigation plans that determine the amount of funding the locality may receive. These FEMAapproved hazard mitigation plans may receive funding directly for mitigation projects in non-
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emergency situations, as a condition under the Stafford Act. These plans are thus of better
quality in areas that FEMA and the Stafford Act require of them for approval and funding
eligibility. Under the Stafford Act, all hazard mitigation plans for a jurisdiction in the U.S. must
identify hazards, risks and vulnerabilities, describe actions to mitigate them, and establish a
strategy to implement those actions (FEMA, 2013). Hence the better performance in those types
of actions in the plans themselves.
Also at the federal tier, several executive orders have been signed since 2013 regarding climate
adaptation at the local level. Particularly, FEMA has received the directive to require state-level
hazard mitigation plans to include future climate scenarios and projections, but they have yet to
enforce that at the local level (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Small & Laporte, 2015). Overall, for
the purposes of this study, the regulatory framework for hazard mitigation would have been a
hindrance since for instance structural controls only accounted for less than one percent of the
possible score. Studies have even found that federal and state programs for hazard mitigation
have had only a marginally positive effect on plan quality (Berke & Lyles, 2013).
The DMA, the successor to the Stafford Act, had intended to diffuse authority by emphasizing
intergovernmental collaboration. Instead of reliance on formal mandates and imposed standards
by the federal government, local governments could have more control over their hazard
mitigation approaches. In reality, state governments coordinated risk assessment, strategy
identification, implementation and monitoring. Unfortunately, even recently, state hazard
mitigation plans have underperformed under measures of the same plan quality principles,
boding poorly for local plans. Specifically, state plans the responsibility of emergency
management agencies are of the poorest quality because they view hazards differently and pay
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less regard for the uncertain impacts of climate change, or economic development and
environmental protection (Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012).
The Southside Hazard Mitigation Plan was in fact prepared and updated in partnership with
FEMA and the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM). On Hampton Roads’
end, the local planning committee is representative of in addition to emergency services,
planning, zoning, public works, healthcare, and environmental offices. Since the committee is
compliant to VDEM and their coordinating of risk assessments, strategy approaches, and
implementation methods. By contrast, New York City’s hazard mitigation plan was far less
reliant on state government, though it was supported by the equivalent New York State Division
of Homeland Security and Emergency Services. The plan was instead co-developed through the
city’s Office of Emergency Management and Department of City Planning in coordination with
the Mayor’s Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability. The self-autonomy and lack of a
dominant regulatory body with New York City’s hazard mitigation certainly would explain the
distance in hazard mitigation quality after accounting for the city’s planning capacity.
Comprehensive plans, like hazard mitigation plans, can serve as a symbol of qualification for a
locality, though in a secondary role. They usually do not themselves entitle a locality to funds to
implement actions proposed in the plan like with a hazard mitigation plan. On a state by state
basis, comprehensive plans can have consistent structure so that they are officially recognized by
their governing state authority. Requirements can vary immensely for comprehensive plans
depending on the rules written in the state’s code. When state comprehensive planning mandates
do include funding and other incentives, hazards typically receive higher priority (Berke,
Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). Certain components of the comprehensive plans for
Norfolk and New York City may be contingent on the requirements from Virginia and New
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York State, respectively, but more than likely, an overwhelming majority of the quality pertinent
to this particular evaluation is dependent on the jurisdiction itself. As an example, an added
requirement under New York state law is for comprehensive plans to comply with state
environmental quality requirements and to allow for full citizen comment though public hearings
during adoption (Coon, 2015). While this is negligible given New York’s capacity combined
with its progressiveness, it is still a requirement that is not equivalently enforced on Norfolk.
In sum, absent regulations can either allow more freedom to plan flexibly under a
multidisciplinary effort or withhold the accountability necessary to integrate certain essential
planning qualities. Regulations in place can also ensure that these essential planning qualities are
accounted for or, if outdated and overly restrictive, can themselves serve as an unbreakable
barrier to more improved planning efforts.
5.2.3.4 Scale
As hypothesized, downscaling planning efforts would improve outcomes for vulnerable
communities. As the plan closes in on a smaller geographic area, so too would its contents. It
would be expected that with less geographic responsibility, assessments of vulnerability might be
correspondingly more complex and wholesome, proposed strategies might be most compatible
and constructive, participation might be all-inclusive and recurrent, implementation might be
shared and convenient, and monitoring might be ingrained. Contrarily, the two examples of
neighborhood-scale plans did not display these traits to much avail. The efforts seemingly
contracted in quality as they concurrently honed in on planning territory. One explanation for the
decrease in quality after the downsizing scale is a narrowed and more focused scope. The
evaluation process is set up to reward those plans that incorporate a variety of actions and
content, and for good reason. As communicated throughout, each criteria has its own function
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and benefit that contribute to the overall potential of a plan to incite resilient transformational
change in vulnerable communities. Since there were fewer stakeholders and fewer constituents,
preferences were most likely more concentrated. Likewise, one single neighborhood may have
numerous issues and vulnerabilities, but as a fraction of the total in an entire city. Proposed
solutions and actions taken would accordingly reflect this condensed realm of problem-solving.
5.2.3.5 Iteration
The main similarity between a city’s comprehensive plan and its hazard mitigation plan is that
each are updated every so many years, typically around five. A major difference between them is
their source of funding to develop the plan. Given the latest version of a city’s hazard mitigation
was approved by FEMA and thus subject to the rules of the Stafford Act, the mitigation planning
committee made up of representatives from planning and zoning, emergency
preparedness/services, and utilities would have allocated the contributions from FEMA directly
toward the future development and updating of the plan. Comprehensive plans forged by the
planning department do not have that same luxury. Rather, they are often a periodic
responsibility of certain members of the planning staff whose positions are paid for through
public revenue. Yet, due to the fact that both imminent plan types are recurring, they bear certain
qualities that other perhaps unfamiliar planning endeavors might elude.
Research has indicated that planning leaders have learned incrementally at different rates
depending on the initial quality of the plans and the extent of state mandate and regulation. Plan
series have improved over time in areas such as emergency preparedness, public engagement and
policy-making (Brody, 2003). The hazard mitigation and comprehensive plans likewise revisit
themselves and the areas they are planning for each time they undergo a regular renovation. The
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community conditions that factor into vulnerability assessments and critical decisions are usually
representative of the latest data and information available.
If each time the plan update process commences, officials revisit their public constituents,
barriers to participation and implementation like reluctance, distrust and opposition may degrade
over time. Thus, the equitable and implementation capacity of the plan would have been
enhanced. Again, since the plans are always building on the preceding version, they are also
constantly realizing past mistakes and errors and correcting them for future versions. Over time,
unless local bureaucracy prevents progress on the plans or a deviation from the bare minimum,
hazard mitigation and comprehensive plans should gradually make improvements in quality.
Their iterative nature, nevertheless, is more auspicious than an impediment. Of all the external
influences on plan quality, the iterative nature of these plans has the least certain effect, but as
according to research it is likely the long duration of hazard mitigation and comprehensive
planning processes has had a positive impact.

5.3 Overcoming Traditional Obstacles
Similar to external influences that have either bolstered or hindered the quality of these sets of
plans, there are certain underlying barriers that have plagued the progression of all planning for
adaptation and preparedness. Studies have chronicled the deficiency of plans in effectively
accounting for the whole sphere of remedial environmental, social and economic actions and
criteria. While these barriers may be deflating and seem overbearing, research has proposed
ways to overcome them – some of which is in practice in the plans of Norfolk and New York
City. The interlacing theme of the ensuing passage is not to argue that the subject plans have
successfully overcome these longstanding obstacles and that other cities can view New York and
Norfolk as utter successes, but that they have made headways. Perhaps certain proposed
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groundbreaking strategies that were adopted by either city are more practical than others that
were not put into practice but are equally supported in research.
These barriers that have continuously threatened the efficacy of planning efforts only complicate
already desperate situations for vulnerable communities. Embracing recommended tools and
tactics to alleviate and eliminate barriers to municipal planning can improve the future prospect
for these communities, but only in an anticipatory sense. As the literature and this evaluation has
established, adaptation and preparedness undertakings also need to seize socioeconomic and
equitable action to whittle away at the incessant shortcomings of vulnerable households.
Otherwise, a vicious cycle of defeat and failure at the hand of extreme flooding and coastal
storms will persist.

5.3.1 Local Leadership
5.3.1.1 Political Prioritization
Consistent with leadership demonstration as a motivation to pursue adaptation and preparedness
to climate change, local leadership is a critical indicator of far-reaching support for adaptation
planning. Leadership also serves as the foundation on which cities are able to tackle
environmental as well as socioeconomic risks. Encouragement from local leaders for climate
commitment early on has correlated with robust coalitions and sweeping political support. A
history of climate change denial, unpredictability of climate impacts, and hierarchy of
government operations have all been cited as deterrents to local leadership embrace of planning
for climate change impacts. Just a quarter of cities have reported that elected officials are highly
committed to adapting to climate change. Inadequate support from mayors and city councilors
translates into challenges in supporting personnel capacity, acquiring enough funding, and
coordinating with other departments and agencies (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Aylett, 2014).
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Of course leadership has been more receptive over time as momentum has shifted in favor of
climate and social progress, but the underliers behind lack of support still persists in those cities
notably without local leadership. Most common has been a shortsightedness or a political focus
on short-term goals linked to electoral cycles. Other city governments cite lack of leadership at
regional or national levels of government as reason to not take initiative. There will always be
competing priorities at the local level, but some cities still view adaptation and preparedness as at
odds with economic expansion and improvements in community facilities. Even cities that have
been declared more at-risk to climate-induced weather events and sea-level rise, action has been
occasionally sluggish because of other priorities on their list receiving precedence (Berke &
Lyles, 2013).
All of these political barriers have been most pervasive in the U.S. Of all nations participating in
a 2014 global survey of action on climate change by ICLEI, U.S. respondents reported the
highest frequency of mitigation only response. Norfolk and New York are among the 58% of
American cities that are taking mitigation and adaptation action, but 41% of 141 participating
cities is still a substantial chunk that has been unable to break through (Aylett, 2014). Local
leadership can be seen as both an external and an internal challenge. Influence and endorsement
from mayors and city councilors is less tangible plan content and more procedural and integrated
into background and authority. Norfolk and New York City are indeed special cases in that social
interests and climate change are already intertwined and immediate rather than off in the distant
future, as it pertains to being adaptive and prepared. Still, they have been governed by leaders
that have championed the fight against the social, economic and environmental impacts of
climate change. In the future, this continuous commitment to socioeconomic and climate
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adaptation will hinge less on local leaders as momentum will have already been realized even as
new individuals occupy leadership positions.
5.3.1.2 Local Coalitions
The Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, launched by then Mayor Bloomberg and made up
of city and state agencies, is still one of the only in existence at that capacity and scale. The task
force has served as an empowering voice behind much of the mitigation and adaption work on
climate change prior to and since Sandy. Coincidentally, the Panel got off the ground thanks to a
grant from the Rockefeller Foundation’s Climate Change Resilience Program (Loeser & Post,
2008; Department of City Planning, 2015). The Foundation, which has been a partner in around
half of the resilience initiatives involving Norfolk and New York City, happens to be
headquartered in New York – further solidifying the city’s status as a trailblazer in combating
climate change. It would be imperative that New York City had created better quality plans to
foster resilience to flooding and coastal storms since it has far greater political will, capacity and
experience.
Concurrently, the Hampton Roads Planning District Commission has served as the regional
liaison on climate action through support from the Virginia Department of Environmental
Quality via NOAA and the Coastal Zone Management Program. The HRPDC with
representation from local leaders across the region were able to commence a climate adaptation
process relying on a three-year focal area grant beginning in 2009 and extending through 2013
(McFarlane, 2013). To opportunistically unite the multiple municipal entities and levels of
government, the Hampton Roads has since piloted an organizationally inclusive approach to sea
level rise preparedness and resilience planning. The purpose of the two-stage project was to
assemble intergovernmental arrangements and procedures comprised of federal, state and local
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government agencies, the private sector, and the public. After the conclusion of the project the
region now has an institutional framework of mutual accountability so that there is universal
leadership indefinitely.
Circling back to the evaluated plans, each set would not have been possible without the political
approval to pursue the 100 Resilient Cities and NDRC initiatives or the adoption of the plans and
reports by local mayors and city council members or even state political leaders. Each city’s
mayor has delivered personalized visions and perspectives to reports like Norfolk’s Resilience
Strategy or New York’s PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York as a way to enunciate
their leadership role in the process. If research is accurate about the advantage to vigorous local
leadership in the fight against climate change, then the NDRC application and 100 Resilient City
reports were of superior quality because, not only did they incur federal support, but they
provided spaces for leadership roles from nontraditional sources. For instance, alongside
Norfolk’s mayor, city council members, and city manager, representatives from all sorts of
agencies, nonprofits, community organizations, municipal services, and academic institutions
serve in an influential capacity among four different working groups.
5.3.1.3 Leadership in Flood Management
A further indicator of local commitment to adaptation and preparedness is participation in the
Community Rating System (CRS) under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) (Berke,
Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). At face value it appears as a specific example of an
action taken to prepare for flooding threats, but is actually a sign that a municipality has gone
above and beyond what is considered acceptable requirements for flooding in communities
regardless of income. The program just happens to benefit low-income communities more as a
matter of proportional impact. The program is entirely voluntary in providing discounts to flood
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insurance premiums for floodplain management activities that minimum NFIP or freeboard
requirements (Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). New York City proposed
participating in the program in 2013 with its comprehensive plan and started the process later in
its 100 Resilient Cities report in 2015 (Department of City Planning). Norfolk has been a
participant in the program since its inception, but is among one of the lowest classes and so only
receives a small decrease in flood insurance premiums. Even though Norfolk and New York City
have not taken full advantage of the rating system that serves as a measure of overall flood
excellence, they stand to improve their status as likely leaders in managing coastal flooding and
sea-level rise.

5.3.2 Local Information & Knowledge
5.3.2.1 Risks
In comparison with long-acknowledged and familiar phenomena, climate change impacts are far
more pervasive, complicated and thus often misunderstood. Phenomena like housing shortages,
infrastructure failures, or business closures are complex and unpredictable in their own right but
none of them compare to the intricacy and rootedness in all facets of cities and segments of
society as climate change. Sea-level rise and extreme flooding events, much the concern of
coastal cities, pose a myriad of risks depending on the structural and physical characteristics, but
also based on demographics, health, mobility, resources. Because of the all-encompassing and
inscrutable nature of climate change, even on the coasts, modelling of these impacts and risks
has taken place mostly at the top – internationally and nationally. Cities might have been able to
effectively plan for coastal hazards like flooding and coastal storms before realizing the
influence of climate change, but since, it has become an insurmountable task for many.
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Consequently, in the U.S., those federal and state agencies responsible for assembling models of
climate impacts share place-specific fragments of their data with those cities that do not possess
the technical abilities to develop the data for themselves. This saves local governments and
organizations time and resources to create the climate data, but as a tradeoff, existing staff are
unable to discern and interpret the newfound information. Thus, cities often still need to hire
technical consultants to interpret these models into specific impacts on the population, services,
and infrastructure. Compounding matters, data on the cost of natural hazard losses are reported
by storm, state, or county, but not by city. This makes it unnecessarily difficult to systematically
examine the tactile impacts of climate and incorporate that into existing planning (Shi, Chu, &
Debats, 2015). The main issue though with climate change and vulnerability data is not the
breadth of information but the interpretation of that data and how the risks can be misconstrued
in regard to how they impact vulnerable populations. Particularly, over half of cities report a lack
of understanding and awareness among local government. Since this scientific data is collected
and extrapolated at larger scales and disseminated to beneficiary cities, the processes through
which the data is transformed into knowledge and action and integrated into local information is
more critical than the data itself (Aylett, 2014).
Nonetheless, the extent to which planners have been able to both access necessary information
and decipher that information to supply to their adaptation and preparedness efforts is difficult to
pin down (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). Still, there have been tactics employed at the local level to
sidestep these knowledge barriers and enhance the ability of municipal governments to
comprehend information regardless of whether they fully understand. It is not possible to grade
the abilities of Norfolk and New York City to interpret their localized experienced of climate
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change through the plans themselves, but the plans can provide insight into whether they are
more likely to have understood the impacts on their cities.
As it takes time to fully discern a largely complex issue like climate change risks and local
vulnerability, both cities have surely benefited from the prolonged commitment to grasping and
being well-informed of the local impacts. In the first stage and on through the end of their multiyear climate adaptation process, Norfolk and the Hampton Roads Planning District Commission
relied on local information from Virginia’s Governor’s Commission on Climate Change, the
Virginia Institute of Marine Science, collaborative studies between state and federal agencies,
and other studies centered on the region. Instead of being bestowed a package of information to
discern on their own, the adaptation planning team representative of each municipality was able
to engage directly with the authors of the information being assessed and with local leaders to
pass along what was learned (McFarlane, 2013). The region certainly benefited from government
buy-in early on to be able to take on the sweeping assessment approach to adaptation. The
planning commission subsequently bypassed the middlemen that would necessary to translate
information acquired from far-flung sources.
New York City went above and beyond to alleviate the potential problems associated with
receiving and interpreting heaps of convoluted information. As implied several times, the city is
an anomaly and does not embody the capabilities of a typical American city. The city was still
exceptional at the time in appointing local organizational leaders and relevant experts to its
Climate Change Adaptation Task Force and Panel on Climate Change. The panel body of
scientists and risk management experts briefed the Climate Change Adaptation Task Force to
generate moment on climate action related to sustainability back in 2008 (Loeser & Post; Office
of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, 2014). Coincidentally, the city’s Panel on Climate
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Change became a permanent entity in September, 2012, a month before Hurricane Sandy. The
NPCC was then able to greatly influence the city’s recovery and rebuilding report following the
storm, PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York (Office of Long-Term Planning and
Sustainability, 2014).
The synthesized scientific information and climate risk analyses were not incorporated into the
content analysis simply because of their marginal relevance in directly affecting vulnerable
communities. Contrary to that belief, the long-term cross-examination of climate risks in-house
and locally has in fact contributed to the level of adaptation and preparedness for vulnerable
communities. The interpretation of the plethora of incoming information has been a barrier to
cities even being able to continue on the right path to addressing the vulnerabilities of
communities. Since Norfolk and New York have apprehended the local sea-level rise and coastal
storm risks that climate change poses on their cities they have had the foresight to conceive these
initiatives and reports. Understanding the risks of climate change is a segue and precursor into
perceiving and addressing the vulnerability of those at-risk to these threats, but it is not a direct
correlation.
5.3.2.2 Vulnerability
Poor understanding and acknowledgement of the distribution of citizen vulnerability has not
been a barrier for planning to adapt to a climate impacts, it has been a barrier to climate justice
and for planning to reduce the susceptibility of those most at-risk (Highfield, Peacock, & Van
Zandt, 2014; Van Zandt, et al., 2012). Given the scientific limitations of climate-change
research, and the uncertainties of how different population groups, and stakeholder interests are
affected by climate change, many kinds of knowledge will be important for ongoing problemsolving (Berke & Lyles, 2013).When municipalities unpack the impacts posed in information on
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climate risk, whether it is received by external sources or locally, they can synthesize the
knowledge with an awareness for what constitutes vulnerability to those risks. Research
repeatedly has affirmed that those communities that are most resource scarce and
underprivileged demographically are quintessentially socially vulnerable. Incidentally, it has also
uncovered that socially vulnerable neighborhoods have not only been susceptible for those
socioeconomic characteristics, but because they have tended to be more often physically
vulnerable and exposed to climate risks (Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014; Van Zandt, et
al., 2012; Mearns & Norton, 2009; Ross, 2013). This has not always been the case, but
nevertheless has been deemed significant enough to consider as a trend. Hazard exposure is of
course more pronounced in coastal cities due to the tangible proximity to surge and flooding,
posing as an endemic threat.
The interdependent relationship between the three modes of vulnerability prompts the need for
them to serve as the foundational basis of facts in plans to minimize the risk to coastal threats
(Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014). Municipalities have either been unable or unwilling to
address the inequities in vulnerability (Weiss, Weldman, & Bronson, 2012). Unlike climate
change modelling, vulnerability is more familiar and even observable. Within planning for
identified risks, efforts either identify vulnerable groups but disregard the geography of
vulnerability, do not adequately identify vulnerability, or lack the resource capacity to address
the underlying causes of vulnerability. Simply not having the capacity to take a vulnerabilitycentric approach comes with a caveat. Cities that have the ability to pursue adaptation planning
then have the ability to pursue vulnerability (Rumbach & Kudva, 2011). Unfortunately, many
have not, as evident in the prevalent intersectionality of vulnerability.
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A likely outcome of successful integration of measurement and mapping of vulnerable
populations would be more geographically organized and impactful action. Disparities in the
quality of vulnerability assessment and mapping between Norfolk’s and New York’s plans back
this theory but differences between individual plans do not. The information most frequented in
Norfolk’s plans is the foundational planning knowledge of geographic extent, land use and
development trends, and demographics/economic characteristics. Where social capital, mobility,
living conditions, risk perception, and a host of other socioeconomic variables are absent in its
comprehensive plan and resilience strategy, the variety and quantity of action distributed to
vulnerable neighborhoods was low. Except only the other planning documents that were
conscious of more insightful knowledge did not fare better. Among its high performing plans,
New York City actually allocated a variety of actions to vulnerable neighborhoods consistently
and effectively. This result seems to accentuate the distributed characteristics of local and
regional information. That the plans for both cities excelled in being coordinated strategically
and informationally could point to the productive distribution of plan action as being dependent
on the overall local quality of vulnerability assessment and mapping.
Consistent with the trend unveiled in Norfolk’s and New York City’s comprehensive and
mitigation plans, comprehensive plans have been recently remarked as having a prominent role
in reducing vulnerability to a variety of risks. They mesh well because of their coordination of
community programs, development and land use, and legal standing. Hazard mitigation plans are
more logically befitting of vulnerability reduction, but FEMA has in the past incentivized
treatment of risks as a symptom of inadequate structure and infrastructure rather than as socially
constructed (Berke, et al., Evaluation of Networks of Plans and Vulnerability to Hazards and
Climate Change: A Resilience Scorecard, 2015). A subset of the aforementioned data result
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indicates that, although vulnerability assessments were a more dominant feature of the two
hazard mitigation plans, the comprehensive plans overwhelmingly distributed action and
proposed action to vulnerable communities, and in a more holistic manner.
Reshaping communities whether through land use, development and/or assets has a positive
impact on reducing vulnerability (Berke, et al., 2015; Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014).
Plans that incorporate place-making and quality of life like comprehensive plans are directed to
target specific locations rather than solely develop programs and policies to apply broadly. All of
New York’s plans that placed land use, development, and quality of life actions in the
foreground, including its comprehensive plan, distributed those actions to vulnerable
neighborhoods. Although place-making strategies held a more enhanced function in its hazard
mitigation plan than in the mitigation plan for Norfolk, still far fewer actions were distributed to
specific neighborhoods let alone vulnerable ones. New York’s recent experiences with Hurricane
Sandy certainly has helped to illuminate specific needs in locations across the city, but the better
quality of information and knowledge in the plans still insinuates part of the responsibility.
Now that place-making and quality of life strategies have been repeatedly affirmed as important
vulnerability reduction approaches, land use and development documents can serve to
complement or even outdo hazard mitigation plans in planning to adapt to and prepare for future
coastal threats, especially when they integrate the risks into the decision-making process.
Although, without a keen awareness for a wealth of possible threats and underlying causes at an
appropriate scale, planning action would not be able to maximize its impact. This reinforces that
coordinating hazard exposure and physical and social vulnerability can bridge the gap between
planning approaches to effectively collaborate and ensure the most productive and symbiotic use
of resources (Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014; Rumbach & Kudva, 2011).
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5.3.3 Public Indifference & Marginalization
5.3.3.1 Awareness & Priority
The public has held a similar sentiment toward climate change and climate disasters as public
officials. They are aware of the threats but do not place them with high regard in place of
circumstances and situations that are viewed as more immediate rather than perceived as distant
or improbable. Planning efforts that have focused solely on infrequent hazards and unpredictable
threats have faced considerable difficulty in exciting or even engaging constituents in
comparison with development, community enhancement, or economic development efforts
(Burby, 2003; Berke & Lyles, 2013; Behr & Diaz, 2014).
The public itself is not to blame for their relative indifference toward climate action and reducing
disaster risk. Inadequate leadership on taking action has meant that information on risk and
vulnerability has been poorly communicated to those that are most affected. Planners and
officials, unknowingly, may have also misconstrued climate information and the exact severity
of risks locally. The intimacy of experiencing a large-scale climate event like Hurricane Sandy
would assumedly raise the awareness and precedence of such threats universally, but planners
and researchers have described the phenomenon as a narrow window of opportunity (Aylett,
2014; Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Schwab, 2014).
A healthy combination of awareness, training, education and capacity building programs can
greatly improve the risk perception of participants and save the lives of participants’ neighbors.
By involving civic and community leaders and other trusted members of the community, plans
can create a domino effect of public understanding and persuasion of the need for action. Norfolk
and New York both effectively involved neighborhood groups and civic/community based
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organizations. These gateways to vulnerable residents can relay information regarding strategy
proposals, preferences, and risks back and forth between residents and planners.
Awareness strategies like warning systems and preemptive warning can alert the general public
of imminent danger, but if risk perception is low, investment in these warnings are
counterproductive. Norfolk and New York were advantageous in investing more in education
awareness campaigns in neighborhoods first over warning strategies. Engagement techniques
like information distribution and emergency drills can also disseminate knowledge, spread
awareness, and train leaders of the community to ultimately build confidence in risk-averse
behavior. Training activities were seldom practiced, especially in Norfolk, but teaching
materials, demonstrations, and use of social media were more often used to inform a broad
audience and also augment awareness strategies.
Evacuation and sheltering procedures are indispensable lifelines in vulnerable communities, but
many households are not able to make intelligent critical decisions unless they had been educated
far ahead of time. Decisions made under disaster scenarios are partly dependent on familial and
social networks, and vulnerable households have fewer of them. Risk/strategy awareness
campaigns are not only effective in informing risk but also of informing vulnerable households
of the best options for them during extreme events. In Norfolk, the Rising Resiliency Challenge
and the ThRIVe NDRC application were the only to channel their awareness strategies to
vulnerable neighborhoods, which both efforts centered on the north shore of the Elizabeth River.
Its Resilience Strategy and Hazard Mitigation plan had equally laudable awareness campaigns,
but discredited their cause in not productively targeting any vulnerable neighborhoods like those
fronting the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay or the south side of the Lafayette River. All of New
York’s plan with proficient awareness campaigns with the exception of its Hazard Mitigation
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plan did target vulnerable neighborhoods like in the Lower East Side of Manhattan and the
Brooklyn/Queens waterfront, that were also impacted by Sandy.
Planners can incite enthusiasm by underscoring problems tied to a specific place or site. The
most logical method of arriving at such site-specific knowledge to disseminate concern is
through vulnerability assessments accompanied by information distributed accordingly.
Residents are universally more interested in contributing to the process when they can personally
perceive the potential impacts on their property and safety as opposed to more abstract policybased issues that are less tangible (Brody, 2003). Plans generate the most buy-in among affected
communities when they draw from human nature in demonstrating emotional intelligence and
the ability to empathize (Schwab, 2014). More than just teaching/awareness strategies, but also
capacity-building exercises can improve the planning process and decision behavior of the
public. Capacity-building is predominantly relied on as a tool to involve the public more.
5.3.3.2 Influence & Involvement
Vulnerable groups, especially those that live in poverty, do not possess the capacity to influence
planning that their less vulnerable and wealthier counterparts do (Baussan, 2015). Many minority
groups in low-income neighborhoods feel abandoned by planning processes and are
subsequently disengaged. They are especially dispassionate toward preparing for and mitigating
coastal storms and flooding. Their distrust of decision-makers is rooted in their persistent
discrimination and unequal treatment from urban investments, resources and services (Berke,
Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011). Mirroring their inequities, vulnerable households
have been vastly underrepresented politically and by stakeholders in planning processes (Burby,
2003). Isolated and underserved residents have also been less likely to have their experiences,
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needs, desires or concerns included in plans, contributing to their lack of control over their own
circumstances (Aldrich, 2014).
Given their distrust of and suspicion toward their public officials, this inability to self-govern and
an apathy toward more abstract issues like disasters and climate change can contribute to general
cynicism (Berke, Cooper, Salvesen, Spurlock, & Rausch, 2011; Baussan, 2015). Feeding off that
apathy and distrust, officials, not demonstrating an awareness for the benefit of involving
isolated residents, have been ineffective in improving mutual trust (Burby, 2003; Berke & Lyles,
2013). The inclinations of municipal leaders and employees combined with the low political
capacity and cooperation of vulnerable residents has been a daunting barrier for both sides
(Green, Kouassi, & Mambo, 2013).
Involving a variety of demographic groups and social service providers can establish trust and
cooperation. Mistrust and apathy may be formidable barriers but they can be transformed into
opportunities to augment the political effectiveness of planners (Burby, 2003; Berke & Lyles,
2013). Special needs groups and impoverished households, often not mutually exclusive,
represent those that have been least involved in planning yet are most socially vulnerable. In
Norfolk, special needs groups like youth, elderly, and disabled were involved alongside the rest
of the public, but not in any greater capacity. The plans did not target their outreach and
participation efforts toward specific vulnerable neighborhoods. In fact, the only targeted area was
in downtown which is of lesser vulnerability. Although, PlaNorfolk 2030, Norfolk’s Resilience
Strategy and the Rising Resiliency Challenge involved residents and their community
organizations in the Park
Place, Kensington and Chesterfield Heights neighborhoods – all socially vulnerable – or at least
indicated that they were included in some form. Generally, despite the advantage for vulnerable
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neighborhoods, outreach, engagement and involvement was not disseminated well, or rather
specified as such. Of course, quality-wise Norfolk’s Resilience Strategy and the ThRIVe NDRC
application had sufficient engagement and involvement, but simply introducing it as content and
not as action taken in specific neighborhoods does not imply a commitment to reducing
marginalization and disenfranchisement in vulnerable neighborhoods.
Social service, childcare, and welfare providers were all consulted with and contributed to the
New York planning process in more than a couple plans. Norfolk involved just a few of its social
service providers in its planning process. New York demonstrated a commitment to engaging its
vulnerable isolated and apathetic residents through its planning processes. New York did manage
to coordinate its planning outreach efforts in demographically diverse and socially vulnerable
neighborhoods like in Brooklyn’s riverfront, the Brooklyn/Queens waterfront, and Lower
Manhattan. The efforts did however notably seem to gloss over neighborhoods in the Bronx, the
most socially vulnerable Borough overall. Norfolk may have connected with residents in a few
of its more vulnerable neighborhoods, but it did not actually specify it as a priority. As a designoriented strategy, New York often proposed communal spaces to enhance social opportunities
and interactions among vulnerable groups as a way to build mutual capacity and trust. It is not
equivalent to granting residents the authority to shape the image of their community, but it can
result in positive social capital outcomes.
Socially-driven policies and capacity building activities are holistically remedial in vulnerable
communities. They can drive up wealth, social capital, health outcomes, interdependence, local
enthusiasm and self-governance. Strategies that satisfy other calls for action like awareness,
preparedness, housing and involvement can secondarily build capacity and collective action.
Volunteerism, focus group meetings and social events, visioning/charrettes, and community
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layout planning are primarily exercised to foster capacity and equitable communication in
disenfranchised communities. Volunteerism as a form of capacity building exercise that was not
readily advocated for in either city. They most certainly did not enforce incentives like time
banking and community currency to reward those who volunteer. Focus groups were much more
popular, especially in New York, to give marginalized groups greater representation in
moderator-led discussion of personalized planning topics. Planning workshops were most
familiar as vision exercises for vulnerable communities between the two cities as described in
their plans. Norfolk and New York both employed at times creative and inviting visioning
exercises for participants to visualize proposed ideas in their community and share their own to
influence future action. Like with its outreach, New York, rather than present its workshops and
focus groups as applying broadly, specified those vulnerable areas of the city that were
particularly engaged.
Ultimately, capacity-building and educational awareness go hand-in-hand. Committing to
increasing the awareness of vulnerable communities might ease some of their apathy toward
adaptation and preparedness and would enhance their desire to be more involved in planning
efforts. Similarly, deepening the capacity of these groups to influence naturally subjects them to
a heightened awareness and understanding and thus the ability to make wiser decisions under
critical scenarios. With the exception of the Rising Resiliency Challenge which was locked on
the Chesterfield Heights neighborhood, not one of Norfolk’s plans indicated that they conjointly
increased the awareness and built up the political capacity in vulnerable neighborhoods. In New
York City, only Lower Manhattan under the BIG U Rebuild by Design project, benefited from
both educational awareness and hands-on engagement/involvement concertedly, though
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OneNYC and PlaNYC are both investing in awareness and capacity, just in differing vulnerable
neighborhoods.

5.3.4 Resources
5.3.4.1 Planning Resources
In face of planning to prepare and adapt to worsening coastal hazards and also generally,
resources are both a government and a constituent obstacle. In municipal planning, the chief
resources needed are will and revenue. Political will is especially critical for climate adaptation
and preparedness planning, as had been outlined earlier. The resource obstacle for planners
directly relates to the influence of state and federal government, financial streams, and local
leadership. For instance, cities that have not had influence from higher levels of government or
strong local will have found it especially difficult to obtain the financial and personnel resources
to pursue climate adaptation and disaster preparedness (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Baker,
Peterson, Brown, & McAlpine, 2012). Fairly recently, even some large cities have equally
reported the difficulties of securing enough resources in light of competing priorities. Around
three-quarters of cities cited insufficient funding to hire enough staff for a unit to combat climate
change and over three-quarters of cities in fact identified short-term and long-term funds
provided by local government itself as the most substantial source of funding for staff working
on the local response to climate change (Aylett, 2014). Securing funding, and reallocating staff
time and resources for climate adaptation has generally been found to be more menacing an
obstacle than obtaining current information, communicating to the public, or garnering interest
from businesses (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015).
Many cities have had to resort to of reallocating responsibilities and time of existing staff to
integrate climate adaptation into ongoing planning (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015). New York has
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had the luxury of employing several dedicated teams, and Norfolk, while not having its own
dedicated department or office, has benefitted from personnel assistance regionally. A secondary
benefit both cities received as a part of their membership in the 100 Resilient Cities network was
the creation of a new municipal staff position, the Chief Resilience Officer. The CRO was
specifically hired to take on the challenge of developing a multifaceted approach to adapting to
the specific social and environmental threats faced. The officer worked directly with leadership
staff and also coordinated with pertinent departmental staff to act as a linking force for
adaptation and preparedness planning. Norfolk certainly gained the most out of the inaugural
resilience government position. Being a knowledge capital, New York City, in addition to its
competitive planning department, has government departments specializing in recovery and
resiliency, long-term planning and sustainability, and even a housing recovery operation. It also
immensely benefitted from the flood of disaster recovery funds in response to Sandy. Still, every
plan was developed by city government employees except for the BIG U Rebuild by Design
report. Considering Norfolk nearly competed with New York in sheer volume of projects and
reports to adapt to the imposing risks is a testament to the reliability and generosity of staff and
organizations across the Hampton Roads region and the state of Virginia. Only PlaNorfolk 2030
and the city’s Resilience Strategy can truly be mostly credited to municipal government staff.
The duration of financial and staff resources is also an indicator into how plans have progressed
during implementation. If there have not been enough resources available to adequately pursue
climate planning then there most certainly has not been enough available to implement
recommendations. Surveys have found that to be true, with nearly nine in ten cities reporting
lack of funding for implementation of projects and programs to help combat climate risks
(Aylett, 2014). That fifteen percent of cities that have been currently engaged in climate
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adaptation are in the implementation phase serves as a parallel (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015).
Fortunately, Norfolk and New York City have surged past the resource barrier in regards to
adoption and funding as evident by their implementation work. They diffused the load of funding
and staff needs for implementing actions. The success in funding and implementing policies and
programs could be attributed to the level of plan integration and horizontal coordination whereby
plans like Norfolk’s comprehensive plan, resilience strategy and the ThRIVe NDRC application
maximized their regional cooperation with other plans and organizations. The interoperability
between organizations and levels of government is characteristic of flexibility and adaptability in
implementation (Serrao-Neumann, Crick, Harman, Schuch, & Choy, 2015). Because decisionmaking authority is distributed across departments, fewer tradeoffs ensue as implementation is
decentralized (Schwab, 2014).
Personnel and organizational decentralization has not been the only tactic that has been
employed to abate the resource barrier. With cities leaning on their own internal revenue sources,
Norfolk and New York City have explored the applicability of unconventional revenue bonds.
Norfolk had been recently exposed to social impacts bonds through one of the 100 Resilient
Cities platform partners, Social Finance. The social impact bond behaves similarly to
conventional revenue bonds except that instead of banking on the revenue generating prospects
of project investments, it is contingent on successful qualitative outcomes. Social impact bonds
marry government, philanthropic organizations, nonprofits and investors around a common goal
of success that drives social progress (Social Investment, 2016). The bonds could have been a
useful concept if deployed simultaneously alongside, to bet on the fiscal stabilizing effects of
environmental progress, precisely in protection against climatic events.
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More environmentally, New York City, specifically its Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
explored a first of its kind risk evading form of bond, a catastrophe bond. The catastrophe bond
as the MTA has envisioned in response to Hurricane Sandy, had little in common with social
impact bonds and their pay for success model. Instead of depending on action that engenders the
agreed upon positive impacts, catastrophe bonds depend upon whether a disaster of a certain
magnitude occurs over the life of the issued bond. Immediately following Sandy in 2012, New
York City’s MTA worked with financial entities to design and issue the first catastrophe bond
through a reinsurer with the purpose of protecting against storm surge flooding. The bond does
not truly protect against flooding – it provides much needed support for insurance companies in
instances of irreparable insurance losses triggered by an event of similar magnitude to Sandy
(Levenson Keohane, 2014). Basically, the bond serves as a sedentary emergency fund rather than
a source of usable funding to redirect into resilience-enhancing investments.
Since this conception, the RE.bound program, born out of the RE.invest initiative, has envisioned
a repurposing of catastrophe bonds. The RE.invest initiative devised a financing tool to fund the
mildly advantageous recommendations in the report so as to not place unmanageable financial
strain on the city of Norfolk. It introduced a concept for catastrophe bonds that drew inspiration
from the healthcare industry’s insurance policies that captured funds for upfront risk reduction
measures on top of reducing potential insurance losses like traditional catastrophe bonds
(RE:focus Partners, LLC, 2015). Commonly, catastrophe bonds are triggered once a certain
threshold of total insured or economic losses is breached, meaning the bond issuer retains the
bond value and investors lose their invested principal, like with the MTA-sponsored bond. The
RE.bound program’s version of a catastrophe bond integrates these insurance-based protection
together with infrastructure project finance. The argument behind this couple model is that
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resilience projects funded through bond investors that generate social value and environmental
benefits increase the financial benefit to investors over time and reduce the associated risk
(RE:focus Partners, LLC, 2015). Both the catastrophe and the social impact bonds can not only
serve to supplement existing revenue to implement projects but also as contingency funds for the
private and public sectors to use in response to emergencies like from extreme flooding and
coastal storm events.
5.3.4.2 Public Resources
Unlike municipal governments, where resource deficiencies affect their ability to pursue action
in the burgeoning realms of climate adaptation and disaster preparedness, vulnerable
communities have resource deficiencies that govern their quality of life and ability to survive.
With the high financial strain that housing costs places on lower-class families, it is essential that
planners, on top of tackling risks, help expand their assets and reduce the everyday costs that are
deep-seated in their underserved neighborhoods. Many quality of life indicators are in fact direct
measures of vulnerability to coastal storms and flooding. Wealth is the most inherent indicator of
vulnerability. Impoverished families often live erratically from month to month with fragile
assets, and thus have poorer access to the life-sustaining resources that their financial superiors
do (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Baussan, 2015). For many low-income households, rent or mortgage
payments comprise of the largest portion of their monthly finances (Baussan, 2015).
Even among families that have fixed rent payments, they are unable to absorb the financial strain
of major disruptions because of the high priority of being able to maintain a home.
Unfortunately, housing assistance whether through recovery funds or flood insurance tends to
benefit those that both own a home and are at least lower middle class (Ross, 2013). All too
often, the quality of housing that a family can afford determines the safety and appeal of their
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environment, the structural integrity of their buildings and infrastructure, the transportation
options at their disposal, and the resources they have access to (Highfield, Peacock, & Van
Zandt, 2014; Mearns & Norton, 2009; Ross, 2013; Van Zandt, et al., 2012). Their social
resources then compound matters. Mirroring the indifference and priority of vulnerable
households, they frequently have shallow networks with which to rely on during financial
difficulties and also emergency situations. Thus, their ability to seek shelter or evacuate is
severely compromised. Even when there are distant familial and social ties with which to rely on,
if families reside in a detached neighborhood with poor public access their decision behavior is
equally compromised. As has been made evident, inadequate resources is essentially equivalent
to a potential for catastrophic impacts. Improvements to all of these resolvable resource
disparities is equivalent to making reductions in physical and social vulnerability.
The vulnerability of powerless families manifests both as a shortage of necessary resources to
thrive, but also as a fragility of resources where they can most easily be stripped away. Climate
displacement is an explicit consequence of this chain of vulnerability fueled by an inherent
shortage of resources and decimation of fragile resources. Minimizing long-term displacement is
accomplished through the enhancement and fortification of resources, but also through the more
practical salvaging of resources – relocation assistance and permanent housing recovery.
In Norfolk, relocation assistance programs were either nonexistent or widely deficient and did
not reflect the ideas or preferences of those that would be most affected by them. The equivalent
programs described in New York’s plans are an improvement but still lack adequate prior
consulting with vulnerable households and enough detail to determine whether they are effective.
New York’s permanent housing programs are collectively a step up, while Norfolk’s programs
are virtually of the same poor quality as its interim housing programs. None of New York’s are
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admittedly citizen-desired options, but few of them do imply a range of options to satisfy the
needs of its diversity of resident types – homeowner, renter and landlord. Likely in response to
the exposed deficiencies during the Sandy recovery process, there were several instances of
strategies to improve disaster housing programs where disaster housing assistance is more
economical and accelerated. It is also recommended that they are better coordinated with
community support services and long-term recovery efforts.
With housing losses relevant and fresh in the mind of many New Yorkers, it would be surprising
that housing recovery programs were not set up in vulnerable neighborhoods across the city.
After all, the vulnerable neighborhoods are most likely the ones with the highest number of
property loss from Sandy. In fact, recovery programs were fairly evenly itemized in the plans for
the Brooklyn/Queens waterfront neighborhoods, riverfront neighborhoods in
Brooklyn/Queens/Manhattan, and in Staten Island. For Norfolk, only two neighborhoods that
readily experience flooding from the Elizabeth River, St. Paul’s and Chesterfield Heights, were
the only to specifically have the support of a housing recovery program. Norfolk has luckily not
experienced an event triggering a large-scale exodus from residences or widespread damage like
New York City has and especially New Orleans. Norfolk might perceive itself as eluding major
coastal storms, but research has insinuated that it is equally as susceptible to such displacing
events.
Planners can alleviate the pressures placed on interim and permanent housing recovery programs
following a disaster by investing in affordable housing and weatherization strategies before the
next strike. Housing is the greatest asset to many and to vulnerable households it is often the only
financial asset if they even happen to own their home. Regardless, a rented or owned residence –
through their structural-integrity, location and value – has the single largest weight in individual
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vulnerability of any facility or resource (Ross, 2013; Baussan, 2015). Projects proposed by local
housing authorities were found to be worthy of being integrated into coastal resilience plans for
their potential to reduce the vulnerability of residents. Smart growth strategies to deconcentrate
poverty and reduce homelessness like housing revitalization and mixed income development
when successful can increase the wealth and social capital of the most vulnerable. The amount of
involvement of each city’s housing authority in the planning processes was a sort of gauge of the
level of integration of affordable housing strategies. New York consulted with its housing
authority regularly and explored a range of cooperative housing strategies. Norfolk involved its
housing authority a little less and thus had a lesser diversity of housing strategies in its plans.
Those smart growth strategies that were borrowed from housing authorities would logically
apply to low-income neighborhoods where there is a high concentration of public and affordable
housing. Smart growth strategies were not quite evenly dispersed amongst all vulnerable
neighborhoods, but as a whole they were the most distributed in Norfolk. Both the Elizabeth
River and Lafayette River watersheds benefitted. Notably, the shorefront neighborhoods were
also included, despite being distant from any developments within the jurisdiction of the Norfolk
Redevelopment and Housing Authority. Unlike its recovery programs, New York's smart growth
strategies were representative of vulnerable neighborhoods fairly equally including those in the
Bronx, rather than only those that fared the worst from Sandy. This is, as a matter of fact, a
promising prospect as research is in agreement that smart growth and preventative development
is among the most auspicious long-term solutions to flooding and disaster vulnerability (Brody,
2003; Berke & Lyles, 2013; Smith, 2015; Berke, Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014;
Berke, et al., 2015).
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To address the burdens placed on families in vulnerable neighborhoods on top of personal
burdens, improving community design, local amenities, and access to resources and facilities has
been repeatedly affirmed as constructive. Yet, all of those strategies are far from groundbreaking.
Both cities invested in strategies to expand community assets and services, and to improve
quality of life. Blight removal and beautification programs were somewhat sporadic in plans for
Norfolk and slightly more consistent in New York’s plans. Strategies varied from prolonging or
expanding upon existing blight removal programs to initiating programs to beautify gradually
deteriorating vulnerable neighborhoods. Plans that reflected the highest standard in quality for
their respective city overwhelmingly had the full capacity to improve access to services and
quality of life. In plans that expanded public transportation options, recreational space, and other
community assets, they occasionally proposed economic development strategies for underserved
areas to prevent the gentrifying of residents that would exacerbate their already horrific
vulnerability.
In the past, equity was incorporated in plans where climate or environmental hazards was the
primary impetus when planners recognized the disparities in livability and amenities in
communities that affects their vulnerability (Schrock, Bassett, & Green, 2015). Either through
the experience of planners or an expanded focus in climate and hazard plans or both, strategies to
enhance community assets and services were well represented. So much so that the level of detail
for this type of strategy within the protocol was not conducive to the whole assortment of
particular strategies. Interestingly, they were frequently enacted for vulnerable neighborhoods, as
much so as smart growth strategies. Smart growth strategies like preventative development and
affordable housing existing in neighborhoods with poor exposure and/or high social vulnerability
is most sensible. But less of a case can be made, at least from a typical planning standpoint, for
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quality of life enhancements to be unequivocally targeted in vulnerable neighborhoods as they
are for both cities.
That certain waterfront neighborhoods were saturated with numerous quality enhancement
proposals additional to preventative code changes for instance is perhaps an indicator of the
approach the two cities were often able to resort to. Both are rather conventional and thus more
favorable to a range of stakeholders, but also are effective at addressing underlying factors of
neighborhood vulnerability. Of the particulars, social and welfare services saw a larger
investment in New York while pedestrian infrastructure received a larger investment in Norfolk.
The earlier detailed capacity building exercises can secondarily improve social connectivity in
neighborhoods, but so too can physical connectivity and quality of life.

5.3.5 Accountability & Responsibility
5.3.5.1 Implementing Action
It is without question that the actual actions that are implemented as a result of a plan is more
momentous than any component of the originating plan. Each successive section of any plan let
alone a plan for adapting to stresses, breathes life into the next section. Specific to coastal storm
and sea-level rise adaptation, strategies to resolve local vulnerabilities would not have been
envisioned without successfully identifying and mapping the intricacies of vulnerability. They
also would not have been possible without the involvement of those that are vulnerable.
Heightening the awareness of vulnerable groups to both to prioritize and be more involved is a
process of relaying information on risk and vulnerability. Lastly, none of it would have been
achievable without securing resources to pursue planning and local leadership coalitions. Any
momentum built through commitments to each aspect of the process can of course be halted with
mismanagement of implementation.
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Everything considered, the elements of implementation are nearly universal across all plan types.
Without assigning appropriate organizational responsibility, identifying viable sources of
continuing funding or managing it all through organized timelines, no matter the circumstances,
a plan will fail to reach its desired potential (Berke & Lyles, 2013). Plans have fallen fate to both
disregarding the aforementioned outlets to implement actions but also articulating
implementation frameworks in a simplistic manner. Many planners do not work out enough
operational detail or provide estimates of the monetary costs of implementing actions merely
from not consulting with those that would offer expertise (Baker, Peterson, Brown, & McAlpine,
2012). Some local governments have managed to assemble the necessary parts to complete a
plan to adapt to and prepare for the effects of climate change, but have been incapable of
implementing them (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Baker, Peterson, Brown, & McAlpine, 2012).
Failure to implement proposed actions is not only a management problem but it also stems from
the impact of deficient resources, collaboration, engagement and leadership.
Both Norfolk and New York City had developed finance mechanisms and capitalized on federal
and state funding opportunities to support the incremental implementation of proposed actions
and also actions for emergency scenarios. They had coordinated with every level of government,
most government departments, all sectors, and a diverse collection of stakeholders. By virtue of
robust local leadership, both cities were able to understand the risks and the impacts they could
create. Also, expectedly, the awareness and enthusiasm that was instilled in communities was
enough to serve as an ally rather than an opponent to implementation. In terms of
implementation, community-based organizations have proved to be instrumental in raising the
concern for equitable action. When local government collaborates with community groups and
other organizations their capacity to convert lofty goals, such as those for social equity, into
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mechanisms for action is enhanced (Schrock, Bassett, & Green, 2015). Consequently, even
though precise organization of responsibility and timetable is evident of potentially seamless
implementation, the interplay between all of these indirect factors are clear prognosticators of
transformative implementation over resistance and maintenance. All in all, both cities have
instituted a favorable environment to be able to overcome foretold tradition on unavailing
implementation specifically of adaptation and socioeconomic policy.
Between Norfolk and New York City, plans that were high performers in overall quality did
regularly boast active implementation. Many of them have formed a network of implementation
where policies and programs are intersectional – that is, they have been borrowed from and by
other planning efforts. A prime example is New York’s hazard mitigation plan, which, unlike the
Southside Hampton Roads plan, coordinated with and involved community, social service and
housing organizations, and engaged with vulnerable members of the public through capacitybuilding exercises. As a result, instead of conforming to mitigation needs that largely satisfy
FEMA requirements by incrementally carrying out a small set of actions, New York’s plan has
moved a multitude of individual policies and programs into various phases of implementation
(Tajan, 2014; Office of Emergency Management, 2016). The projects are the responsibility of a
large portion of local agencies that overlap with other citywide resiliency and capital initiatives.
Also, the plan has demonstrated an openness to including new projects that satisfy different
needs for capital planning, resiliency and recovery (Office of Emergency Management, 2016).
While both hazard mitigation plans made financial estimates, outlined sources of funding, and
organized actions with a timeline, New York’s effectively divided up different types of roles
amongst personnel, volunteers and the public. The discrepancies between the two identical plan
types does not describe the entire picture, but represents a microcosm of the factors that come
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into play to restrict or bolster implementation. It is too early to determine the effects that
different factors have on implementation progress for several initiatives, but a common theme
that left Norfolk’s plans a step behind New York City’s was the inability of decentralizing roles
in the process and in implementing actions.
In the heat of extreme flooding and coastal storm events, it is the facilitation of responsibility to
execute actions and differentiate individual roles that is put to the test. Although vulnerability is
a primary determinant of the impacts that will occur from a major event, some impacts that
bypass safeguards are still mitigable and preventable through the response and recovery actions
taken by officials, trained individuals, volunteers, and members of the public (Schwab, 2014;
Berke & Campanella, 2006; Corbin, 2015). Recalling that Norfolk has not incorporated a
prominent focus on recovery or simply being prepared for recovery when the moment arises,
there is a noticeable gap in the instituting of response and recovery roles. The city’s plans might
be making lucrative progress on implementing projects, but during times of coastal emergency,
impacts are partly contingent on the organization of decision-making under pressure.
5.3.5.2 Monitoring Uncertainty
Planning to combat the convoluted and often overlooked phenomena of climate change and
inequality compels planners to be able to recognize and react to evolving conditions. Drastic
shifts in political and environmental conditions can and have derailed preconceived notions
toward progress (Brody, 2003). If planners remain in a rigid predict-and-plan approach through
process and implementation regardless of their effective quality, plans are subject to
underperforming. Even the scientific and local knowledge that guides problem-solving is prone
to malleability. Plans and planners can identify and solve these roadblocks as they occur by
maintaining flexibility with monitoring programs (Berke & Lyles, 2013; Brody, 2003).
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Monitoring not only implementation, but the various stages of the planning process and through
response and recovery is paramount to ensure that all planners’, stakeholders’ and public
participants’ efforts are not squandered. Successful monitoring of activities institutes indicators
and sources of data to track progress toward meeting goals, and responsibilities for data
collection. Moreover, those responsible continue to pursue monitoring programs, release publicly
available progress reports, and constantly update while accounting for changing conditions
(Berke & Lyles, 2013; Berke, Smith, & Lyles, 2012; Brody, 2003; Schwab, 2014).
The two cities interpreted the monitoring of planning processes as straightforward, with
elaborate setups to monitor the progress being made through the implementation of policies and
programs. A more innovative-minded interpretation would entail the monitoring of each phase of
the planning process, not just that proposed actions were implemented, during a specific timeframe, and by those that were supposed to be responsible. This is a harsh interpretation of the
strategies the two cities employed to track uncertainty. In fact, monitoring implementation can be
a sensible way to observe changing conditions at their terminus. The only issue is, without
monitoring obstacles to success as they arise, the benefit of monitoring implementation is
discounted because planners are unable to utilize strategies to overcome obstacles if specific
ones are even in place. Devoting monitoring efforts mainly to implementation progress also
restricts the ability to learn. Monitoring different phases of the planning process can provide
planners with useful knowledge for the future, especially considering many of these plans
represent uncharted territory. Ultimately, uncertainty presents itself in many different forms.
When those narrow windows of opportunity are capitalized on to generate political momentum
following an extreme event, planners can further benefit planning efforts by closely tracking the
progress made in all planning facets (Shi, Chu, & Debats, 2015; Schwab, 2014). New York City
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had experienced the Sandy effect as an opportunistic source of interest and priority, but also as
an event that could have undermined planners’ efforts with the resource commitments that
accompanied it. One method of remaining up to date following chaotic change has been to
reassess conceptions of knowledge. An expressed need in dealing with climate change and other
data, building on the earlier described information barrier, has been to jointly analyze changing
information (Berke & Lyles, 2013; Schwab, 2014). New York City has incorporated the impacts
of Sandy into its latest planning efforts not as only a source of information as many hazards are
treated, at least in the hazard mitigation process, but as a testing ground for experimentation. The
action could be considered a part of the PlaNYC process, but in any event the city reconvened its
Panel on Climate Change shortly after Sandy to generate new understanding and analyses on
risks and vulnerability (Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, 2014).
Monitoring enables actions taken after an extreme event and beyond to hold relevance and
purpose by investigating damage and economic loss assessments and evaluating actions
accordingly. The new sources of information, however, threaten to increase the complexity of
already complex matters, further dividing experts from the uninformed. Thus, decision-makers
and members of the public would greatly benefit from cooperation around shared perceptions
and experiences of changing conditions. If plans are updated before or shortly after a major
event, they can then articulate and embody the learning that has occurred within organizations
and also of the public for a unified agenda and so that mistakes are not repeated (Brody, 2003;
Schwab, 2014). For the sake of planning, Norfolk has not had the advantage of a source of rapid
growth and learning like Sandy has been for New York. Still, recognizing and overcoming
internal contention and inertia can provide growth and preserve momentum. A major key to
climate and social progress amidst political bureaucracy and complexity is accountability.
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The extent to which decision-makers were held accountable in Norfolk and New York peaked at
inter-departmental accountability. Community groups, non-profits and members of the public
were largely rejected their ability to hold officials accountable. Most of the planning efforts
implemented benchmarks and indicators to easily assess the progress of strategies and actions
toward meetings goals and proposed timelines. A few of the plans reported on the progress in
annual progress reports or updates that were released to the public, more so in New York. In
most cases, however, the public was only satisfactorily able to monitor the progress toward their
own stated desires. More commonly in Norfolk, process participants were given some
jurisdiction over holding decision-makers accountable, but were not urged or empowered to act
in this role. New York had disclosed more of the successes in implementation and meeting
benchmarks, but whatever obstacles that might have emerged along the way certainly did not
reveal remotely intricate strategies to overcome them, and nor did Norfolk. Neither city took the
necessary steps to truly ensure accountability, transparency and equity in planning nor in
recovery processes.
Monitoring is a necessary and valuable tool to establish multiple layers of accountability.
Performance-based monitoring and evaluation systems hold planners and decision-makers
accountable to each other. The public, specifically the vulnerable public monitoring progress on
proposed action in their own community or toward meeting their own needs and desires holds
policymakers and decision-makers accountable to their constituents. In order for the public to
even have the ability to hold their local officials accountable, decision-makers need to both
communicate progress and results to members of the community and empower residents to
become more involved in positive change. If it were the case that officials were not meeting their
marks in vulnerable communities and those residents were becoming displeased, it is up to
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planners and decision-makers to iteratively review stakeholders, analyze obstacles to inclusion
and success, and devise strategies for overcoming those barriers along the way (Schwab, 2014;
Brody, 2003; Berke & Lyles, 2013). And if decision-makers trust citizens enough to grant them
responsibility over their own preparative action, the public can relieve some of the pressure on
their leaders and hold each other accountable. Only members of the public, including vulnerable
ones, would know whether strategies proposed in early decision-making processes and the
actions being implemented are what they most desire. After all, those actions that prove to be
most advantageous are also those outcomes that vulnerable communities most prefer.
Though communal accountability may not have been pronounced in the sets of plans, at least
there is one silver lining, embedded in inter-organizational coordination and accountability.
Those plans like those arisen out of the 100 Resilient Cities initiative and NDRC that employed
more decentralized strategizing and implementation would likely reap the most benefit. The free
sharing of ideas that is encouraged in this organizational arrangement also lends itself well to
implementation and monitoring. The disparate actors and stakeholders that bind together over the
planning processes can share perspectives on challenges faced and solutions they devised or
witnessed to forward implementation and monitoring. On the other hand, participants should be
able to engage in the post-planning phase to offer their own perspectives on what they have
experienced as obstacles to implementation in their own communities in the past even if the type
of actions are not comparable to before (Berke & Lyles, 2013).
The ability to influence leaders be it through accountability during implementation should be
equivalent to the level of engagement and involvement in the planning process for those that are
historically uninformed and resource-deficient. Interestingly, two of the initiatives that targeted a
specific area and yet did not necessarily produce the highest quality plans were able to provide
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some transparency and to a degree, ensure equitable participation. Residents of Chesterfield
Heights in Norfolk and the Lower East Side in Manhattan, New York City can at least feel some
satisfaction that their voices were heard and affected the direction of the Rising Resiliency
Challenge and BIG U Rebuild by Design projects, respectively. Whether due to insufficient
personnel resources/expertise or unawareness, planners did not devote efforts to monitor the
discourse and action that occurred from within the planning process by themselves and those
they engaged. Compromising the ability to self-monitor and monitor the influence of participants
and stakeholders leaves the planning efforts susceptible to biases, unfair conflict, and
mischievous activity.
Individual and behavioral unpredictability is one obstacle that Norfolk and New York City have
not prepared themselves to overcome. Not to assume that certain planners and decision-makers
will inevitably make critical errors or diverge from their commitments; nor that certain
stakeholders will curtail the political drive generated in vulnerable communities, but all of these
are potential outcomes, and neither city has put the tools in place to recognize these and
subsequently mediate them. Despite all of the progress made on barriers to being adaptive for
members of vulnerable communities, the inherent authority of political leaders and stakeholders
can instantaneously put a halt to momentum.
In light of these shortcomings in accountability, equity and transparency, any expectations for
monitoring activities are out of maintaining a certain standard. The monitoring activities that
either city abided by would in a sense be improvisational. There is little precedence with which
to base the capacity to monitor various stages and players in the planning process. So far, few
adaptation planning efforts have pursued monitoring programs whether for implementation or
otherwise, and many have been in the early stages of developing structuring monitoring activities
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(Berke & Lyles, 2013). The same can be said of several of the initiatives facilitated in these two
cities. The quality of monitoring activities was contingent on their descriptions within the plans
themselves, but for plans in particular stages or facing uncertainty with funding at the time of
their release like the 100 Resilient Cities reports and NDRC applications, monitoring, especially
of implementation, may have been in limbo.

5.4 Implications for Planning and Future Research
Recent events and discoveries have shifted the thinking on the role of planners in the urban
context. Researchers have integrated the influence of climate impacts and experiences into their
prescriptive inquiry of planning, and so naturally have turned the dial from focus on solely the
urban and environmental realms to the people that inhabit them. Certain coastal cities have
experienced tangible climate impacts while others have not as much so, but, regardless,
individual planners have expressed a desire to ensure their jurisdictions remain prepared and
adaptive to the potential threats faced. Unfortunately, in the early going, factors at all scales,
independent of concerned planners’ interest, combined with the novelty of the resilient lens had
thwarted pursuits to put local conceptions of researchers’ visions into practice. Plan practitioners
have not had the ability, the knowledge nor the tools to overcome these incessant obstacles and
often still. These obstacles have paled in comparison with the hurdles residents of specific
communities experience regularly to climb out of a state of deep-seated vulnerability. For coastal
cities where socioeconomic disparity overlaps with climate impacts that are most evident,
because of the adaptive adversity, the prospects for planning are perhaps most encouraging.
An unintentional outcome of this wave of coastal planning is a shift in some of the conventional
thinking for urban planning. The broad implications of planning to adapt to and prepare for
extreme flooding and coastal storms have indirectly bridged the gaps between organizational

206

divisions, scales, and sectors. This is by no means revolutionary news for Norfolk or New York
City, but for those cities that expect that they are able to take on all matters of planning through
their planning departments they are wasting opportunities presented by all of their other
agencies. Similarly, each plan, whether for a specific purpose or series of purposes, need not act
independently of other plans. The coveted shift in planning for coastal cities is to leveraging and
repackaging of policies and programs under, for instance, social service organizations or housing
agencies. These policies and programs can be repurposed for this emergent planning approach,
as after all, resilience and adaptation have not surfaced as new planning realms. Rather they are a
coalescent lens on formerly disassociated domains. Often times, these malleable strategies
inhabit already existing plans, thus stimulating the rise of a system of plans. While evaluating the
content in plans for both cities, duplicate policies and programs cross-referenced across plans
was a frequent occurrence. In the near future, planners facilitating comprehensive planning
processes might pull all local and regional projects into a single policy document to showcase a
municipality’s strategies for tackling rising waters, or a shortage of affordable housing options,
and everything in between. Strategies devised in one planning process will influence another
planning process and vice versa.
Before either city repurposed existing programs and envisioned new ones, they were building the
foundation for future adaptation and preparedness. Cities that have not made the conscious effort
to commit to combatting the impacts of and vulnerability to climate change early on are at a
severe disadvantage. Norfolk and New York bypassed some of the traditional adaptation barriers
because the groundwork had already been in place from years of investment on that front before
carrying out these recent plans. Of course, those that have not garnered any momentum have
grim prospects for fending off planning obstacles, but there is immense incentive in expanding
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awareness and motive proactively instead of waiting for disastrous impacts when it becomes
imperative.
Proactive adaptation planning with diverse stakeholder support and collaborative energy can
propel planning forward through previous obstacles. Once these obstacles are overcome, which
research suggests are beatable with the right pieces in place, planners have a clear path to
reducing the vulnerability of those that have long been powerless. The pieces were in place in
both Norfolk and New York City, but only have been for a short time. As both cities become
more accustom to united planning for all urban issues under the umbrella of resilience and
adaptation, they will over time likely improve the imperfections in their approaches.
Tracking the progress that has been and will continue to be made in adaptation and preparedness
planning has become increasingly complicated. No longer is simple plan content evaluation
sufficient to convincingly substantiate the performance of plans produced. In planning to adapt to
climate events, specifically sea-level rise and coastal storms, geography and posterior progress
matter. In land use planning, for instance, content evaluation was effective without regard for
spatiality because the emphasis was not on the characteristics of the people per se but on the
land, its use, its regulation, and the overall population. The impacts of climate change require a
humanizing approach to combat them and that ought to seep into planning evaluation as well. A
plan for sea-level rise and storms in particular can only be effective if it not only employs
adaptability and preparedness, but if it employs it in locations where the people are most
vulnerable. Content evaluation might capture the quality of adaptation and preparedness but it
ignores the most important aspect, that the most urgent communities benefit the greatest.
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Accounting for the geography of plan content certainly injects more complexity into the plan
evaluation process, but it also allows for more constructive assessment of quality. One study
completed and published in late 2015 reinforced this notion by formulating a resilience scorecard
that pits positive and negative content among a series of plans for one coastal city, Washington,
NC, against the social and physical vulnerability to flooding of that city’s individual planning
districts. By determining how the plans improve or infringe upon the preparedness across the
city, the study was able to critique their justification for the actions taken. The scorecard devised
in the study also evaluated the degree of coordination between local planning programs to further
question the merits of the planners’ decisions. The scorecard was much more condensed since it
only concentrated on land use type strategies, but still exemplified the need for modification of
plan evaluation for coastal hazards vulnerability (Berke, et al., 2015). The outcomes of such
reformative plan evaluation research would help inform planners in cities that might be unaware
of the implications of their planning actions with regards to the hazard-prone areas versus the
more secure locations.
The next steps in research would be to assess the merits of recommendations for the field of
planning for adaptation and preparedness by tracking the actual changes in social and physical
vulnerability and hazard exposure. Because hazard exposure is partly a function of the proximity
to hazard prone areas like floodplains, changes in it would solely reflect a change in population
and building density. At the moment it is far too early to observe any significant changes in the
vulnerability of communities in cities that have taken initiative considering the only recent
emergence of this planning realm onto local agendas. Even Norfolk and New York City that
have been leaders have only been able to begin implementing progressive work in response to
their susceptibility in the last several years.
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Speaking of which, the success in terms of overall planning output since 2012 in both cities has
been intelligible through the host of influencing factors that operate outside the means of
planning, but their exact effect is unquantified. Perhaps future research might examine the
intangible factors like scale of disaster or favorability in local government to further explain the
reasoning behind the progress made in cities like Norfolk or New York City rather than declaring
that they are simply outperforming others for certain reasons. Other cities would be left in the
dark about why they are unable to overcome certain obstacles that have plagued them all along
even while exerting effort toward informed solutions, as their situation might not be entirely
equatable to those in more prolific cities. Future research ought to be able to prescribe solutions
and tactics for cities of all shapes and sizes as they continue to try to combat the complicated
phenomena of climate change and the human vulnerability to it.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions & Recommendations
Have the recent adaptation planning efforts of Norfolk and New York City accounted for the
vulnerability of local communities to sea-level rise and coastal storms? Research affirms that
certain demographics are inherently more vulnerable to these threats and are concentrated in
particular neighborhoods. Planners can relieve the risks by reducing the social and physical
vulnerability, and exposure of these highly susceptible communities proactively. No study
examined has determined that plans that attempt to adapt to and prepare for these climateinduced hazards have proactively reduced the vulnerability of communities enough to prevent
the unjust impacts of a disaster. The results of this analysis has not convincingly shifted prior
convictions of planning practice.
New York City and, to a lesser extent, Norfolk have made significant progress toward reducing
the vulnerability of neighborhoods to future coastal events except in a reactive sense. New
York’s vulnerable neighborhoods are prepared for a disaster of a conceivable magnitude after
having already experienced the impacts of Sandy. Although the actions taken in New York’s
plans more often benefitted vulnerable neighborhoods than safer ones, they were predictably
responsive to the impacts of Sandy and not necessarily always the deficiencies embedded in
communities. These targeted communities will most certainly fare better from storms like Sandy
in the future, but perhaps those neighborhoods that were not targeted in recent efforts because
they sustained fewer impacts even though they are equally as vulnerable will not. The
experiences of New York City imply that the quality of plans that aim to reduce future
vulnerability is contingent on an encounter with a disaster-declared event and federal influence.
Norfolk has technically encountered a couple disasters in recent years, but not the full brunt of
east coast storms. Unlike in New York, the storms to impact Norfolk have mostly grazed by or
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been weaker and thus not capable of illuminating the disparities in safety and risk between
neighborhoods and demographics. Its non-invasive brushes with recent coastal storms have
allowed the city to make consistent progress due to its well-known susceptibility but have eluded
its need to prioritize neighborhoods that have seen flashes of severe impact potential. Norfolk
has demonstrated that it has committed as much effort as it is capable of given its experiences
and amount of outside investment. The unfortunate reality is that transformative change,
essential to convert vulnerable neighborhoods into prepared and adaptive, is not obtainable
without enough incentive and motivation given existing fiscal obligations and political
landscapes. Norfolk did make some inroads in neighborhoods fronting the Elizabeth River in part
because of its ability to secure the funding from HUD’s National Disaster Resilience
Competition after experience a qualified federal disaster. Had it not, two of its more admirable
planning efforts from a neighborhood perspective would have stagnated having no future in
sight.
Essentially, if you remove the coastal storms the two cities have had to endure, the highest
performing plan the cities produced would have never come to fruition. Also, if neither city had
been awarded participation in the 100 Resilient Cities initiative, neither would have had an
Office of Resilience, and Norfolk’s best plan, according to this research, would have been its
comprehensive plan. It is almost a coincidence that Sandy inflicted New York with high winds
and intense flooding in 2012 meanwhile attention to adapting to these climatic events had been
ramping up. Thus it is unclear the extent to which the city would have invested in adaptation and
preparedness minus Sandy, but it is certain it would have been less without excess funding from
disaster recovery.
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Given typical sources of funding for adaptation planning in other cities and the details of Norfolk
and New York’s recent planning involvements, federal and state governments have sent a
message that their level of assistance is more dependent on the disaster experiences than present
and future vulnerability at the local level. Until state and federal government funnels more
resources into vulnerable coastal cities in the pre-disaster phases, jurisdictions like Norfolk with
limited budgets will only be able to make progress at their own bounded pace. If Sandy is any
indication of the next leap forward in state and federal adaptation initiatives, it will likely require
another large-scale event to impact a highly populated city. Norfolk and other cities that may not
have experienced a galvanizing event still benefitted from the collateral action incited by Sandy
that FEMA and HUD took to spread the wealth of ideas being generated. However, although it is
true that many of the initiatives that Norfolk and New York City were able to take advantage of
were in response to or inspired by the Sandy relief effort, they were intended to be replicable as
constantly updated renditions.
The overall performance of New York City’s collection of planning efforts does not warrant
much criticism especially given the extent of potentially transformative planning that occurred,
but among the abundance of funding and personnel at the city’s disposal, certain investments
could have been put to better use. The Resilient Neighborhoods initiative in particular was an
insightful concept, but did not always target the neediest neighborhoods or employ very
groundbreaking solutions to localized issues. As a whole, in fact, neighborhoods in the Bronx,
even some of the most underprivileged and vulnerable ones, were underrepresented in the set of
plans. This is another case of chasing the impacts of Sandy alone and not the actual vulnerability
to future events in addition. The Bronx, in light of its social vulnerability and exposure, largely
evaded some of the worst impacts. Again, because of Sandy, New York was far more effective at
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identifying actions in most of its vulnerable areas than was Norfolk. Since Norfolk’s
neighborhoods have at least managed through recent threats, it has of course not been as
compelled into action, but it is still not a justifiable reason to gloss over certain vulnerable areas
of the city. With all the progress made in its resilience strategy, comprehensive plan and the
NDRC application, Norfolk’s planners could have devoted more effort to addressing the
vulnerabilities present in the Lafayette River watershed and the eastern parts of Ocean View.
Where coordination of planning activity with communities of pressing vulnerability was an area
for improvement, operational coordination was the most prized asset in both cities. Planning
processes utilized effective coordination on multiple fronts – with different sectoral
representatives, scales of government and organization, and plans of seemingly divergent subject
matter. If the actions taken and proposed in the plans turn out to be overvalued or mismanaged,
at least there will have been diverse coalitions in place to ensure an all-inclusive plan of attack in
the future. Initiative efforts in Norfolk and New York, with some direction, paired community
organizations with municipal agencies and institutions of education with business leaders, whom
likely have never worked together before, in equivalent planning roles. The barriers to
cooperation and awareness among these dissimilar groups that were lowered is itself a
testimonial of progress.
There is still a drawback, however, to the structure of responsibility. The roles of planning and
implementation responsibility may have been distributed well amongst all stakeholder
representatives, but the public was still underrepresented in certain regards. The one common
miscue between Norfolk and New York’s plans is the inability to grant members of the public
enough authority over the future of their communities. In an era of adapting to and preparing for
a changing climate, it is not enough to inform and engage the public. It is now necessary to
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assign greater responsibility to hold decision-makers accountable and have meaningful influence
on processes in order to minimize existing vulnerability. This is accomplished, through citizen
advisory committees, and representation of citizen leaders on planning, implementation, and
oversight committees, or at least greater recognition. Plans like New York’s OneNYC 100
Resilient Cities report incorporated advisory boards into the planning structure to add some level
of accountability but these were comprised of organizational leaders as opposed to community
leaders.
Research released since 2012 has converged on the prescription of preparedness, adaptability and
community resilience prior to the onslaught of a disaster. Norfolk and New York City may have
met these recommendations to varying degrees but rarely in conjunction and never in all
vulnerable areas or in the pre-disaster phase. Sandy to no surprise has been the greatest impetus
for New York City and the greatest indirect influence in Norfolk. The 100 Resilient Cities
initiative may have also been inspired by the Sandy relief effort, but regardless, it was actually a
promising proactive formula to combat local threats like inequality and sea-level rise. The next
wave of multi-jurisdiction initiatives should combine the intercommunal and pre-disaster focus
of the 100 Resilient Cities initiative with the blueprint of the National Disaster Resilience
Competition. Rather than correcting faults in neighborhoods that have been splintered by climate
events, efforts should monitor the system of factors at play and resolve weaknesses as they
transpire before they have the chance to materialize as impacts. This approach might seem overly
resource-intensive, but in actuality it is reserving resources for optimal use. Instead of wasting
precious resources on marginally impactful solutions, it is channeling them into their most
productive outlets.
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Now that the effectiveness of initiatives like the 100 Resilient Cities and National Disaster
Resilience Competition approaches have been graded in areas they intended to thrive in, it will
depend on the operationalization of their proposed actions and the growth in successive
initiatives for increasingly positive outcomes in the future.
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Plan Coding Protocol
Table 19. Plan Coding Protocol

I. Identification and Vision
1.1 Identification
1.1.1
1.1.2

Data

Evaluator
Date of Evaluation

1.2 Vision

Score

Page #

Comments

1.2.1
1.2.2

Overall vision or mission statement
Increase resilience/reduce vulnerability

Stated vision of an ideal outcome of the plan or future plans

1.2.3

Promote sustainability

Stability, resilience, thriving over long-term; sustained for future
generations, minimal impact, etc.

1.2.4

Foster equity and cohesion

1.2.5

Approach/response defined

Equal opportunity for all, especially low-income; social
connectedness; minimized risk, regardless of status
Identification of how strategy is original; what influences strategies
and actions, ties together (e.g. hazard mitigation, risk reduction, etc.)

Mentions vision for a place that is resilient, able to bounce back,
withstand, emerge from threats etc.

2. Goals
2.1 General
2.1.1

Objectives linked to goals

2.1.2
2.1.3

Clearly articulated
Neighborhood specific goals

Score

Page #

Comments
Connection, similarities, commonalities between objectives in
individual sections and goals of entire plan
Understandable, straightforward depiction of what is to be achieved
More detailed goals that correspond with specific
neighborhoods/districts

2.2 Coordination
2.2.1

Increase information

2.2.2

Continuously collect information

2.2.3

Internal coordination

To spread current knowledge and information and expand, as a part
of goals
As circumstances change, remain up to date to perform assessments,
not to cease collecting information; part of goals
Acknowledges need to maintain a cohesive package or elements
within so that everything works together and remains coordinated

2.3 Equity and Social Cohesion
2.3.1

Connect with socioeconomic factors

2.3.2

Prioritize least advantaged and most
vulnerable

2.3.3

More equitable distribution of services
and facilities

2.3.4

Beautifying neighborhoods, and
promoting diversity and connectedness

Goals to be consistently aware of and revisit socioeconomic factors
to meet other goals for equity in the planning process
Serving needs of individuals and households, further emphasis on
those that have been traditionally underserved and marginalized, on
top of being vulnerable
Goal to redistribute essential facilities and services for highest need
and greatest return
Goal to remove blight and better the appearance of declining and
vulnerable neighborhoods, while enhancing diversity and making
them whole socially and physically

2.4 Restoration
2.4.1

Resumption and build back better

Goal to restore housing and structural conditions following a disaster
to a more improved state of safety, protection and function; return
local economy into full working order
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2.4.2

Replace/repair development

2.4.3

Regenerative design

Goal to completely restore communities and repair new deficiencies
as swiftly and appropriately as possible rather than piecemeal
Goal to adopt design practices that behave restoratively in face of
hazards and disasters

2.5 Adaptation & Anticipation
2.5.1

Account for all scenarios/multiple
visions

2.5.2

Flexible to change and learn from
change

2.5.3

Smart growth

2.5.4

Collaboration

Goal to be aware of extreme scenarios of unseen caliber no matter
the unlikelihood, to ensure that no scenario will breach the capability
of the plan; account for different visions rather than single
Goal to observe and assess changing conditions from a multitude of
factors and to adjust accordingly rather than retain a rigid
perspective
Goal to adopt smart growth practices or those that enhance the lives
of people and the environment all the while allowing for inevitable
growth
Goal to include as many people and resources and as many minds to
solve a problem and to bridge off of others ideas and existing
resources

2.6 Minimal Impacts
2.6.1

Minimize fiscal impacts

2.6.2

Maintain and enhance public safety

2.6.3

Minimize damage to private and public
property

Goal to adopt practices that increase the probability of lesser
economic damages prior to the onset of a disaster and management
during with the same positive result
Goal to adopt practices that maintain the safety and protect the lives
of people in the path of hazards and storms
Goal to adopt practices that increase the probability that private and
public property will endure lesser damage from hazards and storms

2.7 Sustainability
2.7.1

Ensure continuity

2.7.2

Promote resilience for future
generations

Goal to adopt protocol and practices so that a gap in the continuation
of the planning process or all other related processes does not occur
Goal to not only cultivate a thriving culture around unpredictable
scenarios for the current generation but for future generations as well
– think forward in addition to present

3. Fact Base
3.1 Existing Conditions
3.1.1

Geographic extent

3.1.2

Demographics and economic
characteristics

3.1.3

Land Use and development trends

Score

Page #

Comments
Conveys and acknowledges the planning area and all populations
included in the extent
Illustrates and assesses general demographics and economic
characteristics of the planning area absent of the vulnerability
assessment itself
Demonstrates an assessment and understanding of the characteristics
of land use and patterns of development

3.2 Vulnerability Assessment
3.2.1
3.2.2

3.2.3

Identify socially and physically
vulnerable populations
Inventory and map socially and
physically vulnerable populations

Distinguishes social and physical characteristics of vulnerability
from general or combined vulnerability
Maps depicting areas of certain types of social vulnerability, critical
facilities & infrastructure, floodplains, building density,
housing/building conditions; layered data for mapped index of social
and physical vulnerability
Describes source of information for social and physical vulnerability
assessment being local knowledge from members of the community

Local knowledge included in social and
physical vulnerability
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4. Strategies/Actions
4.1 Awareness/Knowledge
4.1.1

Continuously collected data, and
assessment tools

4.1.2

Public warning systems or
communication plan

4.1.3

Community educational awareness

4.1.4

Advertisement and preemptive
warning

Score

Page #

Comments
Description of information collection, archival and use, of flexibility
to shifting demands, and of health and safety information collection,
archival and use; tools relied on to increase data/info collection
Detailed description of specific policies and actions to warn and
inform low-income, isolated and other socially vulnerable
populations of eminent danger, evacuation and in-place protection
Description of an outreach effort to improve disaster risk awareness
and education; inform preparedness measures, for the low-income
E.g. insurance advertising and marketing to low-income, hazards and
risk signage in vulnerable areas, real estate hazard disclosure

4.2 Coordination
4.2.1

Horizontal

4.2.2

Internal

4.2.3

Vertical

Coordinates with policies, programs and responsibilities managed
and operated under other agencies or departments, and with
policies/programs from comprehensive plan or other relevant
jurisdictional plans
Informed by assessments conducted for plan, specifically
vulnerability assessment
Coordinates with policies, programs and funds from higher level like
state and federal or lower level

4.3 Smart Growth & Development
4.3.1

Increasing development density and
population density

4.3.2

Affordable housing

4.3.3

Preventative development

E.g. density bonuses, cluster development, changes in land use
density, density transfer provisions, transit-oriented development,
infill development
E.g. tax abatements, affordable housing set asides, mixed use/mixed
income development, housing rehabilitation/revitalization
E.g. damage thresholds for change in building code standards,
building acquisition and relocation, floodplain management
regulations, freeboard requirements (requirements beyond standard
NFIP)

4.4 Preparedness & Response
4.4.1

Evacuation and re-entry

4.4.2

Sheltering including public shelters and
sheltering in-place

4.4.3

Emergency services and resources
distribution

4.4.4

Mass search and rescue operations

Jurisdiction responsible for directing pre-event evacuation of
susceptible populations plan and/or procedures without understating
the importance of evacuation; protocol for smooth return re-entry;
safety provisions for evacuees
Facilities set-up or centers designated for emergency shelters before,
during, and after an event, with excess capacity for the most extreme
scenarios
Food, water and other supplies distribution to targeted and most atrisk populations including responsible agency, plans and/or
procedures; expanded and tailored medical services under critical
scenarios; volunteer management
Plan and/or procedures and resources to seek out and rescue those
suffering from the impacts of a disaster, may have not heeded
warnings, or that warnings may have not reached

4.5 Structural & Infrastructural Controls
4.5.1

Structural reinforcement

Reinforcement of housing and businesses while taking advantage of
modern practices; weatherizing low-income housing
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4.5.2

Telecommunications infrastructure

Improve telecommunications infrastructure in low-income
communities, particularly where there is a high concentration of nonEnglish-speaking residents

4.5.3

Policies and programs to reduce stress
on public infrastructure and electric
grid

Investments and incentives for renewable energy and energy
efficiency in buildings, especially low-income housing and
community organizations and businesses

4.6 Design Tools
4.6.1

Reusable and adaptable post-disaster
buildings

4.6.2

Design for increased social interaction

Description of materials used to mention reusable materials to cut
down on cost; reusable, flexible buildings or modular components
that are modifiable and adaptable in terms of spatiality and scale, and
replicable housing (for semi-permanent or permanent low-income
housing and critical facilities)
Describes techniques and tools employed to specifically enhance
social opportunities and interactions among low-income and other
socially vulnerable groups

4.7 Recovery & Restoration
4.7.1

Relocation assistance - transitional or
interim housing, etc.

4.7.2

Ensuring post-disaster safety

4.7.3

Permanent housing

4.7.4

Restoration of local businesses

4.7.5

Correct or repair pre-disaster
deficiencies

Description of housing program for vulnerable and low-income
(whom contributed to the details of the program) where housing
provides more space and privacy than shelters, and enables families
to resume normal activity; reconnects families back to community;
community relocation; voluntary buyout programs
Debris removal - Plan for conducting emergency clean-up and
disposal of debris with a list of possible local contractors, actions to
protect low-income communities from disaster debris; Building
inspections including re-entry criteria
Place-based and citizen-desired options for permanent housing
recovery for a range of resident types (homeowner, renter, and
landlord) that ensures a seamless return to stable housing; connects
displaced individuals with resources and wealth of options
Plans and/or procedures for assisting or intervening to bring small
and minority businesses back into operation; administration of small
business resumption loans
Description of plans and responsibilities for assessing the
deficiencies in structures, programs, and policies etc., and
procedures for correcting them for future events

4.8 Households & Individuals
4.8.1

Disaster Unemployment assistance

4.8.2

Disaster supplemental nutrition
assistance

4.8.3

Flood insurance

4.8.4

Energy and water use efficiency
consultation

Plans to increase unemployment insurance and disaster
unemployment assistance and extend the benefit periods
Describes protecting SNAP to ensure the availability of Disaster
SNAP or D-SNAP for food assistance among low-income
households following disasters
Demonstrated effort to make flood insurance more affordable or with
fewer hurdles for lower income families
Pre-disaster planning to consult with and reach out to low-income
households to inform them of energy efficiency products and
retrofitting at a severely subsidized rate; products and habits for
decreasing water use

4.9 Community Assets & Services
4.9.1

Community preservation

Describes an emphasis on preserving the character, culture and
aesthetic of a community to maintain or even enhance its
connectedness and cohesion
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4.9.2

Backup services

4.9.3

Shared renewables

4.9.4

Quality of life & access to services

4.9.5

Blight removal

E.g. community backup heating/cooling in low-income and more
isolated neighborhoods, especially those with poorly performing
existing systems
Describes plans to transfer low-income communities under the
direction of cooperative and shared renewable energy sources to
minimize cost and set up an autonomous communal grid
E.g. increasing access to healthy food and public transportation,
enhancing pedestrian infrastructure and open space, social and other
public services, childcare, welfare
Compiles list of resources to improve the physical appearance of
notoriously underserved low-income neighborhoods; establishes
supplementary or new programs for blight removal in these areas

5. Inter-Organizational Coordination
5.1 Plan Integration
5.1.1

Coordination with standard/required
and other related plans

5.1.2

Coordination with housing, and
affordability/poverty reduction plans

E.g. land use, general, comprehensive plan; emergency
management/operations; climate change plan; disaster recovery plan;
flood mitigation plan; sustainability plan; economic development
plan; transportation plan
Incorporates data and housing/affordability assessments that may
have been conducted and compiled for plans, identifies and builds on
strategies, and utilizes and/or expands on funding and
implementation from plans

5.2 Horizontal Coordination
5.2.1

Coordination with other jurisdictional
organizations & agencies

5.2.2

Coordination with nonprofit and
volunteer organizations

E.g. budget/revenue/finance agency; building dep’t/permit office;
emergency management office; planning/community development
agency; floodplain management office; parks/environmental agency;
contractors; public health/works; transportation agency; utilities
Description of nonprofit and/or volunteer organization that work
with/in low-income neighborhoods to coordinate with or that have
been connected with

6. Participation
6.1 Planning Process
6.1.1

Description of specific outreach and
participation to include socially and
physically vulnerable populations

Includes a narrative of participants, the roles they played in the
planning process, and the impact they had on the plan itself

6.1.2

Schedule of participation

Includes an outline of the dates for specific points or steps in the
participation and outreach process

6.2 Public Engagement Techniques
6.2.1

Citizen advisory committee with
community liaison

6.2.2

Focus groups

6.2.3

Public meetings/workshops

6.2.4

Practice emergency protocol

List of members and description of process to nominate or select
members of the public to spearhead community-based efforts and
represent voice of marginalized constituents; community liaison to
serve as mediator between citizens and organizations
Moderator-led discussions of topics in plan with intimate-sized
group of representatives
Description of outreach strategy and inclusion of various members
and groups demographically and geographically; periodic meetings
or workshops to reflect different stages in the planning process;
exploration of various options and ideas for the plan; informal or
formal event
Cites events specifically tailored to acting out protocol under an
extreme weather event, emphasis on vulnerable and low-income
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6.2.5

Volunteer opportunity

6.2.6

Information distribution

6.2.7

Public survey and targeted outreach

Promotion and offering of volunteer opportunities for all public with
incentives like time banking and community currency for additional
encouragement
Teaching and informative pamphlets/brochures, educational
videos/demonstrations; public notice – radio, television, smartphone
app, social media, website, in-person, paper; community bulletin
Mailed or distributed paper survey, online survey (email, website,
word of mouth); methods for reaching out to low-income –
overcoming barriers

6.3 Stakeholders/Persons Involved in
Process
6.3.1

Neighborhood groups and
civic/community based organizations

6.3.2

General public

6.3.3

Housing agency/authority

6.3.4

Social services/childcare/welfare

6.3.5

Nonprofit organization

Narrative of involvement, role, education and influence of
neighborhood groups, and civic-based organizations on plan and
process
Narrative of involvement, role, education and influence of lowincome/impoverished, minorities groups, elderly, youth, disabled
members of the public on plan and process
Narrative of involvement, role, education and influence of the local
housing agency/authority on plan and process
Narrative of involvement, role, education and influence of social
services, childcare and welfare providers on plan and process
Narrative of involvement, role, education and influence of nonprofit
organizations on plan and process

7. Implementation
7.1 Responsibilities of Organizations
7.1.1

Communications

7.1.2

Immediate responsibilities

7.1.3

Recovery responsibilities

Description of responsible organizations or positions, modes of
communication employed, and communication protocol for each
type of incident, with emphasis on extending reach out to lowincome populations
E.g. mass care, emergency assistance, housing and human services,
public health and medical services, public safety and security,
worker safety, warning
E.g. damage assessments, population protection, setting up programs
and prioritizing long term recovery, management of volunteers and
donations

7.2 Responsibilities of Individuals
7.2.1
7.2.2

Public officials and employees, and
consultants
Volunteers

7.2.3

Public participants

Detailed description and distribution of expert or trained individuals
to lead each task in response and recovery
Description of role, needs and sources of volunteers that have been
informed and consulted with ahead of time
Description of the influence and role committed members of the
public will have during planning, and/or response and recovery

7.3 Timeline
7.3.1

Detailed breakdown of actions/policies
by timeline

Some form of list, table, or graphic showing dates, months and/or
years when each action or policy by grouping is expected to be
implemented and the duration of its implementation; demonstrates
prioritization and hierarchy

7.4 Finances
7.4.1

Develop revenue sources

Detailed description of sources of funding that are and will be
available during crises, and sources of funding set aside specifically
in budget for response and recovery, and for each pre-event strategy;
creates innovative financing mechanisms
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8. Monitoring
8.1 Monitoring Implementation
8.1.1

Monitor performance of actions and
policies

8.1.2

Public monitor progress of meeting
their needs and able to

8.1.3

Identify new and continuous obstacles

8.1.4

Review stakeholder group membership

8.1.5

Ensure progress is clearly
communicated to public and
stakeholders

Description of plans and responsibilities for monitoring the efficacy
of implemented actions and policies; sets up easily understandable
measurement system to benchmark actions/policies
Allowing a space for low-income and other vulnerable groups to
hold policymakers and other decision-makers accountable to meeting
their desires; portion of engagement for empowering residents to act
on their democratic duty and informing them of this authority
Observes and analyzes obstacles to inclusion, vision, and success,
and/or concocts a strategy for overcoming these obstacles or if
necessary, declare obstacles unresolvable or permanent;
identification and acknowledgement of certain cultures and
relationships that challenge engagement and visioning
Persons responsible for overseeing the involvement of each
representative stakeholder and ensuring continuous involvement of
various types of stakeholders particularly those that are traditionally
excluded from the process like low-income groups
Accounts methods used for communicating results and the status of
implementation and successes associated with the plan, specifically
notes methods for communicating to marginalized low-income
groups

8.2 Self-Monitoring
8.2.1

Review biases and assumptions

8.2.2

Manage conflicts and resolve disputes

8.2.3

Assess community engagement and
reactions

8.2.4

Ensure accountability, transparency,
and equity in recovery process

Demonstrates an awareness to revisit the analysis of a problem and
identification of solutions that may have been influenced by biases
and assumptions among the planner and plan creator, continuing the
tradition of marginalization of low-income groups
Mediation for managing conflicts during the planning process, and in
the post-disaster phase, and to resolve disputes and clarify lines of
responsibility to ensure equal opportunity and voice, specifically
with the traditionally marginalized
Description of reactions of those involved and planned alongside
with and how reactions influenced plan; analysis of engagement of
public and low-income members of the community
Members of planning team hold each other accountable for success
of plan and implementation, as do members of the public; each step
and action taken in the disaster recovery process is clearly
communicated to all those affected and/or involved; maintains equal
opportunity for involvement and recovery

8.3 Updating Plan
8.3.1

8.3.2

Review economic and damage loss
assessments, and other changed
conditions
Update vulnerability assessments

8.3.3

Update goals and policies

8.3.4

Update organizational makeup and
responsibility

Analyzes and assesses or plans to, post-disaster damages and losses,
and other conditions in affected communities to include in future
versions or updates of the plan
Acknowledges changing, or the potential for, community conditions
economically and environmentally that warrant revisiting of
vulnerability assessments, with plans to update them
Reveals goals and policies that have been altered or newly
removed/included from plan due to changing conditions or
unexpected conditions; intends to revisit goals and policies with
potential to alter or update them
Review post-plan and/or post-disaster situations and conditions to
ensure organizational flexibility to reorganize and reallocate
responsibilities, as it pertains to low-income communities
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Plan Evaluation Scores
Table 20. Detailed Plan Evaluation Scores for Norfolk, VA

2.1 General

2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3

ST
2.2 Coordination

2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3

ST
2.3 Equity &
Cohesion

2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.4

2. Goals

ST
2.4 Restoration

2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.3

ST
2.5 Adaptation/
Anticipation

2.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.5.4

ST
2.6 Minimal
Impacts

2.6.1
2.6.2
2.6.3

ST
2.7 Sustain

2.7.1
2.7.2

3. Fact Base

ST
Total
%
3.1 Existing
Conditions
ST
3.2 Vulnerability
Assessment

3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3

3.2.1

RE.Invest Haz Mit PlaNorfolk Resil. Strat. Rising Resil.
ThRIVe
1
2
2
2
0
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
0
1
1
2
1
4
4
5
5
4
5
0
1
1
2
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
4
2
4
4
4
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
2
0
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
1
2
1
2
0
1
3
6
3
6
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
3
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
5
6
4
4
2
2
0
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
5
6
2
4
3
4
0
1
1
2
0
2
1
0
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
4
2
3
15
20
20
31
22
29
34%
45%
45%
70%
50%
66%
1
2
2
2
2
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
6
5
6
6
6
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
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total avg
9 1.5
12 2.0
6 1.0
27 4.5
6 1.0
3 0.5
11 1.8
20 3.3
4 0.7
5 0.8
4 0.7
6 1.0
19 3.2
3 0.5
2 0.3
7 1.2
12 2.0
1 0.2
5 0.8
6 1.0
10 1.7
22 3.7
7 1.2
8 1.3
9 1.5
24 4.0
6 1.0
7 1.2
13 2.2
137 22.8
11
9
11
31
1
3

1.8
1.5
1.8
5.2
0.2
0.5

3.2.2
3.2.3
ST
Total
%

4.1 Awareness/
Knowledge

4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4

ST
4.2 Coordination

4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3

ST

4. Strategies/Actions

4.3 Smart
Growth/
Development

4.3.1
4.3.2
4.3.3

ST
4.4
Preparedness/
Response

4.4.1
4.4.2
4.4.3
4.4.4

ST
4.5 Structural

4.5.1
4.5.2
4.5.3

ST
4.6 Design

4.6.1
4.6.2

ST

4.7 Recovery &
Restoration

ST

4.7.1
4.7.2
4.7.3
4.7.4
4.7.5

0
0
0
2
17%
-1
2
0
1
0
2
1
1
1
3

1
1
3
9
75%

0
0
0
0
-1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
2
1
0
1

0
0
2
2
-1
1
0
1
0
1
2
0
1
3
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
-1

0
0
0
0
1
1

0
0
0
5
42%

2
1
2
2
7
2
1
2
5
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0
1
1
7
58%

1
1
1
1
4
2
0
2
4
1
2
2
2
7

2
2
2
1
7
2
2
2
6
1
2
2
2
7

1
1
0
0
2
2
1
2
5
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
5

0
1
2
1
4
2
2
1
5
0
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
6

0
0
0
6
50%
1
2
0
0
0
3
2
2
2
6
1
0
0
1
2

0
1
4
10
83%
1
2
1
2
1
7
2
2
2
6
1
2
2
2
7

0
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
3
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
1

1
1
1
1
4
2
1
1
4
0
2
2
0
1
1
1
1
4

1
3
8

0.2
0.5
1.3

1
11
5
8
5
30
11
8
11
30
4
6
6
9
25
-2
3
3
5
2
11
11
4
7
22
2
5
7
2
2
4
3
2
5
18
0

0.2
1.8
0.8
1.3
0.8
5.0
1.8
1.3
1.8
5.0
0.7
1.0
1.0
1.5
4.2
-0.3
0.5
0.5
0.8
0.3
1.8
1.8
0.7
1.2
3.7
0.3
0.8
1.2
0.3
0.3
0.7
0.5
0.3
0.8
3.0
0.0

4.8 Households/
Individuals

4.8.1
4.8.2
4.8.3
4.8.4

ST

5. InterOrganizational
Coordination

4.9 Community
Assets/ Services

4.9.1
4.9.2
4.9.3
4.9.4
4.9.5

ST
Total
%
5.1 Plan
Integration

5.1.1
5.1.2

ST
5.2 Horizontal
Coordination

5.2.1
5.2.2

ST
Total
%
6.1 Planning
Process

6.1.1
6.1.2

6. Participation

ST

6.2 Public
Engagement
Techniques

6.2.1
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.2.4
6.2.5
6.2.6
6.2.7

ST

6.3
Stakeholders/
Persons Involved

6.3.1
6.3.2
6.3.3
6.3.4
6.3.5

0
0
2
1
2
-1
1
0
0
0
1
1
11
17%
0
0
0
2
1
3
3
38%
-1
0
1
0
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
0
2
-1
0
1
0
0
1

0
0
2
0
2

0
0
1
2
3
1
2
0
1
2
2
8
39
59%
2
2
4
2
2
4
8
100%

0
1
0
0
0
1
22
33%
2
0
2
2
0
2
4
50%
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
5
1
1
0
0
1
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0
0
1
0
1
-1
1
0
0
2
1
3
41
62%
2
2
4
2
2
4
8
100%

1
0
1

2
1
3

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
7
1
2
1
2
1
1

1
2
2
0
1
2
1
9
1
2
1
1
1
1

0
0
1
0
2
1
2
0
0
1
0
4
23
35%
1
0
1
2
1
3
4
50%
0
0
0
1
1
2
2
0
0
0
1
7
1
2
1
2
0
0

0
0
1
1
2
1
2
0
0
2
2
7
43
65%
2
2
4
2
1
3
7
88%
2
1
3
1
2
2
0
0
2
1
8
2
1
2
0
1

0
0
8
4
12
1
8
1
1
7
6
24

0.0
0.0
1.3
0.7
2.0
0.2
1.3
0.2
0.2
1.2
1.0
4.0

9
6
15
12
7
19

1.5
1.0
2.5
2.0
1.2
3.2

-1
5
4
8
1
4
8
9
1
4
6
5
38
2
9
6
7
2
5

-0.2
0.8
0.7
1.3
0.2
0.7
1.3
1.5
0.2
0.7
1.0
0.8
6.3
0.3
1.5
1.0
1.2
0.3
0.8

ST
Total
%
7.1
Organizational
Responsibility

7.1.1
7.1.2
7.1.3

7. Implementation

ST
7.2 Individual
Responsibility
ST
7.3 Timeline
ST
7.4 Finances
ST
Total
%

8.1 Monitoring
Implementation

7.2.1
7.2.2
7.2.3
7.3.1
7.4.1

8.1.1
8.1.2
8.1.3
8.1.4
8.1.5

8. Monitoring

ST

8.2 SelfMonitoring

8.2.1
8.2.2
8.2.3
8.2.4

ST
8.3 Updating
Plan

General
Specific

ST
Total
%
GT
GT

Combined

Total Score

8.3.1
8.3.2
8.3.3
8.3.4

1
3
11%
0
0
0
0
-1
0
0
1
0
0
0
2
2
2
13%
-1
1
1
0
0
0
1

3
9
32%
0
0
0
0

8
16
57%
1
1
0
2

7
19
68%
1
0
0
1

1
0
1
2
2
2
2
2
6
38%

2
0
1
3
2
2
0
0
7
44%

2
1
2
0
1
6

2
1
1
1
1
6

1
1
1
3
2
2
2
2
8
50%
1
2
2
1
0
1
7

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
4%
28
9

0
0
1
0
1
2
1
2
1
6
13
50%
48
35

0
0
1
0
1
1
0
2
0
3
10
38%
50
55

1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
2
10
38%
65
59

13.8587

6
13
46%
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
2
1
1
1
1
4
25%
1
0
1
1
0
1
4
1
0
0
2
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
7
27%
44
35

6
17
61%
1
1
0
2
2
0
1
3
1
1
2
2
8
50%
1
2
1
0
0
1
5

31

5.2

3
2
0
5
0
6
1
6
13
8
8
9
9
35

0.5
0.3
0.0
0.8
0.0
1.0
0.2
1.0
2.2
1.3
1.3
1.5
1.5

2
9
7
5
1
5
29
1
1
0
5
1
8
5
1
5
1
12

0.3
1.5
1.2
0.8
0.2
0.8
4.8
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.8
0.2
1.3
0.8
0.2
0.8
0.2
2.0

0
0
1
1
2
1
0
0
0
1
8
31%
60 49.167
62
42.5

37.349 51.781401 58.6352657 36.26207729 59.3599 42.874
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Table 21. Detailed Plan Evaluation Scores for New York City

2.1 General

2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3

ST
2.2
Coordination

2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3

ST
2.3 Equity &
Cohesion

2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.4

2. Goals

ST
2.4 Restoration

2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.3

ST
2.5 Adaptation/
Anticipation

2.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.5.4

ST
2.6 Minimal
Impacts

2.6.1
2.6.2
2.6.3

ST
2.7 Sustain

2.7.1
2.7.2

3. Fact Base

ST
Total
%
3.1 Existing
Conditions

3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3

ST
3.2
Vulnerability
Assessment

3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3

NDRC P&C Edgewater Haz Mit
One NYC PlaNYC
BIG U RbD total avg
2
2
2
2
2
2
12
2.0
1
2
2
2
2
1
10
1.7
2
2
0
0
0
1
5
0.8
5
6
4
4
4
4
27
4.5
1
2
2
1
1
0
7
1.2
0
0
2
1
1
1
5
0.8
2
0
2
0
0
1
5
0.8
3
2
6
2
2
2
17
2.8
1
0
0
1
0
0
2
0.3
2
0
1
0
0
1
4
0.7
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0.5
2
1
0
2
0
1
6
1.0
6
1
1
5
0
2
15
2.5
1
0
1
0
2
2
6
1.0
1
0
1
0
2
2
6
1.0
2
0
1
1
1
1
6
1.0
4
0
3
1
5
5
18
3.0
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
0.3
0
1
0
1
1
1
4
0.7
2
1
1
0
0
1
5
0.8
2
1
2
0
0
2
7
1.2
4
3
3
2
2
4
18
3.0
1
2
2
2
1
0
8
1.3
2
0
2
2
1
0
7
1.2
2
2
2
1
2
1
10
1.7
5
4
6
5
4
1
25
4.2
2
2
2
2
1
0
9
1.5
1
0
2
1
2
2
8
1.3
3
2
4
3
3
2
17
2.8
30
18
27
22
20
20
137 22.8
68%
41%
61%
50%
45%
45%
2
2
2
1
2
2
11
1.8
2
1
2
2
2
2
11
1.8
2
2
2
2
2
2
12
2.0
6
5
6
5
6
6
34
5.7
1
-1
1
1
1
3
0.5
1
1
2
1
1
2
8
1.3
0
0
2
0
1
1
4
0.7
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
0.3
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ST
Total
%

4.1 Awareness/
Knowledge

3
9
75%
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4

ST
4.2
Coordination

4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3

ST
4.3 Smart
Growth/
Development

4.3.1
4.3.2
4.3.3

4. Strategies/Actions

ST
4.4
Preparedness/
Response

4.4.1
4.4.2
4.4.3
4.4.4

ST
4.5 Structural

4.5.1
4.5.2
4.5.3

ST
4.6 Design

4.6.1
4.6.2

ST

4.7 Recovery &
Restoration

4.7.1
4.7.2
4.7.3
4.7.4
4.7.5

ST
4.8
Households/
Individuals

4.8.1
4.8.2

2
2
2
0
6
2
2
2
6
1
1
2
2
6
1
1
2
2
0
6
2
2
2
6
1
2
3
1
1
1
0
1
2
6
1
0
0

2
7
58%

0
1
0
0
1
2

2
2
2
1
7
2
2
2
6
1
1
1
2
5
-1
2
2
2
1
6
2
2
2
6
2
2
4
1
2
1
2
2
2
10

2
7
58%
1
2
2
2
1
8
2
2
2
6
1
2
2
2
7
1
1
2
2
0
6
2
2
2
6
1
2
3
1
1
2
1
1
1
7

3
9
75%
1
2
2
1
2
8
2
1
2
5
1
1
1
2
5
1
0
1
2
0
4
2
2
2
6
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
8

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
0
2
1
4
2
2
2
6
2
1
2
5
1
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
1
0
1
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3
9
75%

4
10
83%
1
2
0
1
2
6
2
2
2
6
1
0
2
0
3
1
0
0
0
1
2
0
1
3
0
2
2
1
1
0
0
0
1
3
1
0
0

17

2.8

3
11
8
10
7
39
12
11
12
35
5
7
9
10
31
2
6
7
8
1
24
12
8
9
29
6
9
15
5
6
6
4
6
9
36
2
0
0

0.5
1.8
1.3
1.7
1.2
6.5
2.0
1.8
2.0
5.8
0.8
1.2
1.5
1.7
5.2
0.3
1.0
1.2
1.3
0.2
4.0
2.0
1.3
1.5
4.8
1.0
1.5
2.5
0.8
1.0
1.0
0.7
1.0
1.5
6.0
0.3
0.0
0.0

4.8.3
4.8.4
ST

5. InterOrganizational
Coordination

4.9 Community
Assets/Services

4.9.1
4.9.2
4.9.3
4.9.4
4.9.5

ST
Total
%
5.1 Plan
Integration

5.1.1
5.1.2

ST
5.2 Horizontal
Coordination

5.2.1
5.2.2

ST
Total
%
6.1 Planning
Process

6.1.1
6.1.2

6. Participation

ST

6.2 Public
Engagement
Techniques

6.2.1
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.2.4
6.2.5
6.2.6
6.2.7

ST
6.3
Stakeholders/
Persons
Involved
ST
Total

6.3.1
6.3.2
6.3.3
6.3.4
6.3.5

2
2
5
1
2
2
1
2
0
8
52
79%
2
2
4
2
0
2
6
75%
1
2
1
4
1
1
2
2
0
0
2
2
10
1
2
2
2
0
1
8
22

2
0
2

2
1
3

2
0
0
1
0
3
26
39%
2
0
2
2
1
3
5
63%

1
2
2
2
1
8
55
83%
2
1
3
2
2
4
7
88%

1
2
3
1
2
2
0
0
1
0
6

2
2
4
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
13

2
1
0
0
1
4
13

2
1
2
2
2
9
26
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2
2
4
1
2
1
2
2
2
10
57
86%
2
2
4
2
2
4
8
100%
1
2
0
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
9
1
2
2
2
2
1
10
22

2
1
3
1
1
2
2
2
2
10
51
77%
1
0
1
2
2
4
5
63%
1
2
2
5
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
0
11
1
2
1
2
0
2
8
24

1
0
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
9
35
53%
2
1
3
2
2
4
7
88%
1
2
2
5
1
1
2
2
1
0
1
2
10
1
2
2
2
0
2
9
24

11
6
19
4
10
8
8
11
7
48

1.8
1.0
3.2
0.7
1.7
1.3
1.3
1.8
1.2
8.0

11
6
17
12
9
21

1.8
1.0
2.8
2.0
1.5
3.5

4
11
9
24
4
7
11
10
5
4
10
8
59
4
12
9
10
4
9
48

0.7
1.8
1.5
4.0
0.7
1.2
1.8
1.7
0.8
0.7
1.7
1.3
9.8
0.7
2.0
1.5
1.7
0.7
1.5
8.0

%
7.1
Organizational
Responsibility

7.1.1
7.1.2
7.1.3

7. Implementation

ST
7.2 Individual
Responsibility
ST
7.3 Timeline
ST
7.4 Finances
ST
Total
%

7.2.1
7.2.2
7.2.3
7.3.1
7.4.1

8. Monitoring

8.1.1
8.1 Monitoring 8.1.2
Implementation 8.1.3
8.1.4
8.1.5
ST

8.2 SelfMonitoring

8.2.1
8.2.2
8.2.3
8.2.4

ST
8.3 Updating
Plan

General
Specific

ST
Total
%
GT
GT

Combined

Total Score

8.3.1
8.3.2
8.3.3
8.3.4

79%
0
0
2
2

46%
0
1
0
1

93%
2
2
2
6

1
0
1
2
1
1
2
2
7
44%
1
2
1
0
0
2
6

1
0
1
2
0
0
1
1
4
25%
0
1
0
0
2
3

2
2
1
5
2
2
2
2
15
94%
-1
2
1
1
0
2
5

0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
8
31%
63
71

0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
4
15%
39
38

0
0
2
1
3
2
1
2
0
5
13
50%
71
81

66.425121

36.986715
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79%
2
2
0
4
1
2
1
2
6
0
0
2
2
12
75%
2
1
1
0
1
5

86%
1
2
2
5
1
2
2
1
6
1
1
2
2
14
88%
1
2
0
1
0
1
5

0
0
2
1
3
0
0
0
0
0
8
31%
56
80

0
0
2
0
2
1
0
0
0
1
8
31%
53
78

75.5435 70.77295

86%
0
5
0
7
0
6
0
18
1
3
2
10
1
6
1
7
5
26
2
6
2
6
2
11
2
11
9
61
56%
1
2
2
10
1
5
1
4
1
1
1
9
7
31
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
10
0
2
3
13
2
6
0
1
1
3
1
1
4
11
14
54%
52 55.67
67 69.17

68.5688 60.658213 63.16

0.8
1.2
1.0
3.0
0.5
1.7
1.0
1.2
4.3
1.0
1.0
1.8
1.8

0.3
1.7
0.8
0.7
0.2
1.5
5.2
0.2
0.0
0.0
1.7
0.3
2.2
1.0
0.2
0.5
0.2
1.8

Cottage
Road Park
High Vuln.
Low Vuln.
Total

Ballentine
Place
Ingleside
1
1

Crown
Point
1

Industrial
Park
1

Fort
Norfolk
3

2
5
-3

245
1
1

1

1
1
-1

Selfmonit.

Monit.
implem.

1
1
-1

Selfmonit.

Monit.
implem.

SH/
Persons
involved

Public
eng.

Comm.
assets &
services
Planning
process

HH &
indiv.

Recov. &
rest.

Prep. &
resp.

Smart
growth &
dev.

Aware./
Knowl.

Vuln.
Assess.

Respon.

1
1
-1

Respon.

1
1
-1

SH/
Persons
involved

1
1
-1

Public
eng.

1
1
-1

Planning
process

1
1
-1

Comm.
assets &
services

1
1
-1

HH &
indiv.

Recov. &
rest.

1
1
-1

Prep. &
resp.

Smart
growth &
dev.

The Hague
Downtown
Arts
District
Low Vuln.
Total

Aware./
Knowl.

Vuln.
Assess.

Spatial Coding Scores

Norfolk:

Table 22. RE.invest Report Spatial Coding Scores

Table 23. Southside Hazard Mitigation Plan Spatial Coding Scores

Broad
Creek
(area)

1

Moton
(Robert's)

1

Grandy
Village

1

South
Brambleton
Broad
Creek

Spartan
Village

1

Central
Hampton
Blvd

1

5

1

1

1
1

1
3

East Little
Creek Rd

3

3

East Ocean
View

4

2

3

2
2
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2

Selfmonit.

Monit.
implem.

Respon.

SH/
Persons
involved

2

1

Fairmount
Park
Fort
Norfolk

Public
eng.

1

Douglas
(Bruce's)
Park

Colonial
PlaceRiverview
Cottage
Line
Downtown

Planning
process

Comm.
assets &
services

HH &
indiv.

Recov. &
rest.

Prep. &
resp.

Smart
growth &
dev.

Aware./
Knowl.

Vuln.
Assess.

Table 24. PlaNorfolk 2030 Spatial Coding Scores

Ghent
Norview

1
1

1

Wards
Corner
Huntersville

3

Mid-Town
Industrial

1

Military
Highway

2

MonticelloGranby
Park Place
St. Paul's
Southside

1
2
4
2

West Ocean
View
High Vuln.
Low Vuln.
Total

1
2

1

2
5
2

1

23
8
15

1
22
10
12

1
1

2
2

Chesterfield
Heights
Lafayette
River
Downtown
Park Place

1
1
2

1

1

1

Sentara
Norfolk

1
1
1
2
-2

1
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2
2
0

1
1

0

1

Selfmonit.

Monit.
implem.

Respon.

1

Wards
Corner

Sentara
Leigh
High Vuln.
Low Vuln.
Total

SH/
Persons
involved

Public
eng.

Planning
process

Comm.
assets &
services

HH &
indiv.

Recov. &
rest.

Prep. &
resp.

Smart
growth &
dev.

Aware./
Knowl.

Vuln.
Assess.

Table 25. Norfolk Resilience Strategy Spatial Coding Scores

Monit.
implem.

Selfmonit.

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

Monit.
implem.

Selfmonit.

SH/
Persons
involved
2
2
1

Respon.

2
2
1

Respon.

1
1
1

Public
eng.

1
1
1

Planning
process

1
1
1

Comm.
assets &
services

Prep. &
resp.

Smart
growth &
dev.
1
1
1

HH &
indiv.

1
1
1

Recov. &
rest.

Chesterfield
Heights
High Vuln.
Total

Aware./
Knowl.

Vuln.
Assess.

Table 26. Tidewater Rising Resiliency Challenge Spatial Coding Scores

SH/
Persons
involved

Public
eng.

Planning
process

Comm.
assets &
services

HH &
indiv.

Recov. &
rest.

Prep. &
resp.

Smart
growth &
dev.

Aware./
Knowl.

Vuln.
Assess.

Table 27. ThRIVe NDRC Phase 2 Application Spatial Coding Scores

Haven
Creek

1

Knitting
Mill Creek
Colley Bay

1
1

Willoughby
Spit
St. Paul's

1

1

1
2

1

Tidewater
Gardens

1

1

2

1

South
Brambleton
Harbor Park

1
1

1

2
2

1
1

2
1

1

Chesterfield
Heights
ODU

1
1

Norfolk
State

1

Tidewater
CC

1

Grandy
Village
High Vuln.
Low Vuln.
Total

5
5

2
1
1

1
1
4

13
2
11

4
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5
5

New York City:

Stuyvesant
Town
East
Village
Lower East
Side

2

2

2

Two
Bridges

1
1

Financial
District
Battery
Park

1

1

2

1

1

2
3

9

1

4

2

3

1

4

2

1

2

2

1

3

2

1

1

Battery
Park City
Chinatown
Low Vuln.
High Vuln.
Total

1
1
6
8
2

1
1

1
1
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5
15
10

2
2

Selfmonit.

1

West
Village
Tribeca

2
2

Monit.
implem.

2

1
1

3
3

1

2

Hell's
Kitchen
Chelsea

1
2
1

Respon.

1

1
3

SH/
Persons
involved

Public
eng.

Planning
process

Comm.
assets &
services

HH &
indiv.

Recov. &
rest.

Prep. &
resp.

Smart
growth &
dev.

Aware./
Knowl.

Vuln.
Assess.

Table 28. BIG “U” Rebuild by Design Report Spatial Coding Scores

10
10

2
2

2
4
2

7
7

Belmont
Brooklyn
Heights
Civic Center
Kew Gardens
St. George
Coney Island
Rockaway
Beach
South Shore
Howard
Beach
Breezy Point
Midland
Beach
Rikers Island

1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1

3
2
-1

1
0

3
3

-1

1
1
0

2
2

250

1

3
2
-1

Selfmonit.

Monit.
implem.

Respon.

1

Governor's
Island
Arverne East
Kips Bay
Greenpoint
Williamsburg
Hunters
Point
East Harlem
Randall
Manor
Low Vuln.
High Vuln.
Total

SH/
Persons
involved

Public
eng.

Planning
process

Comm.
assets &
services

HH &
indiv.

Recov. &
rest.

Prep. &
resp.

Smart
growth &
dev.

Aware./
Knowl.

Vuln.
Assess.

Table 29. New York City Hazard Mitigation Plan Spatial Coding Scores

Monit.
implem.

1

1

1

2

Oakwood
Beach
Seaside

1
1

1
2

3
2

3

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1

Rockaway
Beach
Arverne
Edgemere
Two Bridges
Kips Bay
Red Hook
Greenpoint

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
2
1
2
1
2
2

1
1
1
1
1
2
1

1
1
1
1
1
2
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

Long Island
City

1

1
1

1

3

1

2
1

4
2
2
5
2
6
4

4
5
3
1
3
3

1
1
1
1
1
2
1

4

1

1

1

1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
2
1
1
1

Woodhaven
Blvd
Marine Park
Canarsie
Navy Yard
Dumbo
Gowanus
Williamsburg

1
1
1
1

2
1
1
2

2
2
2
2

Newtown
Creek
Sunset Park
South Beach

1
1
1

1
1
2

2
2
5

Midland
Beach
New Dorp
Great Kills
Eltingville
Annadale
Prince's Bay

1
1
1
1
1
1

3
2
2
1
1
1

4
2
2
1
1
2

2

1
1
1
1
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1

Selfmonit.

Respon.

1

SH/
Persons
involved

Public
eng.

3

Comm.
assets &
services

7

Borough
Park
Bay Ridge

HH &
indiv.

2

Prep. &
resp.

1

Aware./
Knowl.

Rockaway
Park

Vuln.
Assess.

Planning
process

Recov. &
rest.

Smart
growth &
dev.

Table 30. PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York Spatial Coding Scores

Tottenville
Charleston
Stapleton
St. George

1

1

5

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
2

Howard
Beach

1

2

3

Hamilton
Beach

1

3

2

1

3

4

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
4

4
5
2
2
2
4

2
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
2
1
1

1
1
1

2
1
1

2
6

1
1
1
1
1
2

Brighton
Beach

1

1

4

1

1

1

1

Manhattan
Beach

1

1

2

1

1

1

Sheepshead
Bay

1

2

7

2

1

1

2

Gerritsen
Beach

1

3

3

1

1

1

1

Stuyvesant
Town

1

2

2

1

1

1

Lower East
Side

1

2

5

3

1

1

1

Lower
Manhattan

1

5

5

8

1

1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

2
5
4
3

1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
11
22
11

2
18
42
24

2
35
76
41

15
43
28

1
11
24
13

1
11
23
12

1
11
25
14

Broad
Channel
Far
Rockaway
Belle Harbor
Breezy Point
Sea Gate
Gravesend
Coney Island

Battery Park
City
Tribeca
West Village
Chelsea
Hudson
Yards
Low Vuln.
High Vuln.
Total

1

2
2

1

3
3

1

252

1
2

1

2

3
5
2

8
14
6

West Farms

1

1

2

Crotona Park
East
Longwood
Soundview
Hunts Point

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

3
4
4
4

Long Island
City
Flatlands
East
Midtown
Jerome Ave
Fort Greene
Canarsie

1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1

1

Bedford
Stuyvesant

1

Washington
Heights
Tremont
Coney Island
Kips Bay
East Harlem

3
1
3
1
3

1

1

1
1
1
2
1

1

1

1

3
2

1

Crown
Heights
North Shore
South Shore
Williamsburg
Greenpoint

1

2
2
2

1

2

1

Harlem
Gateway

1

Cromwell/
Jerome

1

253

1

Selfmonit.

Monit.
implem.

Respon.

SH/
Persons
involved

Public
eng.

1

2
1

East New
York
Jamaica

Roosevelt
Island

Planning
process

Comm.
assets &
services

HH &
indiv.

Recov. &
rest.

Prep. &
resp.

Smart
growth &
dev.

Aware./
Knowl.

Vuln.
Assess.

Table 31. OneNYC Spatial Coding Scores

Zarega
Ridgewood
Red Hook
Stapleton
Edgemere
Harding Park
Hudson
Yards
Seward Park
Hunters
Point
Averne
Willets Point
Melrose
Highland
Park
Dongan Hills
Chelsea
Gravesend

1
1
1
2
1

1

1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

Brooklyn
Heights

1

Rockaway
Beach
Brighton
Beach
Low Vuln.
High Vuln.
Total

1

2

1

1
1
5
4

3
11
8

4
4

5

7
7

5
43
38

1
1
0

1
1

1
5
4

1
1

8

254

1
0

1
0

1
0

Selfmonit.

Monit.
implem.

1
0

Respon.

1
0

SH/
Persons
involved

Public
eng.

1
0

Planning
process

1
0

Comm.
assets &
services

HH &
indiv.

1
0

Recov. &
rest.

1
0

Prep. &
resp.

1
0

Smart
growth &
dev.

Aware./
Knowl.

Edgewater
Park
Total

Vuln.
Assess.

Table 32. Edgewater Park Resilient Neighborhoods Report Spatial Coding Scores

5

2

2

2

1

Lower East
Side

1

2

1

1

2

7

2

2

2

1

Campos
Plaza
Riis 1 & 2

1
1

1
1

1
1

2
3

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

Wald
Houses

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

Lavanburg
Houses

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

Baruch
Addition

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

2
1

2
1

1

1
1

3
2

2
1

2
1

2
1

1
1

2

1

1

1

4

2

3

2

1

1
2

1
1

1

2
1

1
2

1
2

1
2

1

2

1

1

2

2

1

1

2
2
9
13
4

1
1
7
35
28

1
1
5
15
10

2
2
8
16
8

2
2
8
15
7

Cooperative
Village
LaGuardia
Two
Bridges
Smith
Houses
Civic Center
Financial
District
Battery
Park
Battery
Park City
Tribeca
Low Vuln.
High Vuln.
Total

2
13
11

1
3
2

2
2

1
12
11

255

1
10
9

Selfmonit.

2

Monit.
implem.

Public
eng.

1

Respon.

Planning
process

1

SH/
Persons
involved

HH &
indiv.

2

Comm.
assets &
services

Recov. &
rest.

1

Aware./
Knowl.

East Village

Vuln.
Assess.

Prep. &
resp.

Smart
growth &
dev.

Table 33. Lower Manhattan Protect & Connect NDRC Phase 2 Application Spatial Coding
Scores

9.2

Vulnerability Maps

Figure 11. Hazard Exposure in Norfolk, VA
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Figure 12. Physical Vulnerability in Norfolk, VA
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Figure 13. Social Vulnerability in Norfolk, VA
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Figure 14. Hazard Exposure in New York City
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Figure 15. Physical Vulnerability in New York City
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Figure 16. Social Vulnerability in New York City
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